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MULTIRACIAL MATRIX: THE ROLE OF RACE
IDEOLOGY IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS, A UNITED
STATES-LATIN AMERICA COMPARISON
Tanya Kateri Herndndezt
This Article examines the role of race ideology in the enforcement of
antidiscrimination laws. Professor Herndndez demonstrates the ways in
which the U.S. race ideology is slowly starting to resemble the race ideology of
much of Latin America. The evolving U.S. race ideology is a multiracial
matrix made up of four precepts: (1) racial mixture and diverse racial de-
mography will resolve racial problems; (2) fluid racial classification schemes
are an indicator of racial progress and the colorblind abolition of racial clas-
sfications an indicator of absolute racial harmony; (3) racism is solely a
phenomenon of aberrant racist individuals; and (4)focusing on race is itself
racist. Because the multiracial matrix parallels much Latin American race
discourse, Professor Herndndez conducts a comparative analysis between
U.S. and Latin American anti-discrimination law enforcement practices.
Professor Herndndez concludes that the new race ideology bolsters the mainte-
nance of race hierarchy in a racially diverse population. Consequently, an
uncritical embrace of the new race ideology will hinder the enforcement of
antidiscrimination laws in the United States. Professor Herndndez proposes
that a greater focus on racism as a global issue that treats race as a political
identity formation will assist in the recognition of the civil rights dangers of a
multiracial matrix.
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INTRODUCTION
Si vi6ramos realmente el universo, tal vez lo entendertamos.
1
-Jorge Luis Borges
The racial justice movement in the United States today has
reached an important turning point. While the formal mechanisms
for addressing racial inequality have long been in place, there is a
growing societal belief that it is no longer necessary for the govern-
ment to be proactively engaged in ensuring racial equality.2 A racial
hierarchy continues to exist3 alongside a deteriorated social commit-
ment to race-based programs.4 The early Civil Rights movement was
astonishingly successful at making the goal of racial equality a stated
national norm and catalyzing government programs designed to pro-
vide concrete access to jobs and education.5 However, the move-
1 JORGE Luis BORGES, EL LIBRO DE ARENA 44 (El Libro del Bolsillo Alianza Editorial,
3d ed. 1980) (1975) ("If we could see the universe as it really is, perhaps we could under-
stand it." (translation mine)).
2 See Richard Morin, Misperceptions Cloud Whites' View of Blacks, WASH. POST, July 11,
2001, atAl (describing a national survey in which White respondents "were far less likely to
view black problems as being serious, or to favor government action to correct persistent
social and economic disparities").
3 Id. (noting that government statistics show that racial disparities continue to exist
in employment, income, education, and access to health care).
4 See, e.g., STEPHEN STEINBERG, TURNING BACK: THE RETREAT FROM RACIAL JusTiCE IN
AMERICAN THOUGHT AND POLICY 168-75 (1995) (discussing growing criticism of affirmative
action programs).
5 See HOwARD WINANT, RACIAL CONDITIONS: POLITICS, THEORY, COMPARISONS 45
(1994) (observing that the formal equality components of the Civil Rights movement
found popular support for the enactment of legislation). Polls show that most U.S. re-
sidents have adopted the rhetoric of formal racial equality. See, e.g., IRWIN KATZ, STIGMIA: A
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 14-16 (1981); HoWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL Arrn-
TUDES IN AMERICA 71-138 (1985).
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ment's very success contributes to the notion that Blacks6 and other
persons of color no longer require legal assistance in accessing equal
opportunity.7 Furthermore, growing rates of immigration, intermar-
riage, and mixed-race children 8 are now routinely touted as both the
proof and the reason why race-conscious remedial programs are no
longer needed. 9 Indeed, the growing acceptance of race mixture and,
more particularly, multiracial racial identities, is viewed as completely
challenging the U.S. notion of race that was so implicitly central to the
early Civil Rights movement.1 0 Thus, the societal shift that the racial
justice movement must now address is not primarily the ways in which
the changes in racial demographics encompass a greater diversity of
cultural backgrounds," but more importantly how the public dis-
6 I capitalize the words "Black" and "White" when they refer to persons of those races
to denote the political meaning of race and the social significance of being Black or White
as something more than just skin color. Accord Victor F. Caldwell, Book Note, 96 COLUM.
L. REV. 1363, 1369 (1996) (reviewing CRIrCAL RACE THEOR. THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT (KimberlM Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995)) (contrasting the Critical
Race Theory historical view of race, which acknowledges past and continuing racial subor-
dination, with the formal view of race, which treats race as "'neutral, apolitical descrip-
tions, reflecting merely "skin color" or region of ancestral origin'" (quoting Neil Gotanda,
A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind", in CRITICAL RACE THEORY. THE KEY WRITINGS
THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT, supra, at 257, 257)). Although capitalizing White may be
interpreted as furthering the supremacy of Whiteness, capitalizing also serves the impor-
tant role of piercing the veil of transparency that cloaks Whiteness and its concomitant
privileges. Only when Whiteness becomes more generally perceived as a race-based privi-
lege will racial justice efforts have a meaningful opportunity to be effective. See generally
BarbaraJ. Flagg, "Was Blind, but Now I See: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of
Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993) (describing Whites' lack of consciousness
of Whiteness and the problem of "colorblindness").
7 Cf THOMAS SoWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? 109 (1984) (stating that
"[t]he battle for civil rights was fought and won-at great cost-many years ago").
8 See Eric Schmitt, For 7 Million People in Census, One Race Category Isn't Enough, N.Y.
TiMEs, Mar. 13, 2001, at Al.
9 See, e.g., RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY- CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE Ac-
TION 78 (1996) ("Today the majority of minorities are nonblack; many are recent immi-
grants. Not only have nonblack minorities diluted the benefits of affirmative action for
African Americans, they have in some instances used affirmative action to exclude
blacks.").
10 See WiNANr, supra note 5, at 157-58; see also Tanya Katern Herndndez, "Multiracial"
Discourse: Racial Classifications in an Era of Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REV. 97 (1998)
(critiquing the Multiracial Category Movement (MCM) and its advocacy of a multiracial
category on the 2010 U.S. Census). "Multiracial" is the term some interracial couples pre-
fer to use as a racial classification for their mixed-race children. Id. at 98-99.
11 Indeed, the U.S. Civil Rights movement consistently lobbied for social welfare poli-
cies that would benefit all poor people and not solely African Americans, despite its mis-
characterization-then and now-as formulating social policies only for African
Americans. See DONA COOPER HAMILTON & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, THE DuAL AGENDA:
RACE AND SOCIAL WELFARE POLICIES OF CIVIL RiGHTS ORGANIZATIONS 2-3 (1997). Further-
more, contrary to the popular perception that directly links the contemporary demo-
graphic increase of non-Black minorities to a shift in the racial scheme, the global racial
order was never simply a Black-White binary construct. See Roger Sanjek, The Enduring
Inequalities of Race Introduction to RACE 1, 10 (Steven Gregory & Roger Sanjek eds., 1994)
("The post-1400s global racial order has always extended beyond black and white in its
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course that uncritically attributes miraculous powers to those demo-
graphic changes contributes to a distinct racial ideology that may
influence the efficacy of antidiscrimination legal enforcement. I use
the term "race ideology" to refer to the discursive forces that over time
transform what officially and unofficially counts as race and the pre-
scribed parameters for self-defining or being defined as of a particular
race,1 2 as well as the limitations on what is defined as racism.' 3 As I
use the term in this Article, race ideology also encompasses the rheto-
ric that attributes value to particular kinds of race formation.
To be specific, the race ideology that predominated during the
time of the early Civil Rights movement was one which viewed racial
identity as static and Blackness as rigidly determined by the existence
of even one ancestor of African ancestry. 14 Today, there is a growing
scholarly acknowledgement that race is a socially constructed concept
and that African ancestry may not necessarily lead an individual either
to embrace a Black racial identity or to view race as socially salient.
15
The U.S. Census Bureau's decision to permit people to claim multiple
racial designations on the 2000 census is a striking example of the
evolving changes in U.S. race ideology.
16
But the current ideological evolution in the United States is not
entirely unique or unprecedented. Historically, the United States has
had geographic diversity with respect to the relative rigidity or fluidity
of approach to racial designation. For instance, both antebellum
ranked racist ordering, but these two terms have also always defined its poles. There is no
decentered mosaic." In fact, Sanjek notes, "[p]ersons of African ancestry have consistently
experienced extreme subjugation within the global racist order, even if its victims have
never been solely black." (citations omitted)).
12 For the analysis, I shall use Ian F. Haney L6pez's definition of race as "a vast group
of people loosely bound together by historically contingent, socially significant elements of
their morphology and/or ancestry." Ian F. Haney L6pez, The Social Construction of Race:
Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 7 (1994).
13 The connection between ideology and racism is clear insofar as:
An ideology is a set of principles and views that embodies the basic
interests of a particular social group. Typically, a broad ideology encom-
passes expressed attitudes and is constantly reflected in the talk and actions
of everyday life. One need not know or accept the entire ideology for it to
have an impact on thought or action. Thus, each person may participate
only in certain fragments of an ideology. Ideologies are usually created by
oppressors to cover what they do, and counterideologies are often devel-
oped by the oppressed in their struggle against domination.
JOE R. FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA 69 (2000).
14 See F. JAMES DAVIS, WHO Is BLACK? 4-6 (1991).
15 See Sanjek, supra note 11, at 1; see also Howard Winant, Racial Democracy and Racial
Identity: Comparing the United States and Brazil, in RACIAL POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY BRAZIL
98, 105 (Michael Hanchard ed., 1999) ("[T]he United States is now experiencing a totally
unprecedented racial situation, in which large-scale uncertainty exists as to the meaning of
race or the proper orientation of state racial policies.").
16 See Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and
Ethnicity, 62 Fed. Reg. 58,782, 58,788-90 (Oct. 30, 1997) [hereinafter OMB Revisions].
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South Carolina 17 and Louisiana'8 sometimes used the existence of Af-
rican ancestry to designate individuals as Mulatto, as opposed to
Black. 19 Similarly, in much of Latin America the process of racial des-
ignation for its sizeable population of African descent has been de-
picted as contextually contingent and varied.20 Yet each of the
aforementioned contexts shares the unfortunate trait of denigrating
Blackness and esteeming Whiteness.21 This commonality underscores
the importance of never presuming that a distinct race ideology indi-
cates a relinquishment of race-based privilege and hierarchy. A
deeper level of inquiry is needed.
In fact, the comparison of traditional U.S. race ideology with that
of Latin America can be very useful in exploring the general role of
race ideology in the development and enforcement of antidiscrimina-
tion laws. Rather than blindly presuming that increased acknowledg-
ment of race mixture and the socially constructed nature of race will
automatically result in a racially tolerant society, an examination of
another context such as Latin America, which shares the U.S. history
of chattel slavery but has long promoted its racial mixture as evidence
of a racially harmonious environment, 22 can provide a tangible mech-
anism for assessing the actual societal influence of this distinct racial
ideology. More specifically, an international comparison of civil rights
structures and their efficacy offers a concrete way to test the hypothe-
sis that race mixture equals race harmony and the transcendency of
race and that focusing on racial differences inculcates racism.23 I have
earlier referred to this colorblind-inspired hypothesis as "multiracial
17 See DAVIs, supra note 14, at 35-36 (describing antebellum South Carolina's societal
and judicial refusal to adopt an expansive definition of blackness that would encompass an
individual with any known African ancestry in favor of a more fluid racial classification
system that recognized Mulattos as racially and socially distinct).
18 SeeVIRGINIA R. DOMINGUEZ, WHITE BY DEFINITION: SOCIAL CLASSIFICATION IN CREOLE
LouISIANA 138-40 (1986) (detailing the separate social status of Mulattos in Louisiana).
19 But see Miriam Jim6nez Roman, Looking at That Middle Ground: Racial Mixing as
Panacea 6 (Nov. 2, 2001) (presented at "Race Mixture in the Americas" symposium, Ameri-
can University, Washington College of Law) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
("The states of the Lower South are frequently cited as anomalies to the one-drop rule but,
in fact, throughout the United States, there have been communities of people of known
mixed ancestry who have been rejected by Whites and have refused to be defined as Black,
people who in practice have constituted a 'third race.'").
20 See MARVIN HARRIS, PATTERNS OF RACE IN THE AMERICAS 54-64 (1964) (discussing
the particularities of a Latin American approach to racial classification).
21 See infra Part III.
22 See CARL N. DEGLER, NEITHER BLACK NOR WHITE: SLAVERY AND RACE RELATIONS IN
BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES (1971).
23 See, e.g., CARLOS MOORE, CASTRO, THE BLACKS, AND AFRICA 258-59 (1988) (discuss-




discourse."24 The comparison to Latin America and its multiracial dis-
course can thereby serve to inform the ways in which racial justice
activists in the United States might begin to respond to the societal
changes with greater efficacy in ameliorating racial inequality rather
than becoming ensnared in a multiracial matrix.
I use the term "multiracial matrix" to refer to the ways in which
the many layers of multiracial discourse can form a matrix. The ma-
trix serves the hegemonic function of dictating what is reality and
thereby convincing all those harmed by its construction of reality that
their experience is natural and sometimes even desirable. 25 Four
precepts comprise the layers of multiracial discourse that, in turn,
form a multiracial matrix: (1) racial mixture and diverse racial demog-
raphy will resolve racial problems by transcending race; (2) fluid ra-
cial identity is an indicator of a form of racial progress that
deconstructs the stability of racial categories and thereby brings soci-
ety closer to a colorblind utopia; (3) racism is solely a phenomenon of
aberrant racist individuals who inappropriately express their
prejudice; and (4) discussing race or focusing on race is itself racist
because it disrupts the harmony of race neutrality.
26
I purposely draw on the Latin American experience for this in-
quiry into the continuing utility of race as a legal, social, or political
concept because the justification that some U.S. commentators have
generated to support the valorization of race mixture and the aboli-
tion of race resonates with the idealized but misguided Latin Ameri-
can approach to race-namely, that referencing race causes racism.
27
24 See Hemndez, supra note 10, at 101-04 (characterizing the campaign for a "multi-
racial" racial category on the census as an implicit solicitation for colorblind treatment of
pre-existing racial hierarchy).
25 Accordingly, my study of a "multiracial matrix" incorporates Gramsci's concept of
hegemony-the means by which a system of attitudes and beliefs reinforces existing social
arrangements and, through a form of ideological control, convinces both the dominated
and dominant classes that the existing order is inevitable. See SELECrIONS FROM THE PRISON
NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMscI 238-39 (Quintin Hoare & Geoffry Nowell Smith trans.,
1971).
26 In its deployment, the multiracial matrix can be as seductive and controlling as the
computer matrix depicted in the film The Matrix. See Larry Wachowski & Andy Wachowski,
The Matrix Shooting Script, in THE ART OF THE MATmX 271, 313 (Spencer Lamm ed., 2000)
("What is the Matrix? Control.... The Matrix is a[n artificially] generated dreamworld
built to keep us under control .... .").
27 See Alejandro de la Fuente, Race, National Discourse, and Politics in Cuba: An Overview,
25 LAT. AM. PERSP., May 1998, at 43, 44 (quoting the influential Cuban leaderJosc Martf as
saying: "To insist on the divisions into race, on the difference of race.., is to make difficult
both public and individual enterprises .... [T]he Negro who proclaims his racial charac-
ter.., authorizes and brings forth the white racist... Two racists would be equally guilty,
the white racist and the Negro . . . "). While there is great diversity in Latin American
particularities and racial formation, all countries in Latin America share the commonality
of denying the existence of racism while simultaneously maintaining racial hierarchy and
privilege. Cf Marisol de ]a Cadena, Reconstructing Race: Racism, Culture and Mestizaje in Latin
America, 34 NACLA REP. ON AM., May/June 2001, at 16, 16 ("One of the most puzzling,
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The Latin American racial context is often idealized because of the
widely promoted depiction of Latin America as respectful of the fluid-
ity of race and racial identity,28 and because of the misperception of
Latin America as tolerant of racial differences due to its race mixture
and relative lack of public focus on race.29 However, this comparative
analysis shows why the Latin American experience with race counsels
great caution in any move to discard or devalue race as a unit of criti-
cal analysis and transformative action in the United States. 30
More specifically, I will focus on Cuba and Puerto Rico's civil
rights structures for this Article's comparison. I chose Cuba as a case-
in-point because of its self portrayal as a racially mixed "racial democ-
racy"''s and, more so, because of its official rejection of race as a for-
mal concept.32 Cuba's explicit and public rejection of the notion of
race provides a wealth of experience and information with which to
assess more effectively the advisability of abandoning racial categories
in the ongoing development of civil rights. And because the "racial
democracy" construction of contemporary Cuban race relations is a
disconcerting phenomena that the non-native visitor confronts while traveling in Latin
America is the relative ease with which pervasive and very visible discriminatory practices
coexist with the denial of racism.").
28 See DEGLER, supra note 22, at 6.
29 See id. at 4-7. It should be noted that what I term multiracial discourse is not
unique to the Spanish-speaking world, inasmuch as Lusophone and Francophone America
have also utilized the concept of race mixture for ordering a racial hierarchy. Lourdes
Martfnez-Echazdbal, Mestizaje and the Discourse of National/Cultural Identity in Latin America,
1845-1959, LATIN ANi. PERSP., May 1998, at 21, 23. But it is still useful to focus on the
particularities of Latin America because of its popular idealization as a racial democracy.
See, e.g., William W. Megenney, The Black Puerto Rican: An Analysis of Racial Attitudes, 35
PHYLON 83, 85 (1974) (describing the popular notion of Latin America's more benign race
relations and concluding that "[t]he first facet concerning the feelings of equality exper-
ienced by Puerto Rican Negroes may be summed up in the historical fact of racial
mixture").
30 Furthermore, the recent demographic changes in the United States, which reflect
increasing numbers of Latino residents, Schmitt, supra note 8 (reporting that the Latino
population in the United States increased nearly 60% in a decade), also counsel the impor-
tance of international comparisons; comparisons aid us in better understanding the dis-
tinctive ideology of a population that demographers predict will soon be the largest racial
minority in the country. See id. Because it is beyond the scope of this Article, I will not be
focusing upon the influence of Latino/a U.S. residents on U.S. race ideology. While it is
certainly a topic worthy of focused inquiry, the project of this Article is to unveil the ways in
which systemic forces in the United States are themselves generating a shift in race ideol-
ogy. Itjust so happens that the shift parallels similar institutional interests and dynamics in
Latin America.
31 See MooRE, supra note 23, at 163-65, 256. "Racial democracy" is a term that
originated in Brazil, but was adopted elsewhere in Latin America to describe the assertion
that racial mixture has obviated all racial hostilities and as a consequence all races are
treated equally. See GILBERTO FPRmEY, THE MASTERS AND THE SLAvES 83 (Samuel Putnam
trans., 2d rev. ed. 1986) (premising a theory of "racial democracy" upon the claim that
racial mixing results in a racially harmonious society).
32 See MooRE, supra note 23, at 28.
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model cultivated in much of Latin America, 33 Cuba serves as a useful
example of the broader Latin American backdrop.3 4 I also focus on
Puerto Rico because it manifests a Latin American perspective on race
while having access to the full panoply of U.S. civil rights statutes as a
commonwealth of the United States.3 5 Indeed, it is Puerto Rico's
unique position as a legal context with both its own local civil rights
laws as well as those of the U.S. federal government that provides the
most promise in considering the consequences of the U.S. shift in
race ideology. To the extent that Puerto Rico's experience in the en-
forcement of U.S. civil rights statutes differs from that of the contigu-
ous United States, an exploration of the effect of its Latin American
race ideology on civil rights enforcement may have much to portend
for the United States and its own reconsideration of its race ideology.
This comparative study of the Latin American and U.S. racial
contexts indicates that the ostensible Latin American rejection of race
as a social or formal concept sustains rather than diminishes White
privilege. In Cuba's case, discarding race has not abated racism.3 6
One lesson that may be drawn from the Cuban abolition of race is that
race is likely to remain an analytically and politically useful concept as
long as racial hierarchy exists in fact.3 7 Similarly, the Puerto Rican
focus on race mixture as a panacea for racial discord has failed to
remedy ongoing racial disparities.38 Significantly, all of the examined
Latin American contexts-including Puerto Rico-show an alarming
underenforcement of civil rights laws despite the existence of demon-
strable and longstanding incidences of race-based discrimination.
The contemporary U.S. racial justice movement may benefit from this
comparison by formulating a strategy for countering the negative ef-
33 See id. at 21 ("Castro's exclusive emphasis on the goal of racial integration was en-
tirely consistent with the Latin model of race relations.").
34 For a survey of the extent of the African diaspora in Latin America, see generally
LESLIE B. ROUT, JR., THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE IN SPANISH AMERICA: 1502 TO THE PRESENT
DAY (1976).
35 See Organic Act of Puerto Rico, Pub. L. No. 64-368, ch. 145, § 9, 39 Stat. 951, 954
(1917) (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. § 734 (1994)) ("[T]he statutory laws of the
United States not locally inapplicable, except as hereinbefore or hereinafter otherwise pro-
vided, shall have the same force and effect in Porto Rico as in the United States.... ."); see
also JAY KINSBRUNER, NOT OF PURE BLOOD: THE FREE PEOPLE OF COLOR AND RACIAL
PREJUDICE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY PUERTO RICO 32 (1996) ("'Puerto Ricans share more
with the Latin American conception of race than with the North American.'" (quoting
CLARA E. RODRfGUEZ, PUERTO RICANS: BORN IN THE U.S.A. 52-53 (1989))); Pedro A.
Malavet, Puerto Rico: Cultural Nation, American Colony, 6 MICH.J. RACE & L. 1 (2000) (analyz-
ing how Puerto Rico's popular island culture remains independent of the Anglo culture
dominant in the continental United States).
36 See infra Part IV.B.
37 See Tanya K Hernfndez, An Exploration of the Efficacy of Class-Based Approaches to
RacialJustice: The Cuban Context, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1135, 1142-51 (2000).
38 See infra Part IV.C.
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fects of a shifting race ideology on the enforcement of antidiscrimina-
tion laws.
39
This Article begins by contrasting the Latin American race ideol-
ogy with that of the United States. Part II presents the particular ways
in which the United States is slowly moving towards a Latin American
race ideology in its public discourse and in some legal scholarship.
Part III then assesses the critical differences between Latin American
and U.S. approaches to race. Part IV analyzes the manner in which
the Latin American race ideology, as exemplified by the Cuban and
Puerto Rican examples, has hindered the development and enforce-
ment of antidiscrimination laws. The Article then concludes with an
exploration of how U.S. antidiscrimination law might respond in or-
der to achieve continued efficacy at addressing racial inequality in the
likely event that the United States should formulate the same troubled
approach to civil rights enforcement as the one currently existing in
Latin America.
I
CONTRASTED MODELS OF RACE: A CnrricAL OvERvIEw
It is an open question whether a society that sees every addition of white blood
as a step toward purification is more, or less, prudiced than a society that
sees any appreciable trace of Negro blood as a mark of degradation.
40
Cuba and Puerto Rico, like much of Latin America, have been
historically credited with a seeming respect for social fluidity41 in ra-
cial labeling. But a critical examination of Latin American racial la-
beling demonstrates that racial identity and identification are neither
completely fluid nor neutral. Instead, this claimed or imputed fluidity
operates as a vehicle for the perpetuation of White supremacy. In
fact, an interrogation of the Latin American race model reveals the
manner in which its operation and effects do not differ greatly from
the facially distinct U.S. model-racial hierarchy is a substantive and
structural reality in both contexts.
39 One civil rights attorney suggests that the "Civil Rights Movement presently lacks
direction and strategic vision." William R. Tamayo, When the "Coloreds"Are Neither Black nor
Citizens: The United States Civil Rights Movement and Global Migration, 2 ASIAN L.J. 1, 8 (1995).
40 DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE 275 n.24
(1966).
41 I use the term "fluidity" to encapsulate the way in which the Latin American race
model is characterized as malleable in its designation of racial classifications in response to




A. Race in Latin America: Prejudice of Mark
The perception of racial fluidity throughout Latin America gen-
erally is based upon the premise that racial classifications are deter-
mined more by how closely one phenotypically appears to belong to
one race than by one's blood or ancestors. 42 For instance, before a
racial designation of Black is deemed appropriate, custom dictates an
informal visual assessment of an individual's hair texture, nose width,
thickness of lips, and degree of dark pigmentation for consistency
with what is stereotypically viewed as a Black person.43 Accordingly,
individuals with identical racial heritage can be identified socially or
informally by distinct racial designations based on their phenotype.
For this reason, Latin American racial classification practices have
been termed a "prejudice of mark."44
For example, formal racial classifications contained in the Cuban
census are listed in terms of skin color.45 These categories include
White (a person primarily of European ancestry), Black (a person pri-
marily of African ancestry), Mulatto (a person of mixed European and
African ancestry), and Yellow (a person of Asian ancestry).46 Because
the Cuban census historically has been conducted by appointed enu-
42 See HARIs, supra note 20, at 57 (discussing the occurrence of this phenomenon in
Brazil). The Latin American exceptions to the use of racially fluid racial classifications are
countries such as Argentina and Chile-countries that view themselves as White as a result
of earlier campaigns conducted to diminish the demographic presence of Blacks and in-
digenous persons. See, e.g., GEORGE REID ANDREWS, THE AFRo-ARGENTINES OF BUENOS
AIMES, 1800-1900, at 199 (1980) (describing the disappearance of fluid racial distinctions
after 1850, which were "replaced by a tendency to lump 'morenos,' 'negros,' 'mulatos,' and
'pardos' together under the general denomination of 'people of color'").
43 See HARRIS, supra note 20, at 57-58; see also id. at 38-39 (observing a similar phe-
nomenon with regard to the Native American phenotype); cf. HOETINK, CARIBBEAN RACE
RELATIONS 120, 170-72 (Eva M. Hooykaas trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1971) (1967) (refer-
ring to a societal preference for certain physical features and coloring as a "somatic norm
image").
44 See Oracy Nogueira, Skin Color and Social Class, in PLANTATION SYSTEMS OF THE NEw
WORLD 164, 169 (1959).
45 Although socialist Cuba presumably abolished racial categories, see MOORE, supra
note 23, app. 2, at 359, the government has continued to include racial classifications on
the census and on government-issued identification cards. The government pursues its
race-lessness project by withholding or delaying the distribution of census racial data to the
public. Cf. DOREEN S. GOYER & ELIANE DOMSCHKE, THE HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL POPULA-
TION CENSUSES: LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, NORTH AMERICA, AND OCEANIA 144-47
(1983) (noting that the Cuban census has contained a race/color question in the census
years of 1953, 1970, and 1981); MOORE, supra note 23, app. 2, at 357-62 (describing the
unreliability of the Cuban census data); Lourdes Casa, Race Relations in Contemporary Cuba,
in ANANI DZIDZIENYO & LOURDES CASAL, THE POSITION OF BLACKS IN BRAZILAN AND CUBAN
SOCiETv 11, 22 (Minority Rights Group, Report No. 7, new ed. 1979) (observing that publi-
cations of the 1970 Cuban census have not included any breakdowns of the population by
race).
46 See GOYER & DOMSCHKE, supra note 45, at 144-46 (delineating the Cuban census
format); see also Nadine Therese Fernandez, Race, Romance, and Revolution: The Cultural
Politics of Interracial Encounters in Cuba 24-25 (1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
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merators, the actual determination of which Cuban racial label ap-
plies to an individual has turned on who is viewing the person to be
designated.47 In this way, the informal method of racial classification
by visual assessment effectively conflates with the formal method of ra-
cial classification each time a census enumerator uses an "eyeball" test
to determine the race of an individual respondent by his or her skin
color. Within certain parameters, race in Cuba and throughout Latin
America is in the eye of the beholder. In those countries where the
population of persons of African descent is smaller, such as Mexico,
Guatemala, or Bolivia, the indigenous population is the more popu-
lous racial minority. In turn, a corresponding fluidity in ethnic desig-
nation is evident in the use of the "Mestizo" category to reflect those
individuals of mixed White and Indigenous ancestry.48
The Puerto Rican experience with racial classifications is also par-
ticularly demonstrative of the distinctive Latin American race ideol-
ogy. Census enumerators have traditionally conducted a visual survey
of the respondent's physical appearance in order to determine racial
designation. It was not until the recent 2000 census that a self-identifi-
cation method was employed.49 While census forms issued during the
period of Spanish rule used the color categories of Black, Mulatto,
and White,50 sixteen informal racial categories embodied a racial
spectrum that referenced race mixture of Europeans, Blacks, and in-
digenous populations. 51 When Puerto Rico was ceded to the United
States in 1898, the United States continued to incorporate a color
question on the decennial census.52
University of California, Berkeley) (on file with author) (listing racial categories used in
Cuba).
47 See GOYER & DOMSCHKE, supra note 45, at 10-11, 142-46 (describing the canvasser
method and the use of this method for census-taking in Cuba); see also MOORE, supra note
23, app. 2, at 358 (suggesting that when enumerators for the 1943 census permitted each
person to select a racial category, the reported results gave an unreliably low figure for the
Black category).
48 See Madeline Barbara Lfons, Stratification and Pluralism in the Bolivian Yungas, in 1
BLAcKNEss IN LATIN AmERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 335, 337 (Norman E. Whitten, Jr. &
Arlene Torres eds., 1998) (describing the tripartite Bolivian racial classification system of
White, Mestizo, and Indian).
49 SeeJorge Duany, Neither White Nor Black: The Representation of Racial Identity Among
Puerto Ricans on the Island and in the U.S. Mainland, in THE MEANING OF RACE AND BACKNuSS
IN THE AMERICAS: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECrIVES (Anani Dzidzienyo & Suzanne Oboler,
forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 15, on file with author).
50 See Kelvin Santiago-Valles, Policing the Cfisis in the Whitest of All the Antilles, 8 CENTRO
43, 44 (1996).
51 Id. at 43; see also Eduardo Seda Bonilla, Two Patterns of Race Relations 5 (1969)
(U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Office of Educ., No. ED 058 368) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (listing sixteen racial terms used by the Puerto Rican
colonial society).
52 See GOYER & DoMscHKE, supra note 45, at 298-99.
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The decision to omit altogether a race/color question on the
census came only after Puerto Rico acquired commonwealth status in
1952, and the census became a joint project of the local Puerto Rico
Planning Board and the U.S. Bureau of the Census. 53 A Puerto Rico
Planning Board official justified the removal of a race question as obli-
gatory under the commonwealth's constitutional prohibition against
race and color discrimination.54 Like Cuba, Puerto Rican government
officials viewed the public focus on race as divisive and counter-
productive to the goal of unification under a common ethnicity.5 5 Yet
even after the abolition of the race/color question on the census, Pu-
erto Rico continued to use racial categories in other official venues,
like the courts, social services agencies, and the police.56 The racial
categories that are officially used are white, black and "Triguefio,"5 7
while at least nineteen different categories are used informally by the
populace.
58
Commentators speculate that the 1952 decision to abolish the use
of racial classifications on the Puerto Rico census was motivated in
large part by the unreliability of the 1950 census.59 The race/color
question on the 1950 census listed two racial categories-White and
non-White (to include Blacks and Mulattos together).6° With the use
of only those two categories, the Puerto Rico census reported 79.7%
of the population as White.6 1 The race data was viewed as inherently
suspect because a visual inspection of the population would inevitably
lead one to conclude that "[w]hatever else it may be, Puerto Rico is
not a society that is preponderantly 'white' under conventional North
American definitions of race. ' 62 More importantly, the progressive
decrease in those identified as Black on the island since the 1820 cen-
sus by the Spaniards has occurred at a pace inexplicable by emigra-
tion, immigration, and birth and death patterns.63 Indeed, when the
Puerto Rico 2000 census reinstated a race question identical to that
used in the continental United States and allowed respondents to
choose multiple racial classifications for the first time, the census
yielded 80.5% of the population self-identifying as White, 8.0% as
53 See id. at 301-02.
54 Duany, supra note 49, at 17.
55 See id. at 22.
56 Santiago-Valles, supra note 50, at 50.
57 See id. "Trigueflo" literally translates as "wheat color," but is used to amorphously
describe anyone who seems to fall between White and Black. See id. at 44.
58 See Duany, supra note 49, at 1.
59 SeeJost A. CABRANES, CITIZENSHIP AND THE AMERICAN EMPIRE 97 n.475 (1979).
60 GOYER & DOMSCHKE, supra note 45, at 299.
61 CABRANEs, supra note 59 (citing U.S. Census Bureau statistics).
62 Id.
63 See HOETINK, supra note 43, at 184-86.
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Black, 4.2% as of multiple races, and 7.3% as other races such as
Asian/Pacific Islander and Native American. 64
These recent census results not only fail to comport with Puerto
Rico's national image as a mixed-race population, they do not com-
port with a visual inspection of the population. For instance, even in
the municipality of Loiza, founded as a community of escaped slaves
and culturally respected as the center for African folklore with a den-
sity of Black people,65 29.7% of the population self-identified as White
on the 2000 census.66 The consistent, apparent disconnect between
the appearance of the population and the selection of racial catego-
ries has been prevalent in Puerto Rico as it has fluctuated between the
use of fluid categories as a Spanish colony, the more circumscribed
census choices of a U.S. territory, and once again more fluid catego-
ries with the 2000 census option to select multiple racial categories. It
is therefore incorrect to interpret the unreliable race data as being
the direct result of the superimposition of U.S. racial categories upon
a jurisdiction like Puerto Rico that maintains a more Latin American
approach to racial definition.67 In fact, comprehensive studies of
other Latin American contexts have revealed the same disconnect be-
tween physical appearance and self-identification absent the use of
U.S.-influenced racial categories. 68 In addition, the public preference
for Whiteness on the census is consistent whether it is the census enu-
merator who selected the category based on a visual survey, as in pre-
1960 census years, or if the respondent is allowed to self-identify, as
was permitted on the 2000 census.69
Another feature that distinguishes Latin American race ideology
from the historically prevalent race ideology in the United States is its
64 See Puerto Rico 2000 Population and Racial Breakdown, IPR DATANOTE ON PUERTO Ri-
cAN CoMMiuNrrY (Puerto Rican Legal Def. & Educ. Fund Inst. for Puerto Rican Policy, New
York, N.Y.), May 2001, at 1, 1 fig. [hereinafter IPR DATANOTE].
65 See, e.g., MARcos A. RIVERA ORTIZ,JusTICIA NEGRA [BLAcKJUSTICE] 53 (2001) (assert-
ing the popular conception of Lofza as characterized by a 90% Black population and con-
sequently as the region that suffers the most race discrimination).
66 IPR DATANOTE, supra note 64, at 2.
67 But cf. CABRANES, supra note 59, at 98 n.475 ("The statistics on race collected by the
... United States Census Bureau, based as they were upon North American notions of race,
were invariably meaningless.").
68 See, e.g., MELISSA NOBLES, SHADES OF CITIZENSHIP: RACE AND THE CENSUS IN MODERN
PoLrmcs 85-128 (2000) (describing Brazil's struggle to have its population self-identify as
of African descent, although Brazil is home to the largest population of persons of African
descent outside of Nigeria); see also DAVID HowARD, COLORING THE NATION: RACE AND ETH-
NICITY IN THE DOMINIcAN REPUBLIC 41-49 (2001) (describing how persons of African de-
scent in the Dominican Republic identify themselves with the ambiguous term of "Indio"
(Indian) in order to avoid associations with Blackness).
69 See Duany, supra note 49, at 17. One possible explanation for the similarity in cen-
sus enumerators' racial selection and individual self-identification can be found in the
Latin American concern with insulting someone by publicly referring to them as non-
White and the way in which socioeconomic status informs racial classification.
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focus on the individual rather than on familial and ancestral connec-
tions when selecting a racial classification. In theory, both formal and
informal Latin American practices associated with the visually based
prejudice of mark permit siblings with the same ancestors to be ra-
cially designated as distinct based on the variance of their racial ap-
pearance. 70 To a certain extent, prejudice-of-mark practices also
permit economic and social status to mediate a formal racial designa-
tion.71 In Latin American settings, social status informs formal racial
classification, as illustrated by the common belief that persons of
prominence should not be "insulted" by referencing their visible Afri-
can ancestry. Additionally, it is generally presumed that because no
person of prominence could be Black, these persons should be desig-
nated distinctly.
For example, when Cuba's pre-Revolution dictator, Fulgencio
Batista, was a humble sergeant in the Cuban military, he was formally
identified as a Mulatto.72 But when Batista installed himself as dicta-
tor in 1952, his African ancestry was no longer publicly or formally
acknowledged.73 Social and political position served to whiten him.74
Batista's ascension into the White racial classification, based upon his
improved social status and his quasi-European phenotype, thus illus-
trates the fluidity associated with formal Cuban/Latin American iden-
tity practices and the "blanqueamientd' (whitening) ideal which is
central to the Latin American race ideology. 75 Blanqueamiento refers
to both the aspiration and possibility of transforming one's social sta-
tus by approaching Whiteness. 76 An individual can become socially
lighter by marrying a lighter-skinned partner, or by becoming wealthy
or famous. For instance, it is consistently alleged that the dark-
skinned soccer icon from Brazil, Pel, successfully deployed the blan-
queamiento ideology when he had his birth certificate amended to re-
70 See, e.g., Pnu THOMAS, DowN THESE MEAN STREETS 142-48 (1967) (relaying an in-
sightful exchange between two Puerto Rican brothers-one who identifies as White, and
one who identifies as Black).
71 See Arlene Torres & Norman E. Whitten, Jr., To Forge the Future in the Fires of the Past:
An Interpretive Essay on Racism, Domination, Resistance, and Liberation, General Introduction to 2
BLACKNESS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 3, 23 (1998).
72 See MOORE, supra note 23, at 5.
73 See Gayle McGarrity & Osvaldo Cdrdenas, Cuba, in No LONGER INVISIBLE: AFRO-
LATIN AMERICANS TODAY 77, 92 (Minority Rights Group ed., 1995).
74 Yet the ability of an individual with any known African ancestry to become a na-
tional leader is quite astounding when one compares the Cuban context to that of the
United States, in which no individual with publicly acknowledged African ancestry has ever
ascended to the presidency.
75 See Torres & Whitten, supra note 71, at 8-9 ("Blanqueamiento refers to the processes
of becoming increasingly acceptable to those classified and self-identified as 'white.' This
is an ethnic movement-coterminous with socioeconomic advancement governed by the




flect a White racial classification after achieving world fame.77 Pel's
racial revision of his birth certificate already had great historical pre-
cedence in Iberian America: in the eighteenth century, Iberian colo-
nial authorities officially instituted laws that permitted upper-class
Mulattos in the Americas to purchase the privileges of Whiteness.
78
In concert with the prejudice-of-mark and blanqueamiento ap-
proaches to racial identification, the Latin American race model ad-
vances the cultural perspective known as "mestizaje," which asserts that
race mixture has made racial identification a very indeterminate and
unnecessary practice.79 In other words, mestizaje advances the notion
that the existence of extensive racial mixture in the population has
created a new people that can only be identified in a nationalistic fash-
ion as, for example, "Cuban," "Puerto Rican," "Mexican," and so
forth.80 In turn, racial mixture is rhetorically idealized and promoted
as the national norm.81 But the new people envisioned by mestizaje are
purposefully more White than Black or indigenous.8 2 For instance, in
a contemporary and implicit invocation of mestizaje and blan-
queamiento, a Puerto Rican newspaper observed that "Puerto Ricans
will 'bleach away' many of the physical traces of its African past by the
year 2200, with the other Spanish-speaking Caribbean [islands] follow-
ing a few centuries later."8 3 The Latin American race model also
maintains a distinctive approach to racial group identity formation.
77 SeeTelephone Interview with Anani Dzidzienyo, Professor of Afro-Brazilian Studies,
Brown University, African Studies Department and Portuguese & Brazilian Studies Depart-
ment (Feb. 20, 2002) (explaining that Brazilians so frequently set forth Peli as the proof
that "money whitens" that it is also thought that PelI altered his official racial classification
on his identity documents); see also Femi Ojo-Ade, Black Brazil: African Notes on a New Negri-
tude, in BLACK BRAziIz CULTURE:, IDENTrTy, AND SOCIAL MOBILIZATION 175, 182-83 (Larry
Crook & RandalJohnson eds., 1999) ("[Pel] is Brazil's ambassador of 'whitening,' always
by the side of blond, blue-eyed bombshells (e.g., Xuxa), forever denying any sign of racism
in his beloved nation.").
78 SeeJames F. King, The Case ofJosgPonciano deAyarza: A Document on Gracias al Sacar,
32 Hisp. Am. HisT. Rev. 640, 641-43 (1951).
79 See Torres & Whitten, supra note 71, at 7-8.
80 Cf id. (discussing the relatedness of race, nationalism, and ethnic blocs).
81 An illuminating example of the Latin American use of mestizaje as a rhetorical de-
vice is the case of Venezuela. While Venezuela has long boasted about being a "cafr con
leche" (coffee with milk) society in which its citizens are proud of their Black and White
origins, "the thrust of official policy since the nineteenth century, expressed primarily in
immigration policies, has been to dilute the caf6i [coffee] as much as possible." Winthrop
R. Wright, Elitist Attitudes Toward Race in Twentieth-Century Venezuela, in SLAVERY AND RACE
REATIoNs IN LATIN AMERICA 325 (Robert Brent Toplin ed., 1974).
82 SeeArlene Torres, La Gran Familia Puertorniqueifa "EjPrieta de Beldd" (The Great Puerto
Rican Family Is Really Really Black), in 2 BLACKNESS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
285, 286 (1998) ("Upon first glance, it appears that a national emphasis on mestizaje in
Puerto Rico promotes processes of social integration; however, there is still a hyper-
privileging of individuals of European descent with phenotypic features associated with
'whiteness.'").
83 Peggy Ann Bliss, Black, White, Puerto Rican All Over, SAN JuAN STAR, Mar. 22, 1995, at
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Individuals are overtly discouraged from identifying along racial
lines.8 4 The rationale underlying such a societal approach is the cul-
tural conviction that a focus on race and distinctive racial identifica-
tion is socially divisive and without a redeeming value.8 5
The origins of mestizaje and blanqueamiento are rooted in nine-
teenth-century Latin America's search for a positive identity in the
face of encroaching European and Anglo-American eugenic judg-
ments and values that associated the prevalence of non-Whites in
Latin America with the backwardness of mongrel nations.8 6 Between
1880 and 1930, intellectuals in Latin America were strongly influ-
enced by European racial theories like eugenics that asserted the in-
nate inferiority of non-Whites and thus provided the justifications for
European colonialism and U.S. imperialism.8 7 Blanqueamiento, and its
gradual approach to the Whiteness ideal across generations, provided
a means both for removing some of the taint of backwardness and for
philosophically opposing colonialism and imperialism. 8 In turn, mes-
tizaje countered the mongrel nation descriptor with a well-constructed
illusion of moral superiority for having solved racial problems by mini-
mizing racial differences and facilitating a racial democracy.8 9 A Mex-
ican philosopher with great influence in Latin America promoted
mestizaje as a means for creating a new race-a "cosmic race" so that
" [t] he lower types of the species will be absorbed by the superior type.
In this manner, for example, the Black could be redeemed, and step
by step, by voluntary extinction, the uglier stocks will give way to the
more handsome."90 Not only was "pure" Blackness undesirable, but
84 See Torres & Whitten, supra note 71, at 7 (contrasting the mestizaje and blan-
queamiento approaches with negritude, a concept that promotes Black self-identification by
calling attention to the positive power inherent in "blackness").
85 See Pedro Pdrez Sarduy & Jean Stubbs, Preface to AFRo-CuBAN VoICEs, at xi, xii (Pe-
dro Pdrez Sarduy & Jean Stubbs eds., 2000).
86 Martfnez-Echazdbal, supra note 29, at 23-24.
87 See Aline Helg, Race in Argentina and Cuba, 1880-1930: Theory, Policies, and Popular
Reaction, in THE IDEA OF RACE IN LATIN AMERICA, 1870-1940, at 37, 37-38 (Richard Graham
ed., 1990).
88 Accordingly, blanqueamiento ideology pervaded Latin American countries in which
the indigenous population outnumbered the Black populationjust as it did in those coun-
tries in which the Black presence predominated. See, e.g., Moisds Gonzflez Navarro, Mes-
tizaje in Mexico During the National Period, in RACE AND CLASS IN LATIN AMERICA 145, 154
(Magnus M6mer ed., 1970) (describing the application of whitening ideology to Indians
in Mexico). Furthermore, it was particularly salient in those Latin American nations that
are now perceived to be predominantly White such as Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay,
because the blanqueamiento ideology was overtly deployed in the immigration context to
whiten those countries. See MARGARITA SANCHEZ & MICHAEL FRANKLIN, COMUNIDADES DE
ANCESTRIA AFRICANA EN COSTA RIA, HONDURAS, NICARAGUA, ARGENTINA, COLOMBIA, ECUA-
DOR, PERO, URUGUAY Y VENEZUELA 223 (Inter-Am. Dev. Bank 1996) (publication prepared
for conference on poverty relief for minority communities in Latin America).
89 See Martinez-Echazdbal, supra note 29, at 33-35.
9o Jost VASCONCELOS, THE CosMIC RAcE/LA RAZA COsMICA 30 (Didien T. Jadn ed. &
trans., Pace Publ'ns 1979) (1925).
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asserting a Black identity was also perceived as a threat to the national-
ism of Latin American countries. "[D]uring the period of national
consolidation and modernization... mestizaje underscored the affir-
mation of cultural identity as constituted by 'national character'
.... ,91 For example, while at different times Cuba has had an ethni-
cally diverse population of persons of Spanish, Chinese, Jewish, and
African ancestry, the nation-building process has consistently deval-
ued racial and ethnic group formation in the creation of racially and
ethnically affiliated organizations. 92 Similarly, in Puerto Rico, Black-
ness is a contested site of identification for the state.93 Accordingly,
"[t] his retreat from blackness is evident not only in nationalist[ ] dis-
courses, but also in everyday social interactions, and it surfaces prima-
rily in family narratives."'94 Furthermore, any discussions of a race-
related topic are viewed as the equivalent of racism. In short, the per-
vasive denial of the existence of racism is viewed as synonymous with
the treatment of race and racial identity as taboo subjects.
Hence, the prejudice-of-mark racial classification system of Latin
America shies away from overt considerations of racial categories and
instead focuses on color gradations. Latin American racial distinc-
tions, which are visually based on phenotype, have been described as a
"prejudice of mark" because they seem to focus on physical appear-
ances rather than origins. This descriptor stands in supposed contrast
to the U.S. model, known as a "prejudice of origin," which makes ra-
cial distinctions based chiefly on heritage or ancestry.95 Yet, in opera-
tion, the prejudice-of-mark's use of phenotype effectively incorporates
ancestry into the process or act of racialization, both formally and in-
formally.96 Similarly, and as the following section will demonstrate,
91 Martfnez-Echazbal, supra note 29, at 21.
92 Cuba's recent economic interest in promoting Afro-Cuban music and dance for
foreign tourists is viewed as an acknowledgement of Cuba's cultural origins and not as a
validation of Afro-Cuban racial identity. Cf Hermndez, supra note 37, at 1145 (arguing
that highly valued, well-paying jobs in the tourist industry "are reserved for persons 'de
buena apariencia' (good looking but commonly understood as white Cubans)").
93 See Isar P. Godreau, La semdntica fugitiva: "raza, "colory vida cotidiana en Puerto Rico, 9
REMSTA DE CIENCIAS SoCIAI.ES (n.s.) 52, 52-55 (2000) [hereinafter Godreau, La Semdntica];
see also Isar P. Godreau, Confronting the Panic: Troublesome Hispanics 2 (Mar. 16-19,
2000) (presented at Latin American Studies Association Conference, Univ. of Pittsburgh)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Godreau, Confronting the
Panic] ("Notions of whitening go hand-in-hand with nationalist representations of Puerto
Rico as a Hispanic culture.").
94 Godreau, Confronting the Panic, supra note 93, at 3.
95 See Nogueira, supra note 44, at 169.
96 One can quickly surmise this incorporation of ancestry from the correlation be-
tween skin color and ancestry on the Cuban census. See GOYER & DOMSCHKE, supra note 45,
at 145 (citing the Cuban census definition of "race" as "color of skin"); see also HOETiNK,
supra note 43, at 169 & n.3 (stating that prejudice of origin also permeates Latin American




the deployment of a prejudice-of-origin approach to racial distinctions
pragmatically incorporates observations of phenotype into considera-
tions of ancestry.
B. Race in the United States: Prejudice-of-Origin
The designation of the Latin American model of racial classifica-
tions as fluid principally stems from its comparison to the U.S. model,
which is thought to be overly restrictive. 7 Traditionally in the United
States, an individual with even one ancestor of African descent has
been viewed as Black regardless of phenotype.9 8 This approach to ra-
cial designation has been known alternatively as the "one-drop rule"
or the rule of "hypo-descent."99 While the U.S. Census Bureau has
just recently abandoned the rule of hypo-descent by permitting multi-
ple racial designations,100 this Article shall delineate the specifics of
this rule in order to trace the influence of this ideology on the en-
forcement of antidiscrimination laws.
A contemporary ruling in the United States enforcing the rule of
hypo-descent is instructive. Susy Phipps, a Louisiana resident, always
considered herself White, but unlike Pel in Brazil' 01 was unable to
have her birth certificate formally altered to reflect a White racial des-
ignation.'0 2 Her desire to make this alteration was incited by the dis-
covery that the State of Louisiana had classified her as Black because
of the existence of a Black ancestor five generations removed from
her. 03 The Louisiana court refused to order Ms. Phipps's requested
modification, a decision supported by-but not formally based on-
Louisiana's statutory one-drop definition of Black.10 4 Thus, the U.S.
method of racial classification is criticized for its seeming rigidity be-
97 While the U.S. system of Jim Crow racial segregation certainly contributed to the
formation of a distinct Black racial identity, see DAvis, supra note 14, at 5, it cannot provide
the central explanation for the distinctions in the U.S. and Latin American race models.
While de jure segregation was unknown in the Latin American context, virulent de facto
segregation was and is quite common in Latin America, including Cuba. See NANCY Lm's
STEPAN, "THE HOUR OF EUGENICS": RACE, GENDER, AND NATION IN LATIN AMERICA 174
(1991).
98 See DAVIS, supra note 14, at 5.
99 Id.
100 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
101 See supra text accompanying note 77.
102 See Doe v. State, 479 So. 2d 369 (La. Ct. App. 1985). For a more in-depth discussion
of Phipps's case, see Robert Westley, First-Time Encounters: "Passing" Revisited and Demystifica-
tion as a Critical Practice, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 297, 317-22 (2000).
103 See Westiey, supra note 102, at 319; see also id. at 322 (noting the relevance of docu-
mentary uncertainty regarding whether Phipps's ancestor was a "slave" or "free Negress").
104 See Doe, 479 So. 2d at 372 (concluding "that the now infamous 'one-thirty second'
statute, which was repealed in 1983, is not relevant to this case. All evidence indicates that
the disputed racial designations were not made by a public official but by the attending
midwife or by the parents themselves" (citation omitted)).
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cause it confines those who do not wish to socially or formally claim a
Black identity to a "trap" of formal, official Blackness.
The U.S. race model also differs from that of Latin America in
that the contemporary census uses a system of self-identification with
respect to racial classification.10 5 Self-identification officially removes
third-party visual assessment from the formal method of racial classifi-
cation in the United States. Thus, it is the individual's own knowledge
or belief of familial ancestry that formally determines one's race on
the U.S. census. Although third parties inevitably influence racial
construction and self-classification, 10 6 U.S. census practices are consid-
ered comparatively rigid because the self-identification system re-
mains typically and formally based on blood, origin, or ancestry, as
dictated by the rule of hypo-descent. Furthermore, unlike the census,
state collection of vital statistics, employer reports on the racial com-
position of their labor force, and crime statistics do not always employ
a self-identification method of racial classification, as demonstrated by
the Susy Phipps case in Louisiana. 10 7 Yet, in conjunction with the
seemingly rigid approach to racial classification, the U.S. race model
historically has tolerated the formation of distinct racial identities.
Even while cultural assimilation to a North American ideal has been
favored, the United States has simultaneously permitted an individ-
ual's psychic affiliation with a discrete ethnic or racial group.'08
Hence, while Blacks in the United States have been subjected to the
national pressure to assimilate to White cultural norms, they have not
previously been discouraged from identifying as Black in the way in
which persons of African descent have in Latin America. In contrast,
the recent public discourse in the United States has begun to take on
a Latin-American approach to race that discourages the assertion of
racial identity.
105 Self-identification is a twentieth-century feature of the U.S. census inasmuch as ear-
lier census taking employed the visual survey method for racial classification. See Ella P.
Lacey & Bikash Nandy, Race, Color, and Ethnicity: Diverse, Unequal and Uneven Categories of tlw
U.S. Census, 14 W. J. BLACK STUD. 24, 25 (1990) ("Until 1960, determination of a person's
race was left to the census taker and based on that person's observation."). Self-identifica-
tion is also more suited to the use of mail-in census forms in highly literate societies. See
GOVER & DoMscHRE, supra note 45, at 10-11; Lacey & Nandy, supra, at 25 (observing that
the 1960 census enabled those respondents who completed their own census forms to use
the self-classification method).
106 For two authors' struggles with race identity and their encounters with racism, see
KEVIN R JOHNSON, How DID You GET TO BE A MEXICAN? A WHITE/BRowN MAN'S SEARCH
FOR IDENTITY (1999) and GREGORY HOWARD WILLLIs, LIFE ON THE COLOR LINE: THE TRUE
STORY OF A WHITE Boy WHO DISCOVERED HE WAS BLACK (1995).
107 See Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of "Race" in Race-
Conscious Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1250, 1256-59 (1994) (discussing the use of the visual
survey method rather than the self-identification method).
108 See generally 39 Nomos: ETHNICTY AND GROUP RIGHTS (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka





TmE U.S. RECONSIDERATION OF RACE
The mere existence of a multiracial democracy does not spell the end of racism
or important dimensions of its Black-White frame.10 9
What makes the comparison to the Latin American context in
this Article particularly relevant is the seeming shift that the United
States is slowly making from a prejudice-of-origin race model to a
prejudice-of-mark race model. Most recently, for example, the federal
government responded to the demand for a separate multiracial ra-
cial category on the census by permitting census respondents to select
multiple racial designations.' 10 Multiple box-checking fundamentally
deviates from the single-box-checking norm of the rule of hypo-de-
scent, a shift that indicates a growing convergence between U.S. and
Latin American approaches to racial classification. Indeed, the deci-
sion to authorize multiple box-checking for the first time since the
institution of the U.S. census in 1790111 arose in response to the grow-
ing numbers of mixed-race children and their parents who wanted
greater flexibility in designating a racial affiliation. 1 2 Yet, an even
greater demonstration of the U.S. reconsideration of race is the man-
ner of interpretation with which the public has received and fixated
on the Census 2000 population results. Although few people actually
chose to select more than one racial category, 113 the public clamor
regarding the potential to do so is a striking indicator of how the Cen-
sus Bureau and the rhetoric about the census is essentially a racial
109 Paulette M. Caldwell, The Content of Our Characterizations, 5 MIcH.J. RACE & L. 53, 90
(1999).
110 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
111 ELIZABETH M. GRIECO & RACHEL C. CASSIDY, OVERVIEW OF RACE AND HISPANIC OR-
GIN: CENSUS 2000 BRIEF, at 2 (U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Publication
No. C2KBR/01-1, Mar. 2001), available at http://Nvwv.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/
c2kbrOl-1.pdf.
112 See Hermkndez, supra note 10, at 98-99. The census change was also a bureaucratic
response to the vast numbers of Latin American immigrants and Latino residents who
consistently refused to designate a single racial category and would often select the "other
race" option to reflect their own cultural perspectives on racial classification, which was
distinct from those of the Census Bureau. See CLARA E. RODRIGUEZ, CHANGING RACE: LATI-
NOS, THE CENSUS, AND THE HISTORY OF ETHNICITY IN THE UNITED STATES 129-52 (2000).
Given the growth in the United States' Latino population and its emerging position as the
most populous racial minority, see Schmitt, supra note 8, at A14, it is logical to expect their
continuing indirect and direct influence on the U.S. race model. See Rachel F. Moran,
NeitherBlack nor Wite, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REv. 61, 61-69 (1997);Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and
the Constitution: Beyond the Black and White Binary Constitution, 36 WM. & MARY L. R v. 571,
595-603 (1995); Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and White
Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REv. 957, 959-60 (1995).
113 NICHOLAS A. JONES & AMY SYMENS SMITH, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ECONOMICS AND
STATISTICS ADMIN., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE Two OR MORE RACES POPULATION: 2000, CEN-
SUS 2000 BRIEF I (Nov. 2001) (reporting that 2.4% of the population reported more than
one race on the 2000 census).
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formation project.114 For instance, in observing the increasing racial
diversity of many cities that was reported by the Census Bureau, news
entities have typically noted that the demographic shift "will not only
transform the city but will also alter how Americans think about race,
helping them move beyond simple concepts of whiteness and black-
ness." 115 Kenneth Prewitt, the former director of the Census Bureau,
has concluded that the availability of multiple racial categories to an
increasingly mixed-race demographic is "'a very healthy sign that bar-
riers are breaking down.... It's an indication of not only the com-
plexity but the fluidness of our population makeup. 11 6 In addition,
Prewitt's predecessor, Martha Farnsworth Riche, has commented that
the Census 2000 results mark "'the beginning of the end of the over-
whelming role of race in our public life.'
117
Nor have some civil rights activists been immune from jumping to
the conclusion that the demographic changes immediately mean
"'we're moving beyond a black-white paradigm of race,"' l8 and that
"'[t] he more mixed we are, the more likely it is that we will be sensi-
tive to each other." '119 Similarly, some demographers and sociologists
have concluded that "the more nuanced" racial identification permit-
ted by checking multiple racial designations "may help break down
racial barriers."120 In short, in a national poll conducted after the
public release of the Census 2000 data, 121 sixty-four percent of respon-
114 See MICHAEL OMI & HoWARD WINANT, RACIAL FoRMATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
FROM THE 1960's TO THE 1990's 55 (2d ed. 1994) (defining racial formation as "the soci-
ohistorical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and de-
stroyed"). Racial formation projects are simultaneously an interpretation, representation,
or explanation of racial dynamics, and an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources
along particular racial lines. Racial formation projects connect what race means in a par-
ticular discursive practice and, based upon that meaning, the ways in which both social
structures and everyday experiences are racially organized. See id. at 66-68. Racial forma-
tion theory identifies the state as the preeminent site for the controversy over the meaning
of race. See id. at 66. Scholars such asJoe Feagin identify the mass media as playing a key
role in racial formation as well. See FEAGIN, supra note 13, at 88-89 (revealing how the
concentration of media control in just a few corporations provides white elites with the
.capability to mobilize mass consensus on elite-generated ideas and views").
115 Andrew Friedman, Behind the Big Numbers, a Million Little Stories, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,
2001, § 14, at 6.
116 Mae M. Cheng, 'The Face of America. New Census Acknowledges City's Multiracial Re-
sidents, NEWSDAY (Melville, N.Y.), Mar. 16, 2001, at E6 (quoting Prewitt), available at 2001
WL 9221852.
117 Martin Kasindorf & Haya El Nasser, Impact of Census'Race Data Debated, USA TODAY,
Mar. 13, 2001, at IA (quoting Riche).
118 Schmitt, supra note 8 (quoting Sonia M. Perez, a deputy vice president at the Na-
tional Council of La Raza, a Hispanic advocacy organization).
119 Kasindorf& El Nasser, supra note 117 (quoting Beatriz Lopez-Flores, vice president
of the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational Fund).
120 Schmitt, supra note 8.
121 The USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll surveyed 1,015 adults on March 9-10, 2001. See
Kasindorf & El Nasser, supra note 117.
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dents stated that it "would be 'good for the country' to have more
Americans 'think of themselves as multiracial rather than as belong-
ing to a single race."' 12 2 Reporting on the poll, USA Today observed:
"Racial lines may blur until the 'melting pot' idealized by playwright
Israel Zangwi!l in 1908 becomes a harmonious, 'we-are-the-world' real-
ity."' 23 That observation was then followed by the reaction: "'Who'll
be left to hate?"
'" 24
In short, popular reaction to the Census 2000 results demon-
strated the intersection of two related notions in the U.S. reconsidera-
tion of race. The first is that the idea that racial mixture and
increasing racial diversity require fluid racial classification schemes
represents a step towards racial progress because they do not incite
the same racial divisiveness that a rigid classification scheme does.
Fluidity is favored because it is thought to be a deflection from an
inappropriate focus on race. In turn, the instability of fluid racial cat-
egories calls into question the utility of any racial classification
scheme. This is how fluidity converges with colorblindness-the sec-
ond idea about race idealized in the U.S. reconsideration of race. As
fluidity underscores a classification's inability to fully reflect an indi-
vidual's complex racial identities, it simultaneously questions the
ongoing need to racially classify at all. And indeed, the public excite-
ment about fluidity rests in part on its trajectory towards the eradica-
tion of all racial classification schemes. In this manner the preference
for fluid racial categories can be understood as another incantation of
the preference for colorblindness. Thus, the U.S. reconsideration of
race is reflected in a growing transformation from the belief that ra-
cial categories are static and hence that racial identification is self-
evident and straightforward, to a belief that race mixture will dissolve
the rigidity of those categories and, in and of itself, instill societal ra-
cial harmony and even eradicate the need to refer to one another by
race.125 In short, the general public's response to the census change
was overwhelmingly positive as a result of a multiracial discourse 126
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. (quoting Oscar Garibay, a Mexican-American police officer).
125 But see Hern~ndez, supra note 10, at 114 n.81 (describing the ways in which even
stated beliefs in social construction of race can be expressed in terms that reinscribe bio-
logical notions of race).
126 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (explaining the term "multiracial dis-
course"); see also EUGENE ROBINSON, COAL TO CREAM: A BLACK MAN'S JOURNEY BEYOND
COLOR TO AN AFFIRMATION OF RACE (1999) (relating the seductiveness of multiracial dis-




supporting the belief that the fluidity of multiple box-checking was a
definitive sign that racial hierarchy was no longer an issue.127
The emergence of a Latin American-style multiracial discourse
in the United States is also suggested both by the growing numbers of
individuals who no longer think that racism is a problem, 28 and by
thejudiciary's own deflection from race in the pursuit of "colorblind-
ness" because race is a taboo subject whose mere referencing is an act
of racism.129 Indeed, even attacks on race-conscious attempts to facili-
tate electoral political participation in redistricting have been articu-
lated as being concerned with how they "stimulate[ ] public awareness
of race" and thus "fan[ ] the flames of racial division."'130 Further-
more, as with Latin America's various nation-building campaigns, U.S.
citizens are being encouraged to view themselves as "simply Ameri-
can" rather than identifying along racial or ethnic lines, which prac-
tice is considered inherently divisive. 131 Such views are succinctly
articulated by Justice Scalia's statement: "In the eyes of government,
we are just one race here. It is American."'132 The danger of national-
ism submerging all public considerations of race and racism may only
127 Multiracial discourse is even starting to manifest itself in popular culture with refer-
ences to "multiracial" individuals as being a race physically distinctive from all others. For
instance, best-selling author Nora Roberts has written a number of books under the name
J.D. Robb in which police officers in the year 2058 immediately identify people as White,
Black or Multiracial upon visual survey. See, e.g., J.D. ROBB, GLORY IN DEATH 39 (1995)
("The manufacturer [of the droid-robot] had given him the titled eye, golden-skinned
appearance of a mixed race.");J.D. ROBB, NAKED IN DEATH 64 (1995) ("Eve saw he had the
pale gold complexion of a multiracial heritage"). The idealization of the notion of an
identifiable multiracial appearance has also begun to be put forth as the model of beauty
for the future in fashion magazines. See, e.g., Eve Epstein, Heaven Can Wait ALLuRE, Apr.
2002, at 166 (describing a "new paradigm" of mixed-race beauty that "publicists and news
magazines like to refer to as the future of female beauty").
128 See FEAGIN, supra note 13, at 96 ("Today, many whites deny the seriousness of an-
tiblack racism in the past and present history of the United States .... In recent interviews
with members of the white elite, Rhonda Levine and I have found that many see racism as
having declined significantly in importance.")
129 See Hernndez, supra note 10, at 139-56.
130 Melissa L. Saunders, Of Minority Representation, Multiple-Race Responses, and Melting
Pots: Redistficting in the New America, 79 N.C. L. REv. 1367, 1367-68 (2001) (describing the
concerns of Robinson Everett, an opponent of the "racial gerrymander," which are also
shared by many other Americans).
131 See Lourdes Marttnez-Echaz~bal, 'A Pluribus Unum': The Discourse of National/
Cultural Identity in Latin America (Nov. 2, 2001) (presented at "Race Mixture in the
Americas" symposium, American University, Washington College of Law) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
132 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (ScaliaJ., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment). Adarand held that federal affirmative action pro-
grams instituted to assist subordinated groups, are subject to the same strict scrutiny stan-
dard as acts of discrimination against subordinated group members. See id. at 227.
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intensify with the resurgence of nationalist American pride in the
wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks.133
The Latin American multiracial discourse has also begun to ex-
press itself within the works of some Critical Race theorists. Critical
Race Theory (CRT) is a strain of legal scholarship that challenges the
ways in which race and racial power are constructed and represented
in legal culture and, more generally, in society as a whole. 34 Despite
the centrality of race as a unit of analysis to CRT, a number of theo-
rists have begun to question the continuing value of focusing on
race.'3 5 These theorists suggest that the continuing reference to race
reaffirms the use of phenotype and ancestry as a locus of oppression
and difference. 136 I shall refer to these theorists as the new "race-less
CRT theorists."
Three common attributes loosely unite and most usefully de-
scribe these race-less CRT theorists: (1) published work as CRT schol-
ars; (2) documented commitment to antisubordination efforts for
racial minorities; and (3) recent interest in abandoning racial labels as
a mechanism for achieving racial justice. For instance, legal scholar
Reginald Robinson is a self-professed Critical Race theorist who has
begun to widely promote the idea that racial categories are counter-
productive to racial justice.'3 7 Robinson demonstrates his commit-
ment to eradicating the use of racial categories through recurrent
delivery of his paper, "The Death of the Critical Race Theorist and the
End of Race Consciousness."' 138 Robinson's premise is that the CRT
133 See Martinez-Echaz~bal, supra note 131, at 1 (describing the post-September 11,
2001 American Council television advertising campaign that features racially diverse par-
ticipants repeating the refrain "I am an American").
134 For surveys of CRT scholarship, see CRTICAL RACE THEORY- THE CtrrrlNG EDGE
(Richard Delgado &Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000) and CRITICAL RACE THEORY. THE KEY
WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT, supra note 6.
135 Scholars outside of legal academia have also begun to advocate the abolition of
race-consciousness. See PAUL GILROY, AGAINST RACE: IMAGINING PoLITICAL CULTURE BEYOND
THE COLOR LINE (2000) (contending that race-thinking, whether imposed or as an insur-
gent identity, has distorted the finest promises of modem democracy).
136 See Alex M. Johnson Jr., Destabilizing Racial Classifications Based on Insights Gleaned
from Trademark Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 887 (1996); Reginald Leamon Robinson, Race Con-
sciousness: A Mere Means of Preventing Escapes from the Control of Her White Masters?, 15 TOURo
L. REV. 401 (1999); Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Shifling Race-Consciousness Matrix and
the Multiracial Category Movement: A Critical Reply to Professor Hernandez, 20 B.C. THIRD
WORLD LJ. 231 (2000) [hereinafter Robinson, Citical Reply]; Jonathan K. Stubbs, The Im-
plications of Uniracial Theory: Towards a Jurisprudence of Race and Rights for the Next
Millennium (Nov. 13-15, 1997) (presented at "Critical Race Theory Conference," Yale Law
School) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
137 See Robinson, Critical Reply, supra note 136. But see Hernndez, supra note 10, at
115-21 (asserting that the movement for a "multiracial" racial classification reinforces soci-
etal value for Whiteness).
138 Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Death of the Race Crit: Deconstructing Critical
Race Theory and the End of Race Consciousness (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author). Professor Robinson has presented his paper at the following conferences: 1997
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scholar's commitment to race-consciousness is misplaced and under-
mines the CRT project to expose and eliminate racism. Because CRT
scholars rely upon the paradigm of racial categories in their legal anal-
ysis, Robinson believes that they "unwittingly give energy to racism
and white supremacy."' 39 Accordingly, a move away from the use of
racial categories would assist CRT scholars and others to "relate to
each other as Spirit beings."
140
What Robinson's analysis leaves unclear is the way in which a fo-
cus on "Spirit beings" would concretely uproot racial subordination.
Instead, Robinson argues that both the adoption of a "multiracial" ra-
cial category for mixed-race persons and a shift towards viewing per-
sons of African ancestry as an ethnic group could assist in abolishing
the use of racial categories. 141 Robinson's preference for ethnic labels
over racial labels grows out of philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah's
scholarly project to recognize racial classification as a culturally-based
practice rather than biologically-based reality.' 42
Similarly, legal scholar Alex M. Johnson Jr. refers to Appiah in
asserting that people of African descent will benefit from a paradigm
shift that abandons racial categories in favor of ethnic labels. 143 Al-
though Johnson ultimately rejects Appiah's wholesale approach to
supplanting the term "race" with "culture," 44 he does favor the as-
pects of Appiah's work that support a view of persons of African de-
scent as an ethnic group rather than a racial group. 145 Johnson's
premise is that an ethnicity model of identification will be able to gen-
erate the formation of a positive community, unfettered by color bias,
because it is free of the stigma that presumably accompanies a race-
based model of identification. 146 Furthermore, an ethnicity model
has the supposed benefit of permitting individuals to reject the cate-
Critical Race Theory Conference at Yale Law School; 1999 Critical Legal Theory Confer-
ence at the University of London; and the 2000 Mid-Atlantic People of Color Scholarship
Conference.
139 Robinson, Critical Reply, supra note 136, at 254-55.
140 Id- at 238. Similarly, the work of Jonathan K. Stubbs promotes a shift from race-
consciousness to humanness, but fails to address how this shift will dismantle the material
benefits within the current racial hierarchy. See Stubbs, supra note 136, at 2-6.
141 See Robinson, Critical Reply, supra note 136, at 238, 263, 272-73.
142 See KwAME ANTHONY APPIAH, IN My FATHER'S HOUSE: AFRICA IN THE PH4ILOSOPHY OF
CULTURE 37-42, 73-83, 174-78 (1992). Appiah is a Professor of African-American Studies
and Philosophy at Princeton University who has written extensively on African and African-
American literary criticism.
143 SeeJohnson, supra note 136, at 894-95, 917.
144 ME. at 911-12.
145 See id. at 910-12, 917.
146 See id. at 938.
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gory at will in much the same way that some Latin Americans of Afri-
can descent are able to reject the "Black" racial category.
1 47
In fact, much of Johnson's analysis rests upon a depiction of the
Latin American race model as comparatively more effective at destroy-
ing "the allegedly superior mark of whiteness,"' 48 because its focus
upon phenotype rather than ancestry is fluid enough to create "shade
confusion"'149 so as to undermine the power of the Whiteness "trade-
mark."150 Yet, in their well-intentioned proposals for the destabiliza-
tion of racial categories, Johnson, Robinson, and other emerging race-
less CRT scholars1 5' fail to observe that an investigation of the Latin
American context reveals the fallacy of presuming that more fluid ap-
proaches to racial labeling and a colorblind deflection from race actu-
ally work to destroy racial hierarchy rather than reinforce it.
III
THE CRITIQUE: "MARX" AND "ORIGIN"-CORRSPONDENCES
OF PREJUDICE
When we strip away the historical variations in social and political construc-
tions of race in the Americas, one glaring commonality remains: general so-
cial discrimination based on skin color.
152
While the U.S. and Latin American race models may appear dif-
ferent on the surface, upon closer inspection the two models evince a
disturbing commonality. Both models esteem Whiteness and main-
tain racial hierarchy. Despite its distinct model of race, Latin America
continues to suffer from the same racial disparities in socioeconomic
opportunities as the United States. 153 Indeed, some Latin American
147 See id. at 933-36. But see Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule:
Racial Categories, African Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1161, 1188-1202
(1997) (favoring rigid racial categories because they have maintained the cohesion of the
African-American community).
148 Johnson, supra note 136, at 920.
149 Id. at 891.
150 See id. at 898-99, 920-21.
151 See, e.g., e. christi cunningham, The "Racing" Cause of Action and the Identity Formerly
Known as Race: The Road to Tamazunchale, 30 RUTGERS LJ. 707, 727 (1999) (advocating
the "death of race as a facet of identity"); Stubbs, supra note 136 (advocating a shift from
"race-consciousness" to a focus on "human-ness"). Nor is the race-lessness shift limited to
race critics who are legal scholars. Jorge KIor de Alva is a prominent Professor of Compar-
ative Ethnic Studies and Anthropology who also strongly advocates for the abolition of all
racial classifications. See Our Next Race Question: The Uneasiness Between Blacks and Latinos,
HARPER'S, Apr. 1996, at 55, 59-61 (presenting Kior de Alva's opposition to the use of any
racial categories). "[R]ace is a lamentable category for any kind of progressive organiza-
tion, and we need an alternative to affirmative action. I would remove the government
from participation in the naming game and its divisive racializing of identities." Id. at 61.
152 James Early, Reflections on Cuba, Race, and Politics, Sours, Spring 1999, at 46, 52.
153 See SANCHEZ & FRANKLIN, supra note 88, at 221 (describing the similarities across




historians suggest that the relative population sizes of people of Afri-
can ancestry vis-A.-vis Whites are more central to the fluidity of racial
classifications than any national identity as a racial democracy.15 4 To
be specific, unlike the United States, Cuba and Puerto Rico's popula-
tion of persons of African ancestry have historically numerically ap-
proximated (and some commentators think surpassed)1 55 the
population of its White elite.' 56 In fact, "[o]ver 90 percent of the ap-
proximately 10 million enslaved Africans brought to the Americas...
were taken to Latin America and the Caribbean,"'1 7 whereas only
4.6% were brought to the United States. 158 The distinct racial demog-
raphy of Latin America-where there generally is a smaller propor-
tion of Whites in comparison to its African-descended and indigenous
populations-has in tum motivated Whites in Latin America to per-
mit the social ascendancy of some Afro-Latinos, 159 and usually its Mu-
lattos and Mestizos, to buffer the elite against the discontent of the
subordinated majority of color.160 Hence, even the economic and so-
cial mobility of some Afro-Latinos within the fluid racial classification
scheme is rooted in the reality of a racial hierarchy. Thus, the Latin
American public pride regarding the fluidity of its formal racial classi-
fication practices is particularly misplaced. Indeed, the informal ra-
cial classification practices that Latin Americans rarely discuss more
starkly manifest the connection to White supremacy.
At the same time, informal racial designations are more impervi-
ous to the influence of social status. An Afro-Latino can sometimes
achieve a comfortable socioeconomic standing, but will still be dispar-
aged as a Black person in social discussions outside his or her pres-
ence; the only distinction that will be made is to describe that
individual as "the Black person with money."16' Even Cuban dictator
154 See DEGLER, supra note 22, at 239-45.
155 See Santiago-Valles, supra note 50, at 44 (noting one Puerto Rican scholar's argu-
ment that "in 1942 only about 40 percent of the Island's population could be considered
predominantly white," and another scholar's 1965 estimate that seventy percent of the
population was mixed).
156 See, e.g., KiNSBRUNER, supra note 35, at 28-30 (charting the percentage of Blacks
and Whites in Puerto Rico from 1779 to 1830); David Booth, Cuba, Color and the Revolution,
40 Sci. & Soc'y. 129, 140-41 (1976).
157 MiriamJimenez Romdn, Un hombre (negro) del pueblo:Jos6 Celso Barbosa and the
Puerto Rican "Race" Toward Whiteness, 8 CENrRo 8, 12 (1996).
158 Id.
159 I use the academic terms "Afro-Latinos" and "Afro-Cubans" to collectively describe
all Latino and Cuban persons of African descent, whether racially categorized as Mulatto
or Black, and to focus upon the centrality of bias against African ancestry and phenotype in
Cuba and Latin America.
160 See DEGLER, supra note 22, at 239-44 (discussing the role of demography in the
recognition of mixed-race identities).
161 See, e.g., HoEmmc, supra note 43, at 169 & n.3 (stating that prejudice of origin also
permeates Latin American race relations in that the African ancestors of a designated
White person become relevant in disputes).
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Fulgencio Batista was reportedly denied admission to some of Ha-
vana's "exclusive clubs" because of informal knowledge of his African
ancestry.162 Thus, while the formal method of racial classification is
seemingly more fluid than the United States' more restrictive rule of
hypo-descent, Latin Americans have particular moments when they in-
formally deploy a binary model of racial classification more character-
istic of the U.S. approach. The binary race model surfaces when Latin
Americans engage in acts of discrimination and when victims describe
an experience of discrimination. 163 Sociologist Isar Godreau explains
the Latin American shifting between fluid and binary models of race
as a manifestation of individuals' expressions of when "'the other
doesn't belong.""u 64 In contrast, the seeming fluidity of the Latin
American approach to racial designation centers on assisting individu-
als to avoid the negative formal racial classification of Black, while at all
times maintaining an informal recognition of African ancestry.
In this scheme, the parameters that cabin the fluidity of racial
classification are the degree of one's pigmentation, African features,
and socioeconomic status. For instance, Batista would have been less
able to alter his formal racial classification upon improving his social
standing if his African ancestry had been a more prominent aspect of
his coloring and features. Thus, the power of socioeconomic status to
lend flexibility to formal racial classification can be limited by the visi-
bility of one's African ancestry in physical appearance. 165
Ultimately, the Cuban and Puerto Rican fluidity in racial identifi-
cation is premised on a racist ideology of whitening, in which individ-
uals are esteemed by how closely they approximate and effectively
claim Whiteness. 166 More specifically, the value these nations place
on European (Spanish) ancestry dictates the fluidity of racial designa-
tion: the more White one appears, the more "freedom" one has to
162 See MooRE, supra note 23, at 5; Casal, supra note 45, at 18.
163 See Godreau, Confronting the Panic, supra note 93, at 9.
164 Id. (describing how Puerto Ricans interviewed in an empirical study of race on the
island constantly shifted between binary models of race talk and more fluid, euphemistic
models, but observing that the binary use of linguistic categories "speaks to the real effects
of racist[ ] forms of exclusion that fix and essentialize identities").
165 The ability of soccer player Pel6 (a dark-skinned Afro-Brazilian) to alter his identifi-
cation documents to reflect a White racial designation, see supra note 77 and accompanying
text, does not diminish the significance of phenotype as a limitation on fluid racial identity
practices. The absolute rarity of dark-skinned persons altering their formal racial designa-
tion and the singularity of Peld's international stardom lends even greater credence to this
conclusion. See Anani Dzidzienyo, Africana and the United States (of America)-Latin
America Comparison: Myths and Realities 18 (Nov. 2, 2001) (presented at "Race Mixture
in the Americas" symposium, American University, Washington College of Law) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author) (observing that the rarity of instances such as PelM's
that illustrate how "'money whitens'" reinforces the untenability of the hypothesis).
166 See Helg, supra note 87, at 47-48 (discussing the esteem for Whiteness in Cuba);
Torres, supra note 82, at 286 (explaining the hyper-privileging of persons associated with
Whiteness in Puerto Rico).
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claim a racial designation distinct from other persons with similar
non-White origins. Consequently, the flexibility in the Latin Ameri-
can racial designation system is restricted to those persons whose
lighter skin and European phenotype permit them to escape Black-
ness; 167 darker-skinned impoverished members of the non-White pop-
ulation are not at liberty to claim a Mulatto or White racial
designation. In substance, the facial fluidity of the Latin American
model, which presumably gives individuals more autonomy over racial
designation, is in actuality restrictive and racist in its allocation of the
White and Mulatto designations.' 68 The restricted access to fluidity in
racial designations operates cumulatively to the systematic disadvan-
tage of dark-skinned persons of African ancestry because of the con-
comitant racially stratified access to socioeconomic opportunity. In
short, the Latin American racial classification system views Whiteness
as property to the same extent as Professor Cheryl I. Harris persua-
sively describes it with regard to the U.S. classification system.
169
In Latin America, like in the United States, having lighter skin
and European features increases the chances of socioeconomic op-
portunity, while having darker skin and African features severely limits
such opportunity and social mobility.'70 Predictably, the poorest so-
cioeconomic class is populated primarily by Afro-Latinos, the most
167 In those Latin American countries in which persons of indigenous ancestry are the
more numerous non-White population, the Mestizo category provides an escape from pejo-
rative associations with Indianess. See LDons, supra note 48, at 337 (describing the use of
the Mestizo category); cf Richard Rodriguez, Mixed Blood: Columbus's Legacy: A World Made
Mestizo, HARPER'S, Nov. 1991, at 47, 52 ("Mexican mothers may wish for light-skinned chil-
dren; touch blond hair and good luck will be yours. In private, in Mexican Spanish, indio is
a seller of Chiclets, a sidewalk squatter. Indio means backward or lazy or lower-class.").
168 Torres and Whitten posit that:
One would like to think, and many would have us believe, that in Latin
America and the Caribbean there is substantial fluidity in class, ethnic, and
power relationships. Such is not the case. Almost everywhere, serious re-
search turns up a pyramidal class structure, cut variously by ethnic lines, but
with a local, regional, and nation-state elite characterized as 'white' ....
that results in the perpetuation of lightness as superior to darkness... [,]
add[ing] to the features of a racialist structure of domination ....
Torres & Whitten, supra note 71, at 23; see also Booth, supra note 156, at 139 ("This scheme
of classification is not and has never been evaluatively neutral, but rests upon straightfor-
wardly racist assumptions.").
169 See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Proerty, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1707 (1993).
170 See HOETINK, supra note 43, at 40; see also Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker
Shade of Pale 47 UCLA L. REv. 1705, 1708-11 (2000) (summarizing a wealth of literature
documenting the skin privilege that light-skinned Blacks receive in the United States); Leo-
nard M. Baynes, If It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, Why Does Darkness Cast a Longer
Discriminatory Shadow than Lightness?. An Investigation and Analysis of the Color Hierarchy, 75
DENY. U. L. Rzv. 131, 159-62 (1997) (discussing studies comparing income and profes-
sional positions of light- and dark-skinned Blacks and Latinos in the United States); Robyn
Meredith, Color Counts, USA ToDAy, June 21, 1995, at IB (citing a study by the Ford Foun-
dation and Russell Sage Foundation that found that being Black and dark-skinned reduced
the odds of finding employment in Los Angeles by fifty-two percent).
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privileged class is populated primarily by Whites, and an elastic inter-
mediary socioeconomic standing exists for some light-skinned Mulat-
tos. Thus, race influences one's socioeconomic standing and class
status informs the flexibility of one's racial designation. 171 During
downturns in the national economy, when fewer economic benefits
are provided to Mulattos as an intermediate class, Mulattos continue
to experience their racial identification as an enhanced social sta-
tus. 172 The restricted access to fluid racial identification highlights
the manner in which the very flexibility of the racial designation sys-
tem is designed to assist individuals to avoid pejorative associations
with Blackness in order to maintain a system of White privilege, rather
than stemming from a humanitarian impulse to place less emphasis
on the importance of race. For instance, in Puerto Rico it has been
noted that marriages frequently dissolve when the offspring turn out
to be a darker shade than either parent, and each spouse accuses the
other of closeting the African ancestors of the family.' 73 The marital
discord arises from the fact that darker-skinned offspring disrupt the
couple's blanqueamiento social ascendancy, because their own racial sta-
tus is called into question by their association with the child. This is
yet another example of how the presumed fluidity of the Latin Ameri-
can race model is constricted when confronted with Blackness. The
Latin American politics of racial fluidity have historically been-and
continue to be-centered on supporting White supremacy.
At first glance Latin American racial fluidity may seem akin to
"passing," a practice that occurs both in the United States and Latin
America.' 74 However, one crucial distinction exists: passing entails
the private and individuated decision to deny one's African ancestry
for personal gain or survival, whereas Latin American fluidity is the
171 Cf. JORGE I. DOM[NGUEZ, CUBA: ORDER AND REVOLUTION 225 (1978) (citing research
conducted in Cuba in the late 1940s that showed that Whites who resided in the same
tenements as Blacks in the same income group were accorded better accommodations);
Helg, supra note 87, at 53-54 (noting that darkness of skin is also directly related to likeli-
hood of imprisonment, inequality in education, jobs, income, and life chances in Cuba).
But see ALINE HELG, OUR RIGHTFUL SHARE: THE AFRo-CuBAN STRUGGLE FOR EQUALrrY,
1886-1912, at 3-4, 13-14 (1995) (stating that Cuba's virulent discrimination against both
Blacks and Mulattos during periods of heavy Spanish immigration has resulted in moments
of collective action between Blacks and Mulattos as a single "raza de color").
172 See WiNANT, supra note 5, at 134-35 (observing that while Mulattos may not always
statistically outrank Afro-Brazilians in socioeconomic status, their social status as Mulattos
continues to be salient in the racial order). But see Nelson do Valle Silva, Updating the Cost
of Not Being White in Brazil, in RACE, CLAsS, AND POWER IN BRAZIL 42, 54-55 (Pierre-Michel
Fontaine ed., 1985) (noting that Blacks and Mulattos face almost equal levels of
discrimination).
173 See Thomas G. Mathews, The Question of Color in Puerto Rico, in SLAVERY AND RACE
RELATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 81, at 317.
174 "Passing" is the practice by which persons with African ancestry, but with a muted




public endorsement of a national preference for Whiteness. 175 None-
theless, the apparent similarity of passing and fluidity highlights the
use of ancestry in the purportedly distinct prejudice-of-mark Latin
American approach to race: African ancestry is the identification that
an individual denies by passing, and from which the individual dis-
tances herself or himself through fluidity.
Thus, the operation of the U.S. and Latin American systems is
similar in that racial ancestry pervades phenotype in Latin America,
while phenotype is a marker of racial ancestry in the United States.
To be precise, the Latin American model's formal and informal assess-
ment of race-based on a visual inspection of skin color and pheno-
type-necessarily and primarily involves ancestry, which largely
determines one's racial appearance. In Latin America, phenotype
acts as a substitute for ancestry rather than as a determinant of ances-
try, while in the United States, ancestry designations are a proxy for
phenotype. The systemic difference between the Latin American and
the U.S. model is neither one of kind nor even of degree; it is more of
semantics. The Latin American model is promoted as flexible and
therefore less focused on maintaining rigid racial distinctions,
whereas the U.S. model is promoted as static and therefore reliable in
its consistency. But in practice, the rigidity built into "fluid" Latin
American visual assessments, and the imprecise and thus necessarily
fluid, visual assessments that form a part of the rigid traditional U.S.
model, both mix and deploy the politics of fluidity and rigidity to
maintain a hierarchical preference for Whiteness in both places.
Latin American prejudice of mark is also viewed as more fluid in
that Latin America has historically recognized mixed-race persons of
African ancestry, like Mulattos, as formally distinct from persons of
predominantly African descent.' 76 The racial demography of much of
Latin America provides the institutional rationale for recognizing a
distinct Mulatto class privileged over those classified as Black. For ex-
ample, the demographic pattern of Cuba since the invasion of the
Spaniards and the forced labor of African slaves has consistently main-
tained a fluctuating minority of Whites and a significant proportion of
persons of color.' 77 Thus, the White fear of being overrun by a major-
175 Id. at 123-24.
176 See HoETINK, supra note 43, at 40-41. A movement in the United States for a simi-
lar recognition of a mixed-race racial identification has recently emerged. See supra notes
15-16 and accompanying text.
177 See Daridn J. Davis, The African Experience in Latin America-Resistance and Accommo-
dation, Introduction to SLAVERY AND BEYOND: THE AFRICAN IMPACr ON LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN, at xi, xx-xxiii & tbls.1-2 (DarifnJ. Davis ed. 1995) (observing the demo-
graphic pattern of non-White majorities in Latin American countries despite the prevalent
manipulation of census racial data); McGarrity & Cirdenas, supra note 73, at 78.
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ity of non-Whites 178 has motivated normative and official recognition
throughout Cuba and Latin America of an intermediate racial class
that buffers the most privileged from the wholly disenfranchised. 179
The demographic pattern of a White minority with a large non-White
majority, historically and presently, is paralleled in most Latin Ameri-
can countries,180 yet is markedly distinct from the United States's
demographic of a White majority and non-White minority.18' The in-
termediate category variance in racial designation systems is primarily
attributable to this difference in racial demography, rather than to
Latin American fluidity or respect for individual autonomy to infor-
mally self-determine a racial classification.'8 2 The changing
demographics of the United States, reflecting a growing presence of
non-White residents, has propelled a similar concern that Whites may
become a numerical minority and thus have their race-based privi-
leges threatened.'83 It is this very population shift to a non-White ma-
jority, along with the history of White supremacy, that makes the
comparison to the Latin American context particularly relevant.
Hence, sociologistJoe Feagin terms the demographic incentive to rec-
ognize intermediate status racial categories as the "Brazilianization" of
the United States. 1
84
Furthermore, the Latin American Mulatto category indicates how
Whiteness dominates race in Latin America, as it does in the United
178 See, e.g., Rafael DuharteJimdnez, The 19th Century Black Fear, in AFROCUBA: AN AN-
THOLOGY OF CUBAN WRITING ON RACE, POLITICS AND CULTURE 37 (Pedro Perez Sarduy &
Jean Stubbs eds., 1993); see also Matt D. Childs, "Sewing" Civilization: Cuban Female Education
in the Context of Africanization, 1800-1860, 54 AMERICAS 83, 99 (1997) (noting that the nine-
teenth-century promotion of White female education was an effort to portray Cuba as a
"civilized" (and not African) country and "also served a crucial function in defining differ-
ences between the races").
179 See Hern~andez, supra note 10, at 121-39; see also Martfnez-EchazAbal, supra note 29,
at 27-28 (describing the Latin American support for race mixture as a means of coun-
tering the threat of Black supremacy).
180 Even the notable exception of Argentina, with its numerical majority of Whites,
purposely cultivated such a demographic pattern at the expense of its Afro-Argentine re-
sidents. See GEORGE REID ANDREWS, THE AFRO-ARGENTINES OF BUENOS AIRES, 1800-1900, at
101-12 (1980) (describing Argentina's national campaign to "whiten" the country).
181 HARRIS, supra note 20, at 128 fig.
182 See DEGLER, supra note 22, at 245.
183 See Farai Chideya, Editorial, Shades of the Future: Will Race Provide the Midentuy Cri-
sis?, TIME, Feb. 1, 1999, at 54 ("The U.S. Census Bureau predicts that by the middle of the
next century, race in America will be turned upside down. In 2050 whites will be a minor-
ity, and present-day minorities will be in the majority."); see also DALE MAHARIDGE, THE
COMING WHITE MINORITY 1 (1996) (reviewing demographers' predictions that Whites will
become a numerical minority in the United States within coming generations). But see
DAvis, supra note 14, at 35-37 (explaining that colonial South Carolina and Louisiana were
exceptions to the U.S. demographic pattern, with their majority non-Whites and minority
Whites, and that this distinction in racial demographics also accounts for South Carolina
and Louisiana's recognition of Mulattos as a separate racial classification).
184 See FEAGIN, supra note 13, at 232.
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States: the Mulatto category feeds the preference for Whiteness and
the privilege of Whites. For instance, until the Cuban revolution of
1959, certain occupations used explicit color preferences to hire Mu-
lattos to the complete exclusion of dark-skinned Blacks,18 5 based on
the premise that Mulattos were superior to dark-skinned Blacks but
not of the same status as Whites. Thus, a consequence of the exodus
of many wealthy or middle-class White Cubans after the 1959 installa-
tion of the socialist government was that light-skinned Mulattos were
socially promoted to the status of Whites.186 But, when those same
light-skinned Mulattos later managed to leave the island to resettle in
the predominantly White Cuban exile communities of the United
States, the altered racial demographics stripped them of their "White
status" and they were once again treated as Mulattos by their fellow
Cuban 6migr6s (and as Blacks by Anglo-Americans under the rule of
hypo-descent).187 The fluidity of the Cuban racial classification sys-
tem, therefore, is not only constrained by the degree of one's pigmen-
tation, African phenotype, and socioeconomic status, but also by a
structural concern with the number of non-Whites vis-a-vis a privileged
White class. This dynamic is found in much of Latin America. 88
Another point of correspondence between Latin America and
the United States is that the legacy of White supremacy is deeply in-
grained. The tendency to mask African heritage remains pervasive in
Cuba. For example, one scholar recounts that when he referred to a
self-identified Mulatto law student as a person of color, the student
quickly responded "Yes, but I am very advanced," referring to his light
skin and European hair texture.'8 9 In other words, the Cuban law
student immediately wished to distance himself from association with
other persons of African ancestry by emphasizing his superior ("ad-
vanced") physical qualities because no plausible benefit inheres to
identifying with African ancestry, and because only pejorative assess-
ments are made about African ancestry. Similarly, in research con-
ducted in Puerto Rico during the 1997-1998 academic year, the
overwhelming majority of 187 interviewed college students described
185 See RouT, supra note 34, at 305.
186 See McGarrity & Cdrdenas, supra note 73, at 103.
187 See id.; see also Mirta Ojito, Best of Friends, Worlds Apart, N.Y. TIMEs, June 5, 2000, at
Al (describing the heightened race bias expressed by exiled White Cubans in the United
States against Cubans of color).
188 Cf RouTr, supra note 34, at 306 ("As in Santo Domingo [Dominican Republic] and
elsewhere [in Latin America,] if Cubans wanted to believe that their nation was getting
whiter, census statistics would be provided to help them preserve their beliefs.").




"Puerto Ricans who are 'dumb"' as having "dark skin."190 Conversely,
the same interviewees correlated "light" skin color with a description
of "Puerto Ricans who are physically strong."' 9 ' Such negative per-
spectives about African ancestry are not limited to this study's partici-
pants. In 1988, when the presiding Governor of Puerto Rico publicly
stated that "'[t] he contribution of the black race to Puerto Rican cul-
ture is irrelevant, it is mere rhetoric,"' 192 it was in keeping with what
social scientists describe as the standard paradox in Puerto Rico: Pu-
erto Ricans take great pride in the purported claim of being the whit-
est people among the Caribbean islands, while simultaneously assert
themselves as non-racist.193 The pride of being a presumably White
population is a direct reaction to the Puerto Rican understanding that
"black people . . .are perceived to be culturally unrefined and lack
ambition." 9
4
Again, as in the United States, the disparagement of Black iden-
tity is not limited to Mulattos and Whites, but also extends to Blacks
themselves, who can harbor internalized racist norms. 195 This inter-
nalization manifests itself in a widespread concern among Afro-Lati-
nos with the degree of darkness in pigmentation, width of nose,
thickness of lips, and quality of one's hair-with straight, European
hair denominated, literally, as "good" hair.196 This concern with Eu-
ropean skin and features also influences Afro-Latinos' assessments of
preferred marriage partners. Marrying someone lighter is called "ade-
lantando la raza" (improving the race) under the theory of blan-
queamiento (whitening), which prizes the mixture of races precisely to
help diminish the existence of Blacks. 197 A European journalist noted
the following as a typical response in interviews conducted in 1959 in
Cuba:
190 See Ronald E. Hall, A Descriptive Analysis of Skin Color Bias in Puerto Rico: Ecological
Applications to Practice, J. Soc. & Soc. WELFARE, Dec. 2000, at 171, 176-78 (detailing survey
data that demonstrated that light skin is ideally valued among Puerto Ricans interviewed).
191 Id. at 177-78 & tbl.2.
192 Torres, supra note 82, at 286 (quoting Rafael Hernindez Col6n, Espafia, San Antdn
y el ser nacional EL NuEvo DIA, June 6, 1988, at 53).
193 See Robert A. Martinez, Puerto Ricans: White or Non White? A Study of the Para-
dox of Race Perceptions Among Mainland Bred and Island Bred Puerto Ricans 2-3 (1985)
(Educ. Res. Info. Ctr., U.S. Dep't of Educ., No. ED 267 144) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author)).
194 Torres, supra note 82, at 297.
195 See, e.g., Carmen Luz Valcarcel, Growing Up Black in Puerto Rico, in CHALLENGING
RACISM AND SEXISM: ALTERNATIVES TO GENETIC ExPLANATIONS 284, 287 (Ethel Tobach &
Betty Rosoff eds., 1994) (sharing experiences as an Afro-Latina who internalized Puerto
Ricans' negative assessments of Blacks).
196 See Martinez, supra note 193, at 5 (describing Puerto Ricans' fixation on the subtle
racial markers of hair texture, lips, nose, and skin color).
197 See Torres & Whitten, supra note 71, at 8-9, 13 (explaining blanqueamiento as the




"Cuban girls like me, with mixed blood, dream of going out with a
white man like you. The Revolution has done away with color
prejudice but to marry a white man, one hundred percent white,
that would be great. That's a wonderful thing the Revolution could
do. It ought to step up the process of making Cuba white. ... In
that way the coloreds would soon become absorbed, and there'd be
no more Negroes, no more prejudices, no more anything."198
Let us return to the case of Ms. Phipps, the Louisiana resident
unhappily designated Black, and whose valuation of Whiteness reso-
nates with that of the Afro-Cuban noted above. In the words of the
plaintiff, "'I am all white. I was raised as a white child. I went to white
school. [sic] I married white twice."' 199 Ms. Phipps also remarked
that "'[t]here are no blacks out where I live, except the hired
hands.' 200 Ms. Phipps took great pains to live her life within a White
segregated context that would maintain the "purity," and thus the per-
ceived superiority, of a White identity. Despite the richness of her
racial ancestry, she fought to cling to an all-White racial classification
because she understood that, unlike Blackness, Whiteness is not a
trap-it is a prized possession.20 1 But what Ms. Phipps and other crit-
ics of the rule of hypo-descent overlook is the way in which the narrow
concern with being cabined into a Black racial designation supports
White supremacy by preferring a White designation to all others in
the stampede to avoid connections to Blackness. Thus, both the U.S.
and Latin American models of race are constructed to prize White-
ness and devalue non-Whiteness.20 2
In sum, a critical comparison of Cuban, Puerto Rican, and the
U.S.'s racial classification systems reveals that, although the Latin
American model is sometimes described with relative approval be-
cause of its perceived accommodation of individual autonomy in in-
formal racial designation, both the Latin American and United
States's classification systems exist within a hierarchy that systemati-
cally and socially privileges Whiteness and constrains "choice."20 3 In
198 MOORE, supra note 23, at 42-43 (quoting VICrOR FRANCE, THE MORNING AYrER
42-43 (1963)).
199 Slave Descendant Fights Race Listing, N.Y. TimEs, Sept. 15, 1982, at A16.
200 See Art Harris, Louisiana Court Sees No Shades of Gray in Woman's Reques4 WASH. POsr,
May 21, 1983, at A3.
201 Unlike Ms. Phipps, there are many people who view the U.S. designation of all
persons with any African ancestry as Black as a source of empowerment for all Blacks
'trapped" within racially oppressive environments. See Hickman, supra note 147, at
1202-05.
202 See Duany, supra note 49, at 25 ("It is sterile to argue that one scheme is right and
the other wrong, or that one is morally superior to the other. Instead, both systems are
historically and culturally grounded in racist projects originating in colonialism and slav-
ery" (citation omitted)).
203 SeeJoHN CLYrus, BLACK MAN IN RED CUBA 158 (1970) (discussing the African-Amer-
ican experience living in revolutionary Cuba); DOMINGUEZ, supra note 171, at 225; DEBRA
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fact, this analysis shows how the two systems have historically had
more in common than is at first apparent. This correspondence per-
sists under socialist Cuba despite its decreed abolition of race, and in
Puerto Rico despite its long-standing democracy and extensive civil
rights laws.
IV
THE EFFECTS OF RACE IDEOLOGY ON CIVIL RIGHTS LAW
Racism is about race: more races can lead both to changes in the way racism
is presented, and ultimately to more, rather than less, racism.20 4
A. Introduction to the Latin American Commonalities
The vast majority of Latin American countries have mandates
against race discrimination in their constitutions. 205 However, most
EVENSON, REVOLUTION IN THE BALANCE: LAW AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY CUBA 108-14
(1994); cf. LUMSDEN, supra note 189, at 147 (stating that "[w]ithin the gay community, as
elsewhere, there is little or no space for blacks to articulate their feelings about racial
prejudice let alone to respond to it in terms of self-organization"); EuSA LARKIN NAsci-
MENTO, PAN-AFRICANISM IN SOUTH AMERICA: EMERGENCE OF A BLACK REBELLION (1980) (dis-
cussing encouragement for Blacks in Latin America to dissociate from a Black identity);
Alejandro de la Fuente, Race and Inequality in Cuba, 1899-1981, 30 J. CONTEMP. Hisr. 131,
161 n.56 (1995) (noting "manifestations of cultural racism such as the persistence of white
symbols in magazines"); T.Z. Parsa, Club Red, N.Y. MAG., Nov. 17, 1997, at 36, 42.
204 Caldwell, supra note 109, at 63.
205 E.g., BELIZE CONST. pt. II, § 3, reprinted inJefriJay Ruchti, Belize, in 2 CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD Release 97-3, at 13 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 1997); CON-
sTITUICAO FEDERAL tit. II, ch. I, art. 5, § XLII (Braz.), translated in Keith S. Rosenn, Federative
Republic of Brazil, in 3 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra, Release
2001-2, at 5 (2001); CONSTITUCION POLTICA tit II, ch. 1, art. 13 (Colom.), translated in
Gisbert H. Flanz, Colombia, in 4 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra,
Release 95-4, at 164-65 (Peter B. Heller & Marcia W. Coward trans., 1995); CONTITUCI6N
ch. VI, arts. 42-43 (1992) (Cuba), translated in Inter-Univ. Assocs., Inc., Republic of Cuba, in
5 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra, Release 2000-1, at 12-13 (2000);
CONSTITUCIN POLTICA tit. III, ch. 2, art. 23, cl. 3 (Ecuador), translated in Inter-Univ. As-
socs., Inc., Republic of Ecuador, in 6 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra,
Release 99-4, at 5 (Reka Koemer trans., 1999); CONTITUCION tit. II, ch. I, art. 3 (El Sal.),
translated in Inter-Univ. Assocs., Inc., Republic of El Salvador, in 6 CONSTITUrTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra, Release 98-5, at 1 (Reka Koerner trans., 1998); CONSTITU-
CI6N tit. III, ch. 1, art. 60 (Hond.), translated in Gisbert H. Flanz &JefriJay Ruchti, Republic
of Honduras, in 8 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra, Release 97-2, at
16 (Reka Koerner trans., 1997); CONSTrruCI6N POLITICA it. IV, ch. 1, art. 27 (Nicar.), trans-
lated in Inter-Univ. Assocs., Inc., Republic of Nicaragua, in 13 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUN-
TRIES OF THE WORLD, supra, Release 98-5, at 6 (Anna I. Vellv& Torras trans., 1998);
CONSTITUC16N POLfTICA tit. III, ch. 1, art. 19 (Pan.), translated injorge Fabrega P. &JefriJay
Ruchti, Republic of Panama, in 14 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra,
Release 95-8, at 105 (Jorge Fabrega P. trans., 1995); CONSTITUCI6N POLTICA tit. I, ch. I, arL
2, cl. 2 (Peru), translated in Peter B. Heller, Peru, in 14 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD, supra, Release 95-1, at 113 (1995); CONSTrruCION tit. III, ch. 1, art. 21, cl. 1
(Venez.), translated in Gisbert H. Flanz, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, in 20 CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra, Release 2000-3, at 4 (2000).
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lack either legislation to implement the antidiscrimination policy 20 6
or a governmental agency dedicated to enforcing them.20 7 In fact, an
examination of civil fights structures in six Latin American countries,
sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank, characterizes
Latin American countries as generally lacking government agencies
dedicated to handling or investigating charges of discrimination.208
The few countries with enabling statutes have tended to focus on
criminal law provisions as the primary vehicle for combating acts of
discrimination,20 9 in part because the criminal law venue does not re-
quire an investment of financial resources on the part of the victim.
2 10
While criminal law enforcement carries a strong normative state-
ment about the evils of racism, it has proven a poor means for han-
dling incidents of race discrimination. In the case of Brazil, for
example, because the criminal justice system is overloaded with tradi-
tional crimes involving physical harm to individuals and property, few
race discrimination allegations are investigated. 21' In turn, the few
allegations that are investigated encounter a judicial system that is re-
luctant to impose the sanction of prison for such a harm.212 The
aforementioned survey of legal systems also notes that Latin American
civil rights structures are hampered by the lack of provisions for attor-
ney's fees and other financial incentives for client representation, as
well as the absence of an active civil rights bar.2 1 3 While these hemi-
206 See generally Robert J. Cottrol & Tanya Kater Hernd.ndez, The Role of Law and
Legal Institutions in Combating Social Exclusion in Latin American Countries: Afro-Ameri-
can Populations (June 18, 2001) (presented at "Towards a Shared Vision of Development:
High Level Dialogue on Race, Ethnicity and Inclusion in Latin America and the Carib-
bean" conference, Inter-American Development Bank) (while the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank funded the research for this report, none of the statements therein should
be regarded as the official views of the institution) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (observing the absence of enabling legislation for constitutional racial equality
provisions in Colombia, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Venezuela); see also Banco Interameri-
cano de Desarollo, Political Feasibility Assessment: Country Potential for New Research on
Race in Latin America 5-8 (Nov. 8-10, 2000) (presented at "Todos Contamos: Los Grupos
Etnicos en los Censos" conference) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (observ-
ing that few countries in Latin America have laws that directly address racial hatred and
discrimination) [hereinafter Banco Interamericano de Desarollo].
207 See Interview with Bill Lann Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, US
Department of Justice, 4 GEO. PuB. POL'Y Rnv. 119, 119 (1999) (observing that unlike the
United States, most other countries "don't have an office that is charged with the job of
enforcing civil rights guarantees").
208 See Cottrol & Herndndez, supra note 206, at 35-37.
209 See id. at 11.
210 See Sueli Carneiro, Estrategias Legais Para Promover Ajustica Social, in TIRANDo A
MAscARA: ENsAios SOMEu 0 RAcisMo No BRASIL 311, 320 (Antonio Sergio Alfredo
Guimaraes & Lynn Huntley eds., 2000).
211 See RobertJ. Cottrol, The Long Lingering Shadow: Law, Liberalism, and Cultures of Ra-
cial Hierarchy and Identity in the Americas, 76 TUL. L. REv. 11, 74-75 (2001).
212 Id. at 75.
213 Cottrol & Hemndez, supra note 206, at 34-35.
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spheric distinctions in structuring antidiscrimination lawmaking must
certainly contribute to the general underenforcement of civil rights
laws in Latin America, they do not provide a complete explanation for
the distinct enforcement rates of civil rights laws.214
The variation among Latin American antidiscrimination lawmak-
ing approaches undermines the notion that Latin America's legal ap-
proach for handling race discrimination is solely responsible for the
difference in enforcement rates between the United States and Latin
America. For example, although criminal law sanctions are a predom-
inant format for antidiscrimination laws in Latin America, Peru em-
ploys civil law sanctions against discrimination in public
accommodations. 215 Nevertheless, Peru also suffers from underu-
tilization of its civil rights laws.216 Moreover, Puerto Rico has access to
all U.S. federal civil rights laws, yet similarly demonstrates an underu-
tilization of those laws.2 17 Nor can the poverty of the majority of Afro-
Latinos be offered as the primary reason for underenforcement if the
available criminal law venues are cost-free for the victims. In fact,
some studies indicate that the number of criminal law complaints is
deflated by the discriminatory pressure that victims encounter from
law enforcement officials when they attempt to file a complaint.218 In
addition, the refusal of many Latin American nations to collect census
data according to racial identity, or otherwise collect systematic infor-
mation on the status of its racial and ethnic populations, is problem-
atic. "Only 4 out of 26 countries in Latin America have census data on
214 Nor should the United States be viewed as the ideal in its civil rights lawmaking. See
FEAGIN, supra note 13, at 242 ("The laws were never intended to uproot systemic racism.
While they have gotten rid of legal segregation, they are for the most part ineffective in
regard to much informal discrimination and segregation."). Recognizing the inherent effi-
cacy limitations on all individual-focused and equal opportunity-based civil rights legal sys-
tems with limited group-based economic redistributive justice, this Article does not seek to
provide a comparative analysis assessing the most effective civil rights structures or features.
See Hermindez, supra note 37, at 1159-67 (discussing the limitations of a legal approach to
race discrimination that does not consider the group-based issues of socioeconomic sta-
tus). Instead, this comparative study seeks to explore the threshold question about what
effects race ideology has on the incentive to use the legal system for purposes of social
justice reform.
215 Ley No. 27,049 (Dec. 31, 1998) (Peru) (prohibiting discrimination in public ac-
commodations), available at http://www.leyes.congreso.gob.pe/Imagenes/leyes/27049.
pdf; Ley No. 27,270 arts. 2-3 (May 26, 2000) (Peru) (imposing civil fine sanction for racial
discrimination in employment), available at http://wwv.leyes.congreso.gob.pe/Imagenes/
leyes/27270.pdf.
216 La Mesa de Trabajo para la No Discriminaci6n de la Coordinadora Nacional de
Derechos Humanos (Pertd) & APRODEH/FIDH, Reporte ante el Comitepara la Eliminacid6n de
laDiscriminaci6n Racial 30 (March 1999) (stating that the majority of Peruvian citizens are
unaware of the activities of the government agency charged with implementing Peru's an-
tidiscrimination laws), at http://wv.cnddhh.org.pe/infordisc99.htm (last visited on Mar.
7, 2002).
217 See infra Part IV.C.
218 See Carneiro, supra note 210, at 314.
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populations of African descent."219 The lack of census racial data ob-
structs the attempt to address widespread patterns of inequality that
could, inter alia, more effectively address societal inequality through
litigating individual acts of discrimination.
220
More importantly, the widespread refusal to collect racial census
data in Latin America is but one indication of the influence that Latin
American race ideology has on the pursuit of racial justice, inasmuch
as racism is not viewed as a problem, and any focus on race is thought
to be adverse to maintaining a racially harmonious environment.
Without census data aggregated by race, racial justice activists encoun-
ter greater difficulty in asserting that racism is a significant problem.
In addition, the absence of census racial data effectively precludes the
use of statistical evidence to prove a discrimination claim in court.
The influence of race ideology on the enforcement of antidis-
crimination laws can also be noted in the judicial treatment of mixed-
race racial identity. For instance, a recent empirical study of Brazil's
civil rights enforcement record reveals that judges frequently dismiss
civil rights claims in which the accused asserts the "defense" of being
mixed race.22' Specifically, where defendants have asserted a mixed-
race status, Brazilian judges have treated it as a demonstration of their
inherent lack of racial bias by virtue of the Latin American mestizaje
(and Brazilian mestiragem) rhetorical device of promoting race mix-
ture as the national norm.2 22 It is no wonder that Brazilian judges are
persuaded that race mixture can be a defense to a charge of racial
discrimination, when the very image "of a racially democratic and
nondiscriminatory society has hinged on the idea of racial mix-
ture."223 As one close observer of Brazilian racial discourse notes: "a
causal link was drawn that was often presented tautologically:
Brazilians are racially mixed and therefore there can be no discrimi-
nation, or there can be no racial discrimination because Brazilians are
racially mixed. ''2
24
The Latin American mixed-race racial democracy myth is simi-
larly deployed in the Peruvian and Colombian legal systems. In Peru,
employers accused of racial discrimination are allowed to present the
219 Banco Interamericano de Desarollo, supra note 206, at 3.
220 Cf Cottrol & Hern~ndez, supra note 206, at 34 (noting that "racial data has often
proven to be extremely useful in employment discrimination cases in the United States").
221 See Seth Racusen, Contesting Brazilian RacialDemocracy Through the Law 2-4 (Mar.
16-18, 2000) (presented at the 22nd International Congress of the Latin American Studies
Association meeting) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
222 Id. at 2.
223 Melissa Nobles, Race and Poverty in Latin America: Conceptual Difficulties, in INrER-Am.
DIALOGUE, WORLD BANK, RAcE AND POVERTY. INTERAGENCY CONSULTATION ON AFRo-LATIN




defense that the discrimination was "objective and reasonable."
225
The premise that discrimination can somehow be objective and rea-
sonable has its parallel in Colombia's racial discourse. While Colom-
bia has developed an extensive body of law protecting the equality
rights of Afro-Colombians, 226 when Afro-Colombians do assert claims
for racial justice they are in turn accused of promoting discrimina-
tion.227 Such accusations are grounded in the cultural association of
race-consciousness with racism itself, the mere discussion of race is
understood as emblematic of racist divisions, while the social and eco-
nomic stratification of persons of African ancestry is understood as a
mere residue of class divisions. The influence of pervasive race denial
in Latin America is made even more perverse by its interaction with
the blanqueamiento aspect of Latin American race ideology. For exam-
ple, the Peruvian government agency that investigates claims of race
discrimination states that many racially victimized individuals feel too
ashamed and embarrassed to assert a discrimination claim.2 28 Filing a
claim of discrimination would in effect be an admission that the victim
was perceived as non-White-the ultimate shame in a society that es-
teems Whiteness.
In short, Latin American civil rights laws and their enforcement
mechanisms are woefully inadequate for combating racism. A general
disinterest in crafting elaborate civil rights structures in Latin America
stems from the beliefs that there is little racism in the region and that
a focus on race itself would foster racism. In those Latin American
countries with a civil rights enforcement structure in place, the very
same race ideology impedes the efficacy of the legal system. However,
the failure of individuals and government officials in Latin America to
enforce civil rights laws cannot be dismissed with the assertion that
Latin Americans are less prone to litigate matters of social policy. In
fact, a comparative study of civil litigation trends noted that some de-
veloping countries in Latin America have had higher litigation rates
than more developed countries in Western Europe. 229 While Cuba
225 Ley No. 26,772 art. 2 (Apr. 14, 1997) (Peru), available at http://ww.leyes.con-
greso.gob.pe/Imagenes/Leyes/26772.pdf; see also Jorge Ramirez Reyna, Discrimination
Against Afro-Peruvian Groups (Legal Framework), in IrrER-Am. DIALOGUE, supra note 223, at 14,
16 (discussing the hindrance of the "objective and reasonable" discrimination defense).
226 SeeJulio E. Gallardo Archbold, Colombian Legislation: Regulations Governing Afro-Co-
lombian Communities, in INrER-AM. DIALOGUE, supra note 223, at 3, 4-6.
227 Id. at 12. But it should be noted that, in actuality, few Latin Americans openly
assert the existence of race discrimination. See id. at 13.
228 See Entrevista: Conversando con Teresa Ramfrez, del INCECOPI, at http://www.geocities.
com/mnfcongo/artic4.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2002) (transcribed interview with Teresa
Ramirez, representative of INDECOPI, the Peruvian government agency which investigates
charges of racial discrimination).
229 See David S. Clark, Civil Litigation Trends in Europe and Latin America Since 1945: The
Advantage of Intracountry Comparisons, 24 LAw & Soc'v REv. 549, 564-65 (1990).
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and Puerto Rico are not culturally representative of the diversity of
nations in Latin America, 230 the inquiry into the particularities of
Cuba and Puerto Rico provides a rich basis for identifying the similari-
ties in race discourse that are salient to the efficacy of civil rights en-
forcement. Indeed, a brief overview of Latin America, followed by
close analysis of the Cuban and Puerto Rican legal systems, illustrates
the manner in which Latin American race ideology transcends distinc-
tions in governmental structures and philosophies-all in the service
of White supremacy. Cuba and Puerto Rico are useful contexts from
which to draw a comparison to the United States because all three
were slaveholding societies with long legacies of anti-Black bias. In
addition, Cuba and Puerto Rico each highlight different aspects of the
multiracial discourse now beginning to manifest itself in the United
States. The Cuban context highlights the manner in which the color-
blind abolition of racial classifications in turn hinders the construc-
tion of an adequate civil rights enforcement structure and laws. The
Puerto Rican context highlights the ways in which the Latin American
race ideology focus on fluid racial categories impedes the enforce-
ment and use of even the most elaborate civil rights structure.
B. The Cuban Context
Juntos pero no revueltos; cada cosa en su lugar!
-Cuban adage
231
Extreme racial stratification and de facto racial segregation exis-
ted in Cuba prior to the Socialist Revolution in 1959,232 and had char-
acterized the island's social structure as a Spanish colony.233 On
230 See Kevin R. Johnson, Puerto Rico, Puerto Ricans and LatCrit Theory: Commonalities and
Differences Between Latinalo Experiences, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 107, 107-09 (2000) (stressing
the importance of acknowledging and researching the salience of positional distinctions
among Latin American nationals and immigrants).
231 MOORE, supra note 23, at 22 ("Together but not mixed up, for everything has its
place!"-a Cuban adage regarding race (translation mine)).
232 Cuban census data and research compelled the following description of Cuba in
the 1950s:
In the main Afro-Cubans occupied the lower end of the socio-eco-
nomic order. Almost 30 percent of the population of color over twenty
years of age was illiterate. Blacks tended to constitute a majority in the
crowded tenement dwellings of Havana. They suffered greater job insecu-
rity, more unemployment/underemployment, poorer health care, and con-
stituted a proportionally larger part of the prison population. They
generally earned lower wages than whites, even in the same industries.
Afro-Cubans were subjected to systematic discrimination, barred from ho-
tels, resorts, clubs, and restaurants.
Louis A. PNP.Z, JR., CUBA: BETWEEN REFORM AND REVOLUTION 307 (2d ed., 1995).
233 See Philip A. Howard, Creolization and Integration: The Devekpment of a Political Culture
Among the Pan-Afro-Cuban Benevolent Societies, 1878-1895, in CROSSING BOUNDARIES: COMPAR-
ATIVE HISTORY OF BLACK PEOPLE IN DISPORA 134, 136, 150 (Darlene Clark Hine &Jacque-
line McLeod eds., 1999) (describing the colonial caste system that existed in Cuba and the
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March 22, 1959, the Castro government officially ended legal racial
discrimination in Cuba by outlawing Whites-only beaches and
clubs.23 4 Castro announced that "'[a] Cuban is simply someone who
belongs to no race in particular"'; 235 nonetheless, each successive cen-
sus continued to use racial classifications, 236 but dissemination of the
racial census data was often withheld in order to deflect public focus
on race.23 7 The Revolution purportedly ended racial problems in
Cuba by fiat-that is, by ordering the termination of references to
persons by race and by decreeing that all Cubans are "simply" mem-
bers of the "human" race.
The government subsequently instituted a number of legal provi-
sions. When the government amended the Cuban constitution in
1976 to align it with the socialist outlook, it maintained the racial
equality provisions of the former (1940) version, 238 but added both a
commitment to educate the public on the equality principle2 3 9 as well
as provisions proscribing racial discrimination in general regarding
equal pay, equal education, housing, public accommodations, and
promotion within the hierarchy of the armed forces, and other public
employment sectors.240 The current version, enacted in 1992, has
maintained these broader provisions.241 While citizens have the right
to use the constitutional provision as a private cause of action, few if
any actual cases have been filed seeking redress for a complaint of
racial discrimination under either the 1992 constitution now in force
or under the parallel provisions of the 1976 and 1940 constitutions.
2 42
unsuccessful attempts of Afro-Cubans to judicially desegregate the island's public accom-
modations in 1885 and 1888).
234 See DOMfNGUEZ, supra note 171, at 225.
235 MOORE, supra note 23, at 27 (quoting Castro's unprecedented antiracist public
speech). Castro was actually using a phrase coined by national icon Josd Martf, which
"thereafter became the slogan of the Revolution concerning race relations." Id. at 26.
236 See GOYER & DoMscHKE, supra note 45, at 144-47. One possible explanation for the
government's continued collection of racial census data in a race-less society may be the
desire to monitor the success of social reforms aimed at diminishing racial disparities. The
simultaneous desire to discourage a public focus on race may account for the sporadic
release of the census racial data.
237 The Cuban census bureau has on file census forms from census years 1970 and
1981, both of which contained Race/Color categories. See id. However, Cuban authorities
have refused to release the racial statistics. MOORE, supra note 23, at 364.
238 See CONsTITUCI6N tit. IV, sec. I, art. 20 (1940) (Cuba), translated in CONSTITUTION
OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA 10 (Cuban Democratic Judiciary ed., 1965).
239 See CONSTITUCION ch. V, arts. 40-41 (1976) (Cuba), translated in CONSTITUTION OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA 13 (Ctr. for Cuban Studies ed., 1976).
240 See id. art. 42, translated in CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, supra note 239,
at 14.
241 See CONSTITUCI6N ch. VI, arts. 42-43 (1992) (Cuba), translated in Inter-Univ. As-
socs., Inc., Republic of Cuba, in 5 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra
note 205.
242 EVENSON, supra note 203, at 98, 112.
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Similarly, other existing legal provisions-such as the labor law
prohibition against employment discrimination,243 and the criminal
code provision that specifically prohibits the act, promotion, or incite-
ment of discrimination, or other interference with the enjoyment of
the right of equality244-- are rarely invoked to redress racial discrimi-
nation complaints. 245 What is particularly striking about the absence
of discrimination claims pursuant to the criminal code is that, unlike
the context of civil litigation, the financial resources of the plaintiff
are immaterial to the decision to bring a case: the government prose-
cutors are charged with "ensuring that the Constitution, the laws, and
other legal regulations are strictly obeyed by state agencies, economic
and social entities, and citizens." 246 Furthermore, complainants need
not rely on police officers' reporting activity for enforcement, because
Cuban citizens can bring complaints directly to the Department of
Public Attention, and request investigation regarding the violation of
their legal rights.247 In the employment context, discrimination
claims can be brought before labor councils, which "constitute a non-
judicial forum for resolving disputes between workers and manage-
ment."248 If the labor council is unable to resolve the claim to the
satisfaction of the employee, that employee may appeal to the formal
court system.
249
Despite the existence of multiple venues for administering com-
plaints of discrimination, few cases, if any, are brought regarding race
discrimination. While the entire Latin American region is character-
243 C6DIGO DE TRABAJO [LABOR CODE] art. 3(b) (Cuba), available at http://
natlex.ilo.org/txt/S84CUB01.htm.
244 C6DIGO PENAL [CRIMINAL CODE] art. 295 (Cuba), available at http://
cubapolidata.com/gpc/gpc-codigopenal_de_cuba.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2002). The
Criminal Code sanctions an act of racial discrimination with six months to two years of
imprisonment or a fine. "The same sanction is imposed against anyone who disseminates
ideas based in racial superiority or hatred or commits acts of violence or incites commis-
sion of such acts." EVENSON, supra note 203, at 111-12.
245 Evenson elaborates:
There is no information available regarding any individual case of race
discrimination or enforcement of these laws. Unlike gender cases, where
individual cases ofjob discrimination have been prosecuted or reported in
the press, often leading to redress of the discriminatory conduct, com-
plaints based on race have not been reported. If such incidents take place
at all, they are probably rarer than cases of work place discrimination
against women.
EVENSON, supra note 203, at 112.
246 Angel Fern6mndez-Rubio Legru, Cuba: The Courts and the Office of the Attorney
General. The Legislative System. The Legal Profession. Written Law Sources 6 (July
17-22, 1999) (presented at the Ninety-second Annual Meeting and Conference, American
Association of Law Libraries) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
247 See EVENSON, supra note 203, at 81.
248 MARJORIE S. ZaTZ, PRODUCING LEGALITY. LAW AND SOCIALISM IN CUBA 185 (1994).
249 Id. at 186. Plaintiffs in labor councils or in court can represent themselves or be
represented by lawyers, union officials, coworkers, and even family members. Id.
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ized by low rates of race-discrimination case-filing, the low filing rate
in Cuba is particularly troubling because Cubans are especially knowl-
edgeable about the law. The socialist government's tradition of lay
judges and direct community activism results in a much more well-
informed citizenry than that which exists in the rest of Latin America
or the United States.
250
Furthermore, despite the existence of parallel systems for re-
dressing complaints of gender and race discrimination in Cuba, only
gender discrimination claims are brought publicly.2 51 The contrast
between the existence of gender discrimination claims and the ab-
sence of race discrimination claims is especially stark when one con-
siders that the socialist government's abolition of the private practice
of law for the creation of a system of law-collective attorneys has made
public access to legal counsel relatively easy and inexpensive.2 52
Moreover, a large number of the law-collective lawyers are White wo-
men, and a large percentage of law students are White women.253
While White women have encountered hardships in making the so-
cialist revolution responsive to gender issues, they have fared better as
a group than both Afro-Cuban women and men.254 Thus, despite the
fact that the Cuban civil rights structure has many parallels to that of
the United States, and in some respects more expansively embraces
the United Nations Convention on the Discrimination of Apartheid
250 Id. at 163-84 (describing Cuban lay judges as "bidirectional transmitters of
legality").
251 See EVENSON, supra note 203, at 98, 112.
252 See Raymond J. Michalowski, Between Citizens and the Socialist State: The Negotiation of
Legal Practice in Socialist Cuba, 29 LAw & Soc'y REv. 65, 74-75 (1995) (describing the 1973
abolition of private law practice and its replacement with the "bufetes colectivos" system of
self-financed law collectives for the purpose of ensuring universal public access to legal
services).
253 Commentators have observed the preponderance of women (without identifying
them by race) in legal practice and in law schools because of their better scholarly records.
See id. at 81. But it should be noted that the racial hierarchy that exists in elementary,
intermediate, and high-school placement will logically influence the race of the women
who predominate in the legal field-namely White women. See Fernandez, supra note 46,
at 176.
254 See LUMSDEN, supra note 189, at 186 ("[Wlomen . . . , as a group, may have bene-
fited more from the revolution than blacks."). Discussions of Cuban women are often
made in a race-neutral fashion that ignores the intersectional realities of Afro-Cuban wo-
men's lives. See Debra Evenson, Women's Equality in Cuba: What Difference Does a Revolution
Make?, 4 LAw & INEQ. 295 (1986) (discussing the evolving status of women generally in
Cuba). But an examination of the impoverished status of Afro-Cuban women that has
caused them disproportionately to turn to prostitution as a means of survival makes it clear
that the benefits women have obtained from the revolution are more accurately portrayed
as White women's benefits. See Georgina Herrera, Poetry, Prostitution, and Gender Esteem, in
AFRO-CUBAN VOICES, supra note 85, at 118, 123 (describing the disproportionate economic
pressure on Afro-Cuban women to enter into prostitution).
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and All Forms of Racism, 255 race discrimination claims are simply not
brought before the legal system for resolution.
When government officials address the question of race discrimi-
nation in Cuba, they have traditionally described Cuban society as free
of such bias because of the cultural focus on national identity rather
than on racial identity.2 56 In fact, Cuba's cultural focus on the
"Cubanness" of its citizens was inadvertently transformed into an ide-
ology that perceives discourse about race matters to be a threat to the
government's nationalist agenda.257 After assuming power, the Castro
government even discouraged the formation of Black solidarity orga-
nizations.2 58 The government confiscated materials on race in Cuba,
warning that such writings cause division among people.259 The gov-
ernment also took firm measures against persons who wore African-
inspired apparel or hairstyles because they were "acts of 'racial provo-
cation' leading to the division of the Cuban people."260 In effect, de-
spite the government's stated commitment to racial equality, Cuba's
formalistic abolition of race translated into a prohibition against the
possibility of subordinated groups identifying along race lines for pur-
poses of empowerment.
Concurrent with the abolition of formal references to race, actual
racial stereotyping and stratification continued unabated, as evinced
in manifold social settings. For example, in a 1994 ethnographic
study,261 seventy-five percent of Whites and Mulattos surveyed en-
255 See, e.g., EVENSON, supra note 203, at 111-12.
256 See Hernndez, supra note 37, at 1158 n.147 (citing a speech to the United Nations
Human Rights Commission by then-Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations, Carlos
Lage, in which he asserted that racial discrimination does not exist in Cuba).
257 David Booth describes this phenomenon:
Since, as it has been defined, racial discrimination has been abolished, it is
easy to accuse those who insist that there is still a color problem in Cuba of
gratuitously creating division in the ranks of the people, of being inverted
racists, and even of acting as the conscious or 'unconscious' agents of
imperialism.
Booth, supra note 156, at 171; see also Enid Logan, El Ap6stol y el Comandante en Jefe:
Dialectics of RacialDiscourse and Racial Practice in Cuba, 1890-1999, in 6 RESEARCH IN POLITICS
AND SocIETY: THE GLOBAL COLOR LINE: RACIAL AND ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND STRUGGLE FROM
A GLOBAL PERSPECTVE 195, 196-99 (Pinar Batur-VanderLippe & Joe Feagin eds., 1999)
(describing the politics of unity as subsuming racial identity into national identity).
258 Some authors have suggested that the socialist government overtly stamped out the
incipient Black Power movement. See, e.g., HUGH THOMAS, CUBA: THE PURsurr OF FREEDOM
888 n.51 (1971). But other observers suggest that the reality was less dramatic in that
efforts to generate debate on racial issues were simply rebuffed. See Booth, supra note 156,
at 171-72.
259 See, e.g., CLYrus, supra note 203, at 76.
260 MOORE, supra note 23, at 259. There was even a criminal sanction for performing
African dances in public without government permission, a vestige of Spanish colonial
rule. See EvENSON, supra note 203, at 110.
261 See Gayle McGarrity, Cubans in Jamaica: A Previously Neglected Segment of the Cuban
Diaspora, 42 CARIBBEAN Q. 55, 64-65 (1996). Although the survey pool was geographically
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dorsed the practice of seeking a higher societal status by marrying
someone who is lighter-skinned.262 As a result, these same persons
surveyed indicated that they would disapprove of their children partic-
ipating in intimate relationships with persons who were darker than
themselves. 263 The study also revealed that seventy percent of Whites
and Mulattos interviewed felt that Black Cubans engaged in delin-
quent behavior and rarely worked.
2 64
Similarly, a cultural anthropologist conducting research in Cuba
in the early 1980s noted that Whites attributed Black Cuban poverty to
Black culture.2 65 The problematic aspects of Black culture, as de-
scribed by the White Cubans questioned, included lack of importance
placed on education, propensity for violence and crime, and lack of
discipline.2 66 For instance, it is still customary in Cuba for notices of
robbery to be greeted with the comment, "It was probably a Negro."
267
Complaints about the economic crisis are characterized as akin to liv-
ing like "Negroes in our own country, '268 a stereotype exacerbated by
the fact that Blacks still disproportionately inhabit the areas with the
worst housing conditions.
2 69
Social or romantic interactions are also bifurcated across a color
hierarchy in which the few dark-skinned Blacks and Whites who
choose to date cross-racially are subject to prejudicial reaction and
commentary.270 In fact, among interracial couples who have spent
time together in both Cuba and the United States, many report more
harassment from White people in Cuba than from Whites in the
United States.27' Pervasive racial stereotypes also continue to exist
along a color hierarchy in which Blacks are portrayed as "good"
mainly for sexual potency because "[t]hey are a shameless race."
272
This racial stereotype of Black sexuality accounts for the predomi-
nance of Afro-Cubans within the population of prostitutes, a popula-
tion that foreign tourism has revitalized.2 73 In short, the abolition of
"race" was not an effective cure for racial bias and hierarchy because
race continues to be a determinant of social status.
limited to six Havana neighborhoods, and "there are some methodological problems over
the often problematic definition mulato, negro and blanco," id. at 64, the results are telling of
broader Cuban attitudes towards race.
262 See id. at 64-65.
263 See id. at 65.
264 See id.
265 See id. at 66-67.
266 See id. at 67.
267 de la Fuente, supra note 203, at 161-62.
268 Johanna McGeary & Cathy Booth, Cuba Alone TiME, Dec. 6, 1993, at 42, 54.
269 See Fernandez, supra note 46, at 45-46.
270 See id. at 190-222.
271 See McGarrity & Cirdenas, supra note 73, at 102.
272 LUMSDEN, supra note 189, at 148.
273 See Logan, supra note 257, at 208-09.
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An examination of economic and social indicators also indicates
that racial disparities continue to exist in Cuba.274 For instance, de-
spite universal health care coverage, health and medical gaps con-
tinue to exist between Whites and Afro-Cubans in Cuba, as indicated
by the higher vulnerability of Afro-Cubans to the parasitic diseases of
the poor.2 75 Afro-Cubans are also subject to greater police scrutiny
and harassment 276 and are over-represented in prosecuted crimes.277
This greater level of police repression targeted against Afro-Cubans
likely accounts for a Cuban prison population that is estimated to be
seventy percent Black.2 78 With respect to education, Afro-Cubans are
not proportionately represented in university programs.27 9 A color hi-
erarchy in education is apparent in the greater representation of
Whites in institutions of higher education, while mixed-race Mulattos
and Mestizos predominate in technical and vocational schools and
darker-skinned Afro-Cubans dominate in the junior high schools.
280
Perhaps most telling is that despite the large demographic pro-
portion of Blacks in socialist Cuba, they are not represented in the
Politburo of the Communist Party-the most privileged class of to-
day's Cuban society.28 1 Indeed, in 1986, the Third Congress of the
Cuban Communist Party called for a more racially equal representa-
tion in the government and party leadership. 28 2 However, after the
1991 Meeting of the Fourth Congress of the Cuban Communist Party,
Afro-Cubans continued to make up less than fifteen percent of the
274 It should be noted that a racial hierarchy has long existed in Cuba. See VERENA
MARTINEZ-ALIER, MARRIAGE, CLASS AND COLOR IN NINETEENTH CENTURY CUBA: A STUDY OF
RACIAL ArTUDs AND SEXUAL VALUES IN A SLAVE SOCIETY 91-99 (1974); ROUT, supra note
34, at 301-06; ELiZABETH SUTHERLAND, THE YOUNGEST REVOLUTION 149 (1969); de la
Fuente, supra note 203, at 144, 155; de la Fuente, supra note 27; Aline Helg, Race and Black
Mobilization in Colonial and Early Independent Cuba: A Comparative Perspective, 44 ETHNOHIS-
TORY 53, 64-65 (1997); Louis A. Perez, Jr., Politics, Peasants, and People of Color. The 1912
"Race War" in Cuba Reconsidered, 66 HisP. Am. Hisr. REV. 509 (1986); see also STEPAN, supra
note 97, at 174 (noting that although some commentators attribute Cuban segregation
policies to the work of the U.S. occupation forces, Cuba had a long history of racism that
complemented the race-based intervention of the United States).
275 Jorge Domfnguez, Cuba Since 1959, in CUBA: A SHORT HISTORY 95, 119 (Leslie Beth-
ell ed., 1993).
276 SeeJody Benjamin, Police Racism Flourishes in Castro's "Workers'Paradise, LA. DAILYJ.,
May 21, 1992, at 6 (describing the African-American journalist's consistent harassment by
Cuban police and the similar experience of other Afro-Cuban residents whom he
interviewed).
277 See de la Fuente, supra note 203, at 161-62.
278 See McGarrity & Cdrdenas, supra note 73, at 101.
279 EVENSON, supra note 203, at 110. But see id. at 111 (noting the "increasing numbers
of blacks and mulattos enter[ing] university and the professions").
280 See Fernandez, supra note 46, at 176.
281 See EvENSON, supra note 203, at 112-13; cf LUMSDEN, supra note 189, at 149 (noting
the general dissociation between homosexuals and elite government ranks).
282 See Fidel Castro, Renewal or Death, BLACK SCHOLAR, Winter 1989, at 5, 6-7.
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party members elevated to the Political Bureau. 283 Thereafter, in
1997, the Fifth Congress of the Cuban Communist Party acknowl-
edged that the political leadership still notably lacked Afro-Cubans.284
In fact, the proportion of Afro-Cubans in high positions has dimin-
ished from the already-low levels of the 1960s and 197 0s.285 The
under-representation of Afro-Cubans similarly extends to other im-
portant agencies of the government, including the military, the Minis-
try of Interior, the state apparatus, and mass organizations. 28 6
Furthermore, Cuba has appointed mostly White ambassadors as its
representatives to predominantly Black countries. 287 The longstand-
ing pattern of exclusion from the ranks of socialist government lead-
ership carries far-reaching implications, given the connection between
the distribution of economic privileges and services and one's status in
the government.288 For example, soon after the installation of the so-
cialist government, high-ranking government officials were allocated
residences in the abandoned homes of wealthy Cuban 6MigrTs.28 9 To-
day, it is believed that government leaders are granted their requests
for larger housing units and housing relocation more quickly than
other members of the society.290 Mona Rosendahl, a Swedish social
anthropologist who recently conducted fieldwork in Cuba, has also
noted that "[w] hereas political leaders at the municipal level [who are
popularly elected] have few privileges, those at the national level [who
are specially appointed] live rather privileged and secluded lives."291
Currently, the only dynamic sector of the Cuban economy-tour-
ism-is developed and managed in a racially imbalanced manner.
Well-paying jobs in the tourist industry and within foreign enterprises,
283 See EVENSON, supra note 203, at 112-13.
284 See de la Fuente, supra note 203, at 63.
285 See McGarrity & Cdrdenas, supra note 73, at 97.
286 See id. at 97-98.
287 See id.
288 The Cuban government administers a controlled system for the distribution of con-
sumer goods entitled "Los Estfmulos de la Emuladdn Socialistd" (economic incentive award
program) whereby government employers award consumer goods at reduced costs to
model workers. See MONA ROSENDAHL, INSIDE THE REvOLUTION: EVERYDAY LIFE IN SOCIALIST
CUBA 37-38 (1997). The economic incentives program distributes goods like electric fans,
refrigerators, and television sets, and privileges like housing relocation permits and foreign
travel permits. Conflicts often arise over who is a model worker in the disbursement of
merit points. Although selection of a model worker is presumably based on workplace
performance, commentators equate the selection process with a political favoritism that is
itself imbued with racial bias. See, e.g., Stuart Grider, A Proposal for the Marketization of Hous-
ing in Cuba: The Limited Equity Housing Corporation-A New Form of Property, 27 U. MLNu
INTER-AM. L. REv. 453, 474 (1996) (describing the distribution of newly built housing units
in the 1970s based on political favoritism guised as workplace performance).
289 See Fernandez, supra note 46, at 80.
290 See ROSENDAHL, supra note 288, at 124 (presenting the narrative of a Cuban woman
who had sought housing relocation for a long time and was convinced that government
officials did not experience such delays).
291 Id. at 165.
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both providing prized access to valued foreign currency, are reserved
for persons "de buena apariencia" (good-looking) -commonly under-
stood as White Cubans.2 92 The impact of employment within the
tourist industry is profound because it also provides access to scarce
foods and consumer goods (like soap) that are extremely difficult to
locate within the strained government rationing system.293 The ability
to earn extra income with foreign currency tips from tourists enables
these lucky Cubans to shop for scarce foods and consumer goods
within the better stocked U.S. dollar-only shops and restaurants.
294
Therefore, exclusion from employment in the tourist sector restricts
Afro-Cubans to low-ranking government positions for which they are
paid in the undervalued domestic currency.295 Moreover, the con-
straint on Afro-Cuban access to foreign currency also operates as a
rationalization of race-based exclusion policies at restaurants, night-
clubs, and other tourist establishments (which only accept payment in
foreign currency) because all Afro-Cubans are automatically pre-
sumed not to have the preferred currency for payment.29 6 In fact,
middle-class Afro-Cubans today note that they are visibly treated
poorly by restaurant staff.297 The racially skewed development of the
tourist industry is diminishing the ability of Afro-Cubans to improve
their socioeconomic situation, which in turn helps to perpetuate the
equation of Blackness with low social and economic status. Thus,
Cuba is structuring one of its most lucrative economic fields in racist
ways despite the government's formal abolition of race.
Afro-Cubans' limited access to tourism's profitable foreign cur-
rency economy is concentrated in the entertainment industry.2 98 En-
tertainment and sports are economic contexts that traditionally have
been racially defined as the appropriate venues for Black achievement
both in Latin America and the United States.299 Thus, the prominent
292 See McGarrity & Cdrdenas, supra note 73, at 98-100.
293 Id. at 99-100.
294 See Alma Guillermoprieto, A Visit to Havana, N.Y. REv. BooKs, Mar. 26, 1998, at 19,
20-23.
295 The contemporary dynamic of a racially restrictive dual-currency economy repli-
cates the multiple-currency economy of nineteenth-century Cuba that harmed Afro-
Cubans after the War of Independence in 1898. See HELG, supra note 171, at 100-01
(describing how Afro-Cuban laborers were paid pre-war wages in depreciated Spanish sil-
ver that could not match the cost of goods graduated to the value of the U.S. dollar in post-
war Cuba).
296 See McGarrity & Crdenas, supra note 73, at 99.
297 See Guillermoprieto, supra note 294, at 22.
298 See McGarrity & Cdrdenas, supra note 73, at 99-100 (describing the growth of the
tourist sector with its access to valued foreign currency as racially skewed and limited to the
following jobs for Afro-Cubans: entertainers, performers, artists, artisans, and athletes).
299 See, e.g., Flagg, supra note 6, at 980 n.100 (discussing the United States's "'cultural
stereotype' that assumes that blacks are fit only for certain roles in society (such as musi-
cian or athlete), but not others (such as doctor or lawyer)"); Logan, supra note 257, at 208
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promotion of Afro-Cuban music, dance, and religion as part of the
burgeoning foreign tourist trade should not be viewed as Cuba's pro-
gressive celebration of Afro-Cuban culture, but rather as another use
of Black entertainers for economic profit and the consumption of a
White audience.300 This exploitation is corroborated by the present
practices of police and state security officers, who continue to harass
Afro-Cubans for organizing African-based cultural activities outside
the context of tourist folklore shows.
30 1
Indeed, the special access of Mulattas (mixed-race women of par-
tial African ancestry) to the foreign currency economy highlights the
racially skewed construction of this industry. Mulatta showgirls have a
key role in the promotion of the tourism industry, playing on racial
and gender stereotypes about their exaggerated promiscuity, wanton-
ness, and sensuality.30 2 Widely promoted cabaret shows feature scant-
ily clad Mulattas who dance provocatively for visitors, prompting
foreign tourists to visit Cuba as a location for a cheap "sex tour" where
prostitutes and "wanton" Mulatta women can be easily groped at dol-
lar-only nightclubs.303 Current trends are equally alarming: Cuba's
growing economic dependence on tourism is likely to only encourage
further exploitation of Mulattas as commodified sex objects.30 4 In
fact, the resurgence of a tourist-driven prostitution industry has al-
ready intensified the racial stereotype of Mulattas as sexual objects.30 5
This trend vividly demonstrates how gender stratification can con-
tinue to combine with racism to specifically subordinate women of
color, even in states where "race" does not exist.
Cuba's tangible improvements in health and education, which
have benefited Afro-Cubans, generally can be attributed to the gov-
ernment's redistribution programs, which are designed for all Cubans
in an effort to destroy pre-revolution class and political structures.30 6
Although Afro-Cubans have benefited from the redistribution pro-
grams in education, public employment, housing and, primarily, na-
(describing racial stereotypes of Afro-Cubans as naturally excelling at music, dance, and
sports).
300 See Logan, supra note 257, at 208 (observing the commodification of Black bodies
and culture through the tourist industry).
301 See McGarrity & Cdrdenas, supra note 73, at 102.
302 For a more in-depth discussion of the portrayal of Mulattas in Cuban popular cul-
ture, see generally Elizabeth Ruf, iQu. Linda es Cuba! Issues of Gender, Color, and Nationalism
in Cuba's Tropicana Nightclub Performance, DRAMA REv., Spring 1997, at 86.
303 See Parsa, supra note 203, at 40 (describing Cuba's growing popularity as a "sex
tour" destination).
304 See id. at 41 ("In 1996, tourism surpassed sugar production as Cuba's largest source
of hard currency for the first time since the revolution.").
305 See Frank Bruni, Island of Forbidden Fruits, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 8, 1999, § 5, at 15
(describing Cuba as an attraction for tourists seeking "sexy, cash-strapped young women").
306 See Herndndez, supra note 37, at 1138-42.
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tionalized health care,3 °7 the continuing racial disparities in
socioeconomic status demonstrate the persistence of both class struc-
tures and the biased use of race.308 While the redistribution programs
have significantly altered the poor standard of living under which
many Cubans historically suffered, the colorblind nature of the pro-
grams have made them an indirect, incomplete remedy for racial
inequality.30 9
Perhaps most perniciously, the government's formal position,
which asserts that race (and class) distinctions have been re-
nounced-when, in fact, they continue to virulently operate through
both public and private sectors of the society-impairs the ability of
Afro-Cubans to recognize, name, and address systemic racism through
legal or other means.310 Because the government denies the exis-
tence of class-based economic disparities, Afro-Cubans cannot assert a
class-based systemic harm. At the same time, the public ban against
references to race leaves Afro-Cubans without the ability to identify
another locus of their oppression, in that they are unable to use race
to demonstrate the existence of economic and social disparities that
correlate to race. The inability to name the source of racialized harm
relegates Afro-Cubans to explaining their persistently low socioeco-
nomic status in terms of individual misfortune and/or lack of ability.
Such explanations can never address the systemic nature of racism.
Thus, the net effect of the formal ban on race is the suppression of
antiracist color-consciousness and the perpetuation of supremacist
color-consciousness.
The removal of race-based (and class-based) explanations for the
continued poor condition of Afro-Cubans consigns Afro-Cubans to a
demoralizing and simplistic explanation for their status. 31' The domi-
nant pejorative views regarding Afro-Cuban culture also dissuade
Afro-Cubans from organizing around racial identity to challenge ra-
cial subordination in today's Cuba, thus leaving substantially intact the
pre-Socialist racial caste system. Furthermore, the purported non-
existence of racial barriers to socioeconomic opportunity encourages
307 Id.
308 See id. at 1142-46 (summarizing racial disparities in social and economic
indicators).
309 A race-based analysis is not interchangeable with a class-based analysis, because race
and class, like sex and race, are still intimately tied together to maintain a system of White,
male privilege in which Afro-Cubans constitute the lowest-paid and lowest-ranked laborers.
Cf. Evenson, supra note 254, at 296-304 (describing the challenges of overcoming gender
bias even in a socialist system).
310 See Booth, supra note 156, at 171-72 (concluding that the "abolition of race" has
inhibited the formation of social justice movements that could more effectively eradicate
racism).
311 See Pedro Perez Sarduy & Jean Stubbs, Race and Politics of Memory in Contemporary
Black Cuban Consciousness, Introduction to AFRo-CuBAN Voicas, supra note 85, at 1, 17.
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individual Afro-Cubans to distance themselves from a Black racial
identity associated with low economic status and uncivilized cul-
ture.312 Thus, the bitter irony of banning race to discourage divisions
amongst the populace lies in the continued social dissociation, specifi-
cally of Mulattos, from other persons of African ancestry. In effect,
this dissociation provides Afro-Cubans additional license and incen-
tive to denigrate Black identity each time they downplay their African
identity.3 13 Thus, few Afro-Cubans are compelled to use existing legal
remedies for racial discrimination for fear of public association with
Blackness.
The pejorative view of Blackness also discourages demands for
additional legislation to make the existing legal structure more effec-
tive. And the few Afro-Cubans who do speak out on issues of race are
in turn labeled racists because of the ideological equivalence drawn
between discussing the taboo subject of race and an act of discrimina-
tion itself.3 14 Therefore, even though Cubans have long been discuss-
ing the possibilities of promoting racial justice with race-based
affirmative action programs,3 15 no concrete actions have yet been
taken to effectuate such programs. Moreover, some Afro-Cubans have
expressed great ambivalence toward such an initiative.3 16 The aboli-
tion of racial classifications has neither made Cuba a racial democracy
nor allowed it to effectively pursue racial justice through civil rights
laws. In contrast to Cuba, Puerto Rico is a Latin American context
with an extensive civil rights structure, in part because of its unique
political status as a United States commonwealth.
312 See Elvira Cervera, Todo en Sepia: An All Black Theater Prject, in AFRO-CUBAN VOICES,
supra note 85, at 97, 98.
313 See Guillermina Ramos Cruz, Grupo Antillano and the Marginalization of Black Artists,
in AFRO-CUBAN VOICES, supra note 85, at 147, 152.
314 Cf Logan, supra note 257, at 206-07 (arguing that race is taboo and that "the lack
of critique concerning race in Cuba has lent utopic and mythical proportions to popular
notions of contemporary race relations"). Furthermore, Afro-Cuban dissidents assert that
the Cuban government uses the revolution to stifle Black dissent. See Tom Carter, Cuban
Racial Equality Termed a Myth: White Minority Has Most Power, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2000, at
A12 ("The Cuban government always reminds us that 'We gave you this revolution.' Be-
hind this is racism."). To the extent that the government may use totalitarian force to
silence racial justice movements, or inhibit the filing of race discrimination claims, such
force would be yet another indicator of how Cuba's Latin American race ideology equates
the assertion of racial difference as incompatible with national identity.
315 See Castro, supra note 282, at 6; de la Fuente, supra note 203, at 161. The govern-
ment's contemplation of a racially conscious affirmative action program may be inter-
preted as recognition that the government's race-less project is limited in its ability to
eradicate racism. In fact, the 1986 "Rectification Campaign" was an effort to correct past
policy efforts and "recognize some of the shortcomings of the revolution's attempts to
build a socialist society." Fernandez, supra note 46, at 137.
316 See Gisela Arandia Covarrubia, A Panorama of AfroCuban Culture and Histoy: One Way
to Strengthen Nationality, at http://afrocubaweb.com/arandia-art.htm (last visited Jan. 22,
2002) (expressing concern that a quota system or method of numerical participation could
produce adverse reactions in the Cuban population).
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C. The Puerto Rican Context
Si no tiene dinga tiene mandinga.
-Puerto Rican adage
317
Puerto Rico, like Cuba and the rest of Latin America, has a long
history of racial stratification stemming from its use of chattel slav-
ery.3 18 Puerto Rico's Spanish settlers extensively relied on chattel
slave labor after having decimated the indigenous population in the
early 1500s. 31 9 As a Spanish colony, Puerto Rico did not abolish slav-
ery until 1873.320 Thereafter, the colonial racial hierarchy continued
as a privileged White elite, an intermediate "buffer" class of persons of
African ancestry with physically apparent European ancestry and a
sizeable population of disempowered darker-skinned African descend-
ants.3 2 1 Indeed, when U.S. troops invaded Puerto Rico during the
Spanish-American War of 1898, they were greeted by Puerto Ricans of
African descent with U.S. flags pinned to their clothing.3 22 But after
becoming subject to U.S. governmental authority after the Spanish-
American War, Puerto Rican society continued to be racially strati-
fied-and is so today.3 23 In fact, Puerto Rico's legislature had enacted
a variety of measures discussed below to address race discrimination
long before the U.S. federal government enacted the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.
The Puerto Rican legal system's most popularly referenced vehi-
cle for combating race discrimination is embodied in Law 100 of its
Labor Code.324 Enacted in 1959, Law 100 prohibits race, color, and
317 "If you don't have an ancestor from one African country then you certainly have an
ancestor from some other African country" (translation mine). See Eneid Routte-Gomez,
So, Are We Racists?H?? A Conspiracy of Silence: Racism in Puerto Rico, SAN JuAN, Dec./Jan.
1996, at 54, 55 (describing the Puerto Rican saying which emphasizes the mixed-race na-
ture of the entire Puerto Rican populace).
318 Kinsbruner describes Puerto Rican race relations from a historical perspective:
[W]hen it came to the daily lives of the people of color in Puerto Rico,
there were indeed clear lines of demarcation between whites and non-
whites, as indeed there were between the colored subcastes. People of color
rarely became white during their lifetimes, and people of dark skin rarely
overcame the racially imposed barriers to socioeconomic advancement dur-
ing their lifetimes. This was the racial reality that faced people of color in
their everyday lives, a reality that manifested some troubling similarities to
that of the United States.
KINSBRUNER, supra note 35, at 32-33.
319 SeeJorge Duany, Making Indians out of Blacks: The Revitalization of Taino Identity in
Contemporay Puerto Rico, in TMNo RxvrvAL: CRrTCAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUERTO RICAN IDEN-
TMlY AND CULTURAL PoLrrcs 31, 32 (Gabriel Haslip-Viera ed., 1999).
320 See Santiago-Valles, supra note 50, at 44.
321 See id.
322 See Samuel Betances, The Prejudice of Having No Prejudice in Puerto Rico (pt. 2), RICAN,
Spring 1973, at 22, 33.
323 See Santiago-Valles, supra note 50.
324 29 P.R. LA-ws ANN. § 146 (Supp. 1998) (codifying as amended 1959 P.R. Laws 100).
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social or national origin discrimination in the employment context, in
addition to discrimination based on age, sex, social condition, politi-
cal affiliation, and political or religious ideology.3 25 Employers who
discriminate are subject to double civil damages, imprisonment for a
term ranging from thirty to ninety days as a misdemeanor conviction,
and an order to reinstate a wrongfully discharged employee.3 26 Al-
though Law 100 preceded the U.S. Congress's enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, few cases have been litigated for race discrimina-
tion pursuant to Law 100. In fact, an electronic database search of
reported cases involving Law 100 since its enactment has turned up a
paltry four cases alleging race or color discrimination. 32
7
An examination of Puerto Rico's use of federal employment dis-
crimination laws yielded similar results. A comprehensive survey of
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) data from 1992
through 2000 reveals that Puerto Rico's number of race charge fil-
ings328 consistently ranked amongst the lowest of U.S. territories and
states. 329 The only other jurisdictions with comparably low numbers
were the states of Maine, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Utah, and Ver-
mont, all of which are racially homogeneous and smaller in popula-
tion size than Puerto Rico. 330 The number of cases does not
dramatically rise when the database search is expanded to encompass
any local or federal cases alleging an act of race or color discrimina-
tion under any law.331 Twenty-three cases in Puerto Rico were re-
ported between January 1, 1945 and July 19, 2001.332 Compared to
the totals of the District of Columbia and all U.S. states, Puerto Rico
ranks the lowest. 333 The number of race-related cases in U.S. jurisdic-
325 See id.
326 See id.
327 See Rivera v. Walgreens de P.R., No. KLCE0100267, 2001 P.R. App. LEXIS 303
(Mar. 21, 2001); Falu v. Autoridad Metropolitana de Autobuses, No. KLAN9701013, 1997
P.R. App. LEXIS 30 (Dec. 22, 1997); Nieves v. Alltrista Unimark, Inc., No. KLCE9500545,
1995 P.R. App. LEXIS 904 (Oct. 23, 1995); Olmo v. Young & Rubicam of P.R_, Inc., No. R-
80-215, 1981 P.R_ Sup. LEXIS 82 (Mar. 10, 1981).
328 "Race charge filings" are the claims filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
alleging race-based discrimination. See U.S. EQuAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
RAcE-BASED CHARGES FY 1992-FY 2000, at http://wv.eeoc.gov/stats/race.html (last modi-
fied Feb. 22, 2002).
329 See infra Appendix A.
330 In the 2000 census, Maine, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Utah, and Vermont re-
ported the following percentages of non-Whites: Maine 3%; North Dakota 8%; Rhode Is-
land 16%; Utah 11%; and Vermont 3%. See infra Appendix C. These percentages are
significantly lower than Puerto Rico's reported 20%, id., which is an overly conservative
account of Puerto Rico's non-White population, as discussed supra Part I.A_ In addition,
Puerto Rico's total population of 3,808,610 in the year 2000, far exceeds that of Maine
(1,274,923), North Dakota (642,200), Rhode Island (1,048,319), Utah (2,233,169), and
Vermont (608,827). See id.





tions ranged from the high of 1,339 in New York to the low of 280 in
New Hampshire.A3 4 Another point of comparison that suggests a dis-
inclination for filing race discrimination cases is the statistical
database maintained by the Puerto Rico Department of Labor's Anti-
Discrimination Unit. For the year 2000-2001, only sixty complaints of
race discrimination were filed. In contrast, 358 gender discrimination
complaints and 225 age discrimination complaints were filed.3 35
The other Puerto Rico laws that target race discrimination, the
Puerto Rico Civil Rights Act3 36 and the Puerto Rico Constitution,
3 37
are just as underenforced as Law 100. The Civil Rights Act bars dis-
crimination in public places, businesses, transportation, and hous-
ing.338 As a guiding principle, the Puerto Rico Constitution affirms
the dignity and equality of human beings by asserting that the state
cannot discriminate on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex,
social condition, or political and religious ideology.339 The civil rights
group "Liga Para el Progreso de la Gente de Color en Puerto Ricd' ["League
for the Progress of People of Color in Puerto Rico"], which existed on
the island at the time of the drafting of the 1952 Constitution, lobbied
for the antidiscrimination provision because of concern regarding the
treatment of non-Whites on the island. 340 Enacted in 1943, Puerto
Rico's Civil Rights Act3 41 was initially considered ineffective because it
only established a criminal penalty.3 42 A judicial opinion later in-
ferred an additional civil action component,3 43 which was then codi-
fied into law in 1960.344 In addition, the Puerto Rico Criminal Code
imposes a penalty of up to six months of imprisonment or a fine not
exceeding five hundred dollars, for race-based refusal to provide ac-
cess to public accommodations, employment, or to engage in real
334 See id.
335 See E-mail from Nora Vargas, Civil Rights Attorney in Puerto Rico, to Tanya Her-
nmndez, Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law-Newark (Feb. 22, 2002,
17:21:09 EST) (on file with author). While seventy-six complaints of national origin dis-
crimination were filed during the same time frame, they may very well represent overlap-
ping claims with the race discrimination complaints. In my own review of race
discrimination cases in Puerto Rico, I discovered that many cases were filed by non-Puerto
Ricans who alleged concurrent claims of race discrimination and national origin discrimi-
nation. See, e.g., Mandavilli v. Maldonado, 38 F. Supp. 2d 180 (D.P.R. 1999) (three former
professors of Indian, Colombian, and Peruvian descent who were denied tenure at a public
university alleged discrimination based on race and national origin).
336 1 P.R. LAws ANN. §§ 13-19 (1999).
337 P.R. CONST. art. II, § 1.
338 See 1 P.R- LAws ANN. § 13.
339 P.R- CONST. art. II, § 1.
340 See Betances, supra note 322, at 26.
341 1 P.R. LAws ANN. §§ 13-19 (codifying as amended 1943 P.R. Laws 131).
342 See, e.g., People v. Suazo, 63 P.R.R. 869 (1944).
343 Muriel v. Suazo, 72 P.RR 348 (1951).
344 1 P.R. LAws ANN. § 14 (codifying as amended 1960 P.R. Laws 125).
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property transactions.345 But similar to other Latin American jurisdic-
tions with criminal law models for race discrimination enforce-
ment,3 46 few complaints, if any, are made to the police on an annual
basis.3
47
This rich panoply of civil rights laws provided by local and federal
frameworks is essentially underutilized despite the ongoing reports of
continued race discrimination in Puerto Rico and the variety of ad-
ministrative venues for reporting complaints of race discrimination.
Unlike many Latin American countries that lack the administrative
structure to process and investigate race discrimination claims, Puerto
Rico has a local and federal structure for such action. Under a work-
share agreement with the EEOC, complaints filed with the local Pu-
erto Rico Department of Labor's Anti-Discrimination Unit are investi-
gated by the local agency itself.3 48 Puerto Ricans also have the choice
of filing a complaint directly with the EEOC for investigation by
EEOC officers-as of July 30, 2001, they can do so in an EEOC office
established in San Juan, Puerto Rico.3 49 In addition, complaints can
be brought to the Puerto Rico Civil Rights Commission, a government
agency created in 1965 to promote civil rights through public educa-
tion.350 Although the Commission does not have the authority to ad-
judicate cases, it is empowered to participate as amicus curiae.351
More importantly, the Commission is authorized to investigate claims
of racial discrimination and issue opinion letters that are not legally
binding on a defendant, but which can be used by plaintiffs to support
their claims once a case is filed in court.3 52 The Commission's ability
to investigate and issue opinion letters is especially helpful to victims
with few financial resources to retain an attorney, conduct discovery,
or otherwise build a case. Similarly, the additional administrative ve-
nues-the EEOC and Puerto Rico Department of Labor-also pro-
vide a mechanism for financially constrained victims to redress their
345 See 33 P.R. LAws ANN. § 4195 (1983).
346 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 211-12 (describing Brazil's system).
347 Telephone Interview with Ren6 Pinto-Lugo, President of the Board of Commission-
ers of the Puerto Rico Civil Rights Commission (Aug. 1, 2001) (observing that virtually no
claims of race discrimination are ever made to the police in Puerto Rico).
348 See Telephone Interview with Joseph Alvarado, Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission New York District Office Staff Attorney & Puerto Rico Liaison (Aug. 9, 2001)
(explaining that the EEOC only investigates cases regarding civil rights violations by the
local government and claims of retaliation except for sexual harassment retaliation).
349 See Press Release, Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC to Open Area Of-
fice in Puerto Rico (July 18, 2001), at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/7-18-Ol.html (last visited
Feb. 8, 2002).
350 1 P.R. LAws ANN. § 151 (1999) (codifying as amended 1965 P.R. Laws 102).
351 Id. § 155 (1999).
352 COMISI6N DE DERECHOS CIVILES DE PUERTO RICO, ESoMos RAcisrAs? COMo
PODEMOS COMBATIR EL RACISMO 39-45 (2d rev. ed., 1998).
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harms without retaining an attorney and litigating in court.35 3 Conse-
quently, while Puerto Rico parallels other Latin American regions in
its scarcity of race discrimination complaints, an explanation cannot
be sought in the absence of an administrative structure, as might be
the case in other Latin American contexts. Nor can the dearth of
cases be explained as evidence of Puerto Rico's lack of racism, as nu-
merous investigations indicate otherwise.3 54 For instance, the Puerto
Rico Civil Rights Commission issued a report in 1998 that indicated
that race harassment in the employment sector is routine.3 55
At the same time, the Commission notes great confusion amongst
the Puerto Rican populace as to what behavior violates the antidis-
crimination laws.356 A comparison to claims of political discrimina-
tion and sex discrimination, each of which vastly outnumbers race
discrimination claims, validates the Commission's conclusion.3 57 In-
deed, a recent book about race discrimination in Puerto Rico, au-
thored by a prominent Black attorney on the island, primarily
describes criminal cases he has litigated in which the issue of race was
relevant rather than the use of civil rights laws to combat race discrim-
ination.358 In one example involving the defense of a client facing a
murder charge, the attorney found the client's ongoing experience of
unsanctioned workplace racial harassment and humiliation at the
hands of the decedent to be the most salient aspect of the criminal
defense.3
59
In short, Puerto Rico's Latin American race ideology complicates
the use of civil rights laws.360 Victims of race discrimination-along
with the rest of Puerto Rican society-view race as a taboo subject 361
and assertions of racial identity as divisive to the Puerto Rican commu-
353 Id. at 39-41 (explaining the ways in which a victim of discrimination can file a
complaint with the Puerto Rico Department of Labor's Anti-Discrimination Unit or the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as an alternative to the expense of litigating
a discrimination case in court).
354 See infra notes 375-93 and accompanying text.
355 See COMISI6N DE DERECHOS CIVILES DE PUERTO Rico, supra note 352, at 41-45.
356 Id. at 41.
357 See Telephone Interview with Ren6 Pinto-Lugo, supra note 347.
358 See RIvERA ORTIZ, supra note 65, at 45-47, 123, 135 (describing criminal law cases in
Puerto Rico in which racial bias was a salient issue).
359 Id. at 45-46.
360 See KINSBRUNER, supra note 35, at 5 (lamenting the propensity of Puerto Ricans to
disregard the salience of race and thus discourage people of African ancestry from embrac-
ing the fight for equal access).
361 Rene Pinto Lugo, Mensaje Introductorio [Introductory Message] to MARYA MufNoz
VAZQUEZ & IDSA E. ALEGRfA ORTEGA, DiscIuMEN POR RAZ6N DE RAZA EN LOS SISTEMAS DE
SEGURIDAD YJuSTICIA EN PUERTO Rico, at iii (Comisi6n de Derechos Civiles de Puerto Rico
ed., 1999) (observing the tendency of the Puerto Rican populace to treat race as a subject
that should never be discussed).
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nity.3 62 More importantly, victims of discrimination are socially dis-
suaded from conceptualizing their oppression as race discrimination
and from identifying with a denigrated social class; filing a claim of
race discrimination and publicly identifying oneself as a member of
an unworthy race is thus counterintuitive. 363 Instead, Puerto Ricans
of African descent "employ[] [the] ideologies of mestizaje and blan-
queamiento to gain conditional [social] acceptance, 3 64 all the while de-
nying that racism exists on the island.3 65 Perversely, Puerto Rico's
Latin American race ideology prevents many victims of racism from
identifying with the civil rights movement either in Puerto Rico or in
the United States.3 66 In addition, the inclination to generally speak
out against racism is inhibited by fears of being "accused" of having
African ancestry.
3 67
It is thus no wonder that Puerto Rico Law 80368 employment cases
are more frequently litigated than Law 100 cases, despite the more
generous damages provision of Law 100 and its wider applicability.
Puerto Rico Law 80, enacted in 1976, seventeen years after Law 100, is
popularly known as the "law of unjust discharge."369 Law 80 provides
that any discharge from employment that lacks just cause entitles the
former employee to the remedy of lost wages and a minimum of one
month's salary.370 Because Law 80 encompasses any unjust discharge,
it does not require the victim to assert a racial identity.371
362 See Routte-Gomez, supra note 317, at 56 (remarking on the dearth of popular dis-
cussions about race and race prejudice in Puerto Rico). But see Palmira N. Rios, The Grow-
ing Concern About Racism Among Spanish-Speaking Scholars of the Caribbean, 1978 BLACK
SOCIOLOGIST 13 (discussing the few books that break away from the traditional Caribbean
scholarship that ignores the existence of Blacks and racism in the region).
363 See Torres, supra note 82, at 297 ("The view here is that upward mobility cannot be
achieved if a black identity is maintained because there are negative cultural ascriptions
associated with blackness.").
364 Id.
365 KINSBRUNER, supra note 35, at 6 (citing MELVIN M. TUMIN, SOCIAL CLASS AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN PUERTO Rico 245 (2d ed. 1971)) (observing how the majority of Puerto Ricans
deny the existence of racism).
366 Id. at 5 (describing Puerto Rico's indifferent reception of Martin Luther King Jr.
when he visited the island); see also Mathews, supra note 173, at 311-14 (describing the lack
of demonstrated interest in racial justice movements in Puerto Rico).
367 See Mathews, supra note 173, at 318 (detailing news report of a university professor
who was accused of only caring about racial discrimination because "his family had African
blood"). "[T]here is silence, because any protest might cast doubt on the racial identity of
the individual, his family, or his group." Id. at 319.
368 29 P.R. LAws ANN. § 185a (Supp. 1998) (codifying as amended 1976 P.R Laws 80).
369 Luis Oscar Mel~ndez Dones, Esquemas Probatorios: El Discrimen Intencional al Amparo
de la Ley Ntim. lOO y el Thtulo VII, 34 REVISTAJUR1DICA UNVERSIDAD INTERAMERICA DE PUERTO
Rico 239, 251 (2000) (noting the popular term for Law 80 as "Ley deDespido Injustficadd').
370 29 P.R. LAws ANN. § 185a. A progressive scale based on length of employment
determines how much additional salary a discharged employee should receive. See id.
371 The disadvantage of filing a Law 80 claim is that it precludes the pursuit of any
other statutory basis for compensation. See Teresa Chevres, Statutory Note, The Definition of
Unjust Dismissal in Puerto Rico: Act No. 80 of May 30, 1976, 9 COMp. LAB. L.J. 320, 320 (1988).
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Yet the complexity of Puerto Rico's race ideology is problematic
not only from the perspective of victims' willingness to file complaints,
but also with respect to governmental willingness to take the initiative
in enforcing civil rights laws.3 72 Furthermore, perpetrators of race dis-
crimination also use the ideology to obfuscate their illegal conduct.
For example, the Puerto Rico Commission on Civil Rights reports that
employers who refuse to hire dark-skinned Puerto Ricans of African
ancestry instead purposely hire light-skinned employees of less promi-
nent African ancestry.3 73 Employers do so to deter and escape
charges of race discrimination by establishing a record of hiring per-
sons of African ancestry (even if the employees only nominally ap-
proximate an African phenotype), despite an underlying preference
for Whiteness and approximations of Whiteness. 374
Such conduct on the part of Puerto Rican employers thus belies
one possible interpretation of the pattern of civil rights underenforce-
ment as an indicator of a racially harmonious society. The "racial har-
mony" premise is not only a retrograde perspective on Latin American
race relations, but it is also directly undermined by numerous studies
of racial disparity in Puerto Rico. As early as 1969, University of Pu-
erto Rico Professor of Anthropology Eduardo Seda Bonilla surveyed
and documented the particularities of race discrimination in Puerto
Rico, finding "substantial evidence that racial prejudice constitutes a
serious problem in Puerto Rico."3 75 At the same time, Bonilla's re-
search revealed the way in which racial harmony rhetoric leads indi-
viduals to characterize their racial bias as a reflection of what others
think, as opposed to overtly claiming such perspectives. For example,
when asked the question, 'Would you be in favor or against a 'non-
white' family's moving into this neighborhood?," 70.3% of respon-
dents indicated that they would be in favor of such a proposition.3 76
But when asked how they thought their neighbors would respond to
the same question, the number decreased by almost 50%, with only
36.3% of respondents believing their neighbors would be in favor of
the proposition.3 77 Bonilla's survey data is supported by a study on
urbanism that showed the existence of residential racial segregation
372 See Mathews, supra note 173, at 310-11 (describing two instances in which the local
government failed to act upon detailed legislative inquiries into the discriminatory hiring
practices of banks and private and military schools in the 1960s).
373 See COmisI6N DE DERECHOS CMILES DE PUERTO RICO, supra note 352, at 43.
374 See id.
375 See Bonilla, supra note 51, at 33. Bonilla's report was more comprehensive than an
earlier investigation of racial discrimination on the island. See Mathews, supra note 173, at
310-11 (describing a 1963 local legislative inquiry into the racially biased hiring practices
of banks in Puerto Rico).




in Puerto Rico.3 78 At the time of Bonilla's research, the Puerto Rican
Committee on Civil Rights (later renamed the Commission on Civil
Rights) made the following findings: university fraternities, clubs, pri-
vate associations and casinos openly and routinely rejected non-White
candidates;379 racially discriminatory practices existed in the adminis-
tration of private schools; 380 and the employment sector maintained
significant racial disparities by occupation type, creating an almost
complete absence of non-Whites in bank employment and in many
retail stores. 3
81
The race problems researched by Professor Bonilla continue to
be documented today.382 For example, in a 1994 essay, author Car-
men Luz Valcarcel described the contemporary residential segrega-
tion identified by the large concentrations of Black Puerto Ricans in
poor metropolitan areas of the island. 383 The high cement walls that
physically enclose and separate the concentration of poor Black Pu-
erto Ricans also illustrate residential segregation.38 4 In fact, the grow-
ing desire to isolate oneself from interacting with Blacks-who are
presumed to be criminals3 815-has fostered the popularity of gated
communities and otherwise has enclosed already-existing communi-
ties.386 Valcarcel also notes the lack of racial proportionality in gov-
ernment positions 387 and the continued use of race as a criterion for
employment, 388 a phenomenon evidenced by the homogeneity in va-
rious employment sectors such as banking, the media, and even relig-
ious leadership. 389
In addition, current immigration patterns have only exacerbated
the reliance upon skin color as a proxy for intelligence and good char-
acter. The growing communities of Dominican and Haitian immi-
grants within Puerto Rico have ignited a public discourse that extends
the racist stereotypes (regarding stupidity, uncleanliness, and ugli-
378 Id. at 35 (describing a study by Dr. Caplow of the Center of Social Research).
379 See id. at 36.
380 Id. at 38.
381 Id. at 39.
382 See, e.g., COMISI6N DE DERECHOS CMLES DE PUERTO Rico, supra note 352.
383 See Valcarcel, supra note 195, at 291-92.
384 I& at 292.
385 Cf Santiago-Valles, supra note 50, at 50-51 (analyzing the Puerto Rican racializa-
tion of crime).
386 Cf id. at 51 (describing how residential racial segregation has facilitated intensive
policing of non-white areas).
387 See Valcarcel, supra note 195, at 292.
388 See id. at 286-87.
389 Telephone Interview with Ren6 Pinto-Lugo, supra note 347; see also KINSBRUNER,
supra note 35, at 8 (detailing the limited range of opportunity for Puerto Ricans of color in
politics, banking, business, and education).
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ness) about Black Puerto Ricans to Dominicans and Haitians.390 Yet,
the perpetuation of racist stereotypes through the vehicle of nativism
simultaneously supports the illusion of a racial democracy by making
non-Puerto Ricans the "scapegoats for underlying racial tensions,"
3 91
while preserving the notion that all Puerto Ricans-regardless of
color-have social and economic mobility. Accordingly, Puerto Ri-
cans of African descent are becoming increasingly incensed with the
way in which other Puerto Ricans now presume them to be foreigners
in their own land because of their dark skin or African phenotype and
hair texture.3 92 But the targeting of Dominicans with racial slurs can-
not be understood simply as the unfortunate and universal historical
pattern of demonizing immigrants because light-skinned Dominicans
have been reported to have better prospects for social acceptance in
Puerto Rico than dark-skinned migrants.3 93 In the Puerto Rican social
ordering of individuals by status, appearances of African ancestry re-
main salient and the ideological esteem for race mixture remains con-
ditioned on the preference for Whiteness. Neither fluidity in racial
classification nor extensive race mixture have made Puerto Rico's fan-
tasy of being a racial paradise a reality.
V
THE LATIN AMEmIcAN LESSON FOR THE FuTuRE OF U.S.
CviL RIGHTS
History has shown that the most valuable political asset of the Black commu-
nity has been its ability to assert a collective identity and to name its collective
political reality.
394
The contemporary U.S. racial justice movement may find utility
in the comparative analysis deployed in this Article. Legal analyses
that cross geographic and cultural borders enrich our understanding
of the connections between race, discourse, and the subtle permuta-
tions of racial subordination. 395 The examination of the Latin Ameri-
can context cautions against the complacent acceptance of multiracial
390 See Jorge Duany, Reconstructing Racial Identity: Ethnicity, Color, and Class Among
Dominicans in the United States and Puerto Rico, LATIN AM. PERSP., May 1998, at 147, 166.
391 Id. at 164. A similar dynamic occurs in the Dominican Republic itself, where Hai-
tians are racially stereotyped as "Black" in order to distinguish all Dominicans as non-Black.
See Duany, supra note 319, at 41.
392 See Santiago-Valles, supra note 50, at 51 (describing how darker-skinned Puerto Ri-
cans are mistaken for Dominicans and are sometimes falsely arrested for failing to produce
the appropriate immigration papers).
393 See Duany, supra note 390, at 162-63.
394 KimberlM Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Le-
gitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. Rev. 1331, 1336 (1988).
395 See Tanya Kater Herndndez, Pioneering the Lens of Comparative Race Relations in Law:
A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. as a Model of Scholarly Activism, 20 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. (forthcom-
ing 2002) (concluding that comparative race relations in legal scholarship "offers a tool for
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discourse as a definitive indicator that race hierarchy and privilege are
no longer a problem. With the possible shift to a new multiracial race
ideology in the United States, the racial justice movement will have to
be particularly attentive to unveiling all of the ways in which race hier-
archy and privilege can thrive in a racially diverse population with a
facially fluid approach to race that discourages the formation of racial
identity and race-conscious social policies. 396 Specifically, multiracial
discourse may hinder efforts to eradicate racism by discouraging peo-
ple of color from using the legal system to redress the harms of dis-
crimination and thereby further discouraging government officials
from enforcing existing civil rights laws and legislating more effective
civil rights laws.
3 97
Although any comparative analysis is limited by the unique cir-
cumstances of each context, this discussion of the Latin American
context demonstrates, at the very least, the difficulty of shedding race
as a concept within racially stratified environments. This example also
shows why the strategy of dismantling White supremacy through the
elimination of antiracist race-conscious discourse and politics may be
a dangerous and utopian vision: it is utopian because it overlooks the
normative resilience of racial subordination and it is dangerous be-
cause it simultaneously hampers the ability of the subordinated to ad-
dress the racialized causes of structural disparity and societal bias. In
an era such as this one, in which a retrenchment of civil rights and
affirmative action undercuts the reformation of White privilege in the
United States,3 98 such a vision could be misappropriated by regressive
forces.
demonstrating the continued role of race and racial hierarchy in an increasingly diverse
society").
396 Of course, multiracial discourse will only further complicate the constriction in
antidiscrimination laws experienced since the 1980s. See Crenshaw, supra note 394, at
1376-81 (arguing that antidiscrimination law has largely succeeded in eliminating sym-
bolic manifestations of racial oppression but has allowed the perpetuation of material sub-
ordination of people of color); Ian F. Haney L6pez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct
and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1834-44 (2000) (using institu-
tional racism theory to critique central facets of the Supreme Court's contemporary equal
protection jurisprudence-particularly its exclusive focus on purposeful racism and its in-
creasingly strict equation of purposeful racism with open considerations of race).
397 Scholars such as those in the Critical Legal Studies movement suggest that it is
counterproductive to seek racial equality through the use of legal rights because the legal
system legitimates the very racial inequality it purports to remedy. See, e.g., Alan David
Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review
of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978). But as KimberlM Williams Cren-
shaw persuasively argues, "the limited alternatives available to Blacks make[ ] it clear that
legal reform [is] a viable pragmatic strategy for Blacks confronted with the threat of unbri-
dled racism on one hand and co-optation on the other." Crenshaw, supra note 394, at
1335.
398 See STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 107-36.
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In fact, a regressive misappropriation of idealistic proposals for
the elimination of race-based discourse is a significant concern given
White disquietude over the increasing numbers of non-White persons
populating the United States-a population that in the near future
may come to outnumber Whites.s99 Because alarmist concerns re-
garding changing racial demographics in the United States corre-
spond with the apprehension that systemic White privilege will be
upset by the growing number of non-Whites, Cuba provides a dis-
turbing example of the manner in which White privilege can be sus-
tained in spite of an abolition of race-based analysis and the existence
of a large non-White population. The absence of official references to
race has not diminished the dominance of phenotype and ancestry as
a locus of oppression in Cuba; instead, it has silenced discourse and
politics against that dominance. The same can happen in the United
States-a nation with a growing commitment to color-blindness, a fas-
cination with race mixture, a growing proportion of non-White re-
sidents, and increasing numbers of persons for whom our Jim Crow
history is not especially pressing. All are characteristics that speak to
the salience of the Latin American experience with race under paral-
lel conditions. While the United States has yet to capitulate to those
who would like to completely eliminate the use of racial classifications,
the recent change allowing multiple-race designations on the census
may significantly hamper the enforcement of civil rights. Commenta-
tors have already begun to suggest that the new racial categories may
complicate bloc voting analysis pursuant to the Voting Rights Act.
40 0
The added complexity in antidiscrimination law enforcement
heralded by the new shift in U.S. race ideology is also reflected in
cases involving skin-color discrimination 40 1 and claims of intra-racial
bias. 402 Professor Taunya Lovell Banks notes that skin tone increas-
399 See MAHARIDGE, supra note 183, at 3 (stating that sometime after 2050 the United
States's entire population will shift to a majority of persons of color) (citing U.S. BUR.AU
OF THE CENSUS, POPULATION PROJECTIONS FOR STATES, BY AGE, SEX, RACE AND HISPANIC ORI-
GIN: 1995 TO 2020 (1996));Jayne Chong-Soon Lee, Navigating the Topology of Race, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 747, 776 (1994) (reviewing APmLAm, supra note 142) (delineating how the conserva-
tive element of the United States Supreme Court has inappropriately equated the social
construction of race as precluding the importance of examining the political significance
of race altogether).
400 See Nathaniel Persily, Color by Numbers: Race, Redistricting, and the 2000 Census, 85
MINN. L. REv. 899, 936 (2001) ("a decisive number of multiracial respondents could de-
crease the size of a minority community to the point that it would not form a majority in a
compact single-member district."); Saunders, supra note 130, at 1373 ("The format of the
2000 census data will exacerbate these difficulties with the Gingles analysis.").
401 See Banks, supra note 170, 1724-34; TrinaJones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin
Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487, 1532-55 (2000).
402 See ERc K. YAMAMOTO, INTER-RACIAL JUSTICE: CoNFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN
POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA (1997); cf INSBRUNER, supra note 35, at 11 (describing the




ingly mediates how people of color are racialized in the United
States403 and that the differential racialization creates different levels
of status and power among people of color and within a racial
group.40 4 Yet courts presently are uncomfortable engaging "in the un-
savory business of measuring skin color and determining whether the
skin pigmentation of the parties is sufficiently different to form the
basis of a lawsuit. '40 5 Banks suggests that the confusion of courts re-
garding the colorism aspects of a race discrimination claim will only
increase with the growing number of individuals who identify as multi-
racial, and who may "nevertheless encounter discrimination because
others identify them as black or nonwhite." 40 6
Furthermore, the growing ethnic diversity of U.S. immigrants and
citizens will only add greater complexity to the traditional vision of
race discrimination claims as White versus non-White. Specifically,
given the decreasing numbers of Whites in the United States, many
colorism claims may soon be filed by one ethnic group member
against a distinct ethnic group member. Indeed, Professor Eric Yama-
moto has noted the increasing number of inter-minority race-based
grievances, and the difficulty that the parties encounter in recogniz-
ing the White supremacy aspects of their interaction. 40 7 Multiracial
403 See Banks, supra note 170, at 1708-11, 1723.
404 See id. at 1715; see also Michael Omi, Out of the Melting Pot and into the Fire: Race
Relations Policy, in THE STATE OF AsIAN PACIFIC AMERICA: A PUBLIC POLICY REPORT, POLICY
ISSUES TO THE YEA 2020, at 199, 206-08 (1993) (describing differential racialization along
class lines).
405 Sere v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of 11., 628 F. Supp. 1543, 1546 (N.D. I1. 1986), affd, 852
F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1988).
406 Banks, supra note 170, at 1738; see also id. at 1739 n.150 (observing that in "several
recent Title VII cases before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission .... com-
plaining parties described themselves as of mixed race," and discussing several such cases).
407 YAIAMOTO, supra note 402, at 8, 236-53. Civil rights activist and scholar William
Tamayo suggests that public education is needed to foster greater intraracial racial har-
mony and coalition-building:
Within Asian and Latino immigrant communities, there is a need for edu-
cation on the history of the Civil Rights Movement, the history of African
American oppression, and the historical role of racism in U.S. society. Si-
multaneously, the broader public needs to be educated about the global
migration of the 1990s. Information about the impact of racism on non-
white, non-Black communities must be made more readily available.
Finally, immigrants, especially non-white immigrants, must remember
that they owe their success and opportunities in part to the vision, sacri-
fices, and commitment of the Civil Rights Movement. If immigrants are to
share in these civil rights gains, they must also play a critical role in this
Movement and help address the plight of the African American commu-
nity. They must develop the compassion to understand historical condi-
tions which have shaped the present. Immigrants have a duty to participate
in the Civil Rights Movement and to protect its gains, and those active in
the Movement must encourage immigrants to play a significant role. Fuller
inclusion and survival in our society will remain a dream for these new




discourse further obfuscates the complexity of inter-minority racial
discrimination claims through its superficial celebration of racial flu-
idity and diversity, which only veils the maintenance of race-based
privilege.40° Thus, Professor Paulette Caldwell appropriately cautions
race scholars to distrust demography and the temptation to equate
increased racial diversity with the complete destruction of a Black-
White paradigm of racism.409 She notes that "periods of high immi-
gration are not new in the history of the United States. In the past,
the ideology of whiteness has not decentered the Black-White para-
digm but has actually intensified it."410
Should the United States continue its trajectory towards a Latin
American-style race ideology, the failure of courts to attend to the
nuances of inter-minority racism and properly adjudicate colorism
claims will impede contemporary efforts to eliminate discrimina-
tion.411 Professor Trina Jones's examination of the contemporary
colorism dynamic suggests that courts may soon be confronted with
Tamayo, supra note 39, at 25 (emphasis omitted).
408 The power of multiracial discourse to veil racial hierarchy and privilege is exempli-
fied by the Brazilian context. See Sergio da Silva Martins, Direito e Combate A Discriminacao
Racial no Brasil in TIRANDO A MASCARA: ENSAIoS SOBRE o RACiSMO No BRAsIL, supra note
210, at 411, 416 ("The so called 'Brazilian racial democracy,' symbolized by the Mulatto as
its cornerstone and synonymous with racial mixture and harmonious race relations, has
amongst other uses, the ability to hinder a lucid analysis of the race problem in Brazil and
its consequences for the Afro-Brazilian population.") (translation mine).
409 Caldwell, supra note 109, at 107. She elaborates:
[D]emography can be used deliberately, rather than inadvertently, in
the service of particular reconstructions. The principal ideological effect of
the Black-White paradigm has been to create a hierarchy of races with
Whites and whiteness at the top, Blacks and blackness at the bottom, and
other colors and color groups along a continuum between the two. Eco-
nomic and other social indicators, including salient changes in demogra-
phy, both capture and complicate but do not completely reflect or supplant
the essence of this historic relationship or its ideological underpinnings.
Id.
410 Id. at 106. In fact, the ideology of Whiteness has such force that even in West
African countries such as Ghana, many Black residents are seduced by the appeal of chemi-
cal skin bleachers to lighten their skin color. See N. Jamiyla Chisholm, Fade to Wite: Skin
Bleaching and the Rejection of Blackness, 47 VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 29, 2002, at 49-50 (reporting
that Ghanaians have been trying to lighten their skin since the 1500s when the first
Europeans arrived and have continued doing so in larger waves despite the associated
health risks, such as skin diseases in which the skin falls apart upon suturing, and legisla-
tion outlawing the practice). An interesting parallel that can be drawn between the West
African skin bleaching phenomenon and Latin American blanqueamiento ideology is the
West African belief that skin bleaching is an escape mechanism for feeling more attractive
and appearing financially secure. See id. at 50.
411 See Jones, supra note 401, at 1531. Jones is so concerned about the inability of
courts to properly adjudicate colorism issues that she goes as far as recommending that
colorism claims be viewed as distinct from race discrimination claims. See id. at 1544. The
danger of such a recommendation is that it inadvertently overlooks the ways in which
colorism operates as a manifestation of racism and not something apart from it. In fact, it
is Latin America's insistence that colorism is different and less problematic than racism
that has proved to be an obstacle for racial justice activists.
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defenses to race discrimination charges veiled by racist skin-color pref-
erences.412 This is epitomized by such statements as: "I can't be
prejudiced, I hire other people of color (who happen to be light-
skinned rather than dark-skinned)." 413 This has tragically been the
case in Latin America and particularly Brazil. 414 Closer to home, Pu-
erto Rico serves as an example of how even the most extensive civil
rights structure can remain in disuse if societal forces equate asser-
tions of racial identity and claims of race discrimination as racism
itself.
And yet race continues to be a prominent concept in Puerto
Rico, Latin America, and even in the formally declared race-less Cuba.
After decades of living in a formally race-less Cuba, Afro-Cubans con-
tinue to suffer systemic racism and individualized bias, while White
Cubans benefit socially, politically, and economically from their
Whiteness. 415 The racial hierarchy remains, but now it can be dis-
cussed only in abstracted terms that reduce its effects to isolated or
individuated instances of racial discrimination. Thus, the Cuban disa-
vowal of the concept of race in its nationalistic focus on the "Cuban-
ness" of its residents did not result in the egalitarian eradication of
racism.4 16 Race-less Cuba was also ineffective in preventing racial divi-
siveness amongst its residents: Afro-Cubans and White Cubans still see
themselves as different from one another.417 The only unification
that has resulted from promoting a purportedly race-less nation is the
confirmation of the internalized understanding that it is better to be
White. This experience illustrates how the well-meaning tendency of
some Critical Race theorists to promote the end of racism by advocat-
412 See id. at 1542.
413 In fact, advertising agencies in the United States have begun to deploy multiracial
discourse, which resonates with such defenses against racism. SeeJimdnez RomAn, supra
note 19, at 1 (describing a New York City bus-shelter blue-jeans advertisement in 2000 with
the "grammatically incorrect but nonetheless eloquent" caption, "'I cant be prejudice, Im
Mulatto'"). Roger Sanjek similarly offers a contemporary example of racism with a mul-
ticultural face. When White politician Peter Chema opposed a court's housing desegrega-
tion order issued in 1985, he defended himself against charges of being racist with the
following statements. "My wife is minority [Filipina]. My brother-in-law is a minority [Pe-
ruvian]." Roger Sanjek, Intermarriage and the Future of Races in the United States, in RAcE,
supra note 11, at 103, 122.
414 See Seth Racusen, Race, Nation, and Justice: Punishing Prejudice in a Racial Democ-
racy (Sept. 2001) (presented at the 23rd Congress of the Latin American Studies Associa-
tion meeting) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
415 See CLYrus, supra note 203, at 13; NASCIMENTO, supra note 203.
416 See Marie Arana-Ward, Three Marielitos, Three Manifest Destinies, WAsH. POST, July 9,
1996, at Al ("'There is racism in Cuba, too, though everyone there is trained to deny it.'");
Susan Ferriss, Afro-Cuban Writer Studies Black Emigrs in America, S.F. EXAMINER, May 16,
1997, at A8 (interviewing an Afro-Cuban writer who has found that racism still exists in
Cuba); Mireya Navarro, Black and Cuban-American: Bias in 2 Worlds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,
1997, § 1, at 8 ("'In Cuba, racism dictates who is a leader and who is not.'").
417 See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
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ing the elimination of "the iron cage of racial categories" may be mis-
placed.418 Instead, the multiracial matrix establishes an ideological
terrain in which the reality of racial hierarchy is veiled by symbolic
messages of racial harmony through race mixture and avoidance of
race-consciousness. 41
9
Thus, the comparative analysis of this Article cautions race schol-
ars against uncritical adoptions of "race-less multiracial" ideology as
well. The lack of scientific racial determinacy established in the first
decade of CRT does not undermine the potential utility of race in
legal analysis, given its continued significance in the maintenance of
White privilege. On the contrary, the abandonment of race as a con-
cept of social or legal antisubordination analysis may actually impede
CRT's unfinished project of unveiling the systemic sources and mani-
festations of racial hierarchy.420 CRT arose in part out of a dissatisfac-
tion with the traditional civil rights focus on individual perpetrators of
discriminatory conduct, which left unchallenged the more pervasive
harms of institutionalized racism and White supremacy.421 Given
these origins, it is striking that race-less CRT theorists' interpretation
of discursive references to racial difference as a cause of racial bias
should tend to overlook the systemic and material nature of racial op-
pression, as so vividly depicted in the race-less Cuba example.
Because race-less CRT theorists may overlook the importance of
structural privilege in their zeal to eradicate racism with the abolition
of racial labeling, the Cuba example is instructive: it powerfully sug-
gests that systemic attachment to privilege can successfully thrive with-
out official references to race. Indeed, it is even plausible to postulate
418 Robinson, Critical Reply, supra note 136, at 289
419 The following description of the factors that inhibit Black protest in Brazil, serves
as an excellent synopsis of how multiracial discourse in general can impede racial justice
movements and legal reform:
Among the factors most frequently mentioned in the literature as a source
of containment of black protest are: ... the "whitening" doctrine or ideal
that, together with the social perception of race as a color continuum, frag-
ments racial identity and promotes aspirations for social mobility; the no-
tion of racial democracy itself as an ideological recourse that tends to
disguise racial divisions and inequalities through symbolic forms of integra-
tion ....
Carlos Hasenbalg & Nelson do Valle Silva, Notes on Racial and Political Inequality in Brazil, in
RACIAL PoLTIcs IN CONTEMPoRARY BRAZIL, supra note 15, at 154, 165; see also Wachowski &
Wachowski, supra note 26, at 300 ("The Matrix is everywhere .... It is the world that has
been pulled over your eyes to blind you from the truth," the truth that you are "kept inside
a prison that you cannot smell, taste, or touch. A prison for your mind.").
420 Cf Chong-Soon Lee, supra note 399, at 771 ("[R]econceptualizations of race as
ethnicity may actually hinder our ability to resist entrenched forms of racism.").
421 See CRrricAL RACE THEORY- THE KEY WRITING THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT, supra
note 6, at xiii, xiv (noting CRT is unified by an interest in understanding "how a regime of




that racism is better suited to race-less contexts because it more effec-
tively veils the institutionalized causes of racial disparities.422 For in-
stance, the examination of the Latin American context has shown how
existing racial disparities and hierarchy are explained as the result of
the "bad culture" that racial minorities manifest.428 Racism is not
viewed to be the culprit; rather, a presumably race-less but nonethe-
less racially specific entity of culture is understood as the causal factor
for pervasive institutionalized racial disparities. Similarly, contempo-
rary race apologists in the United States rationalize the persistence of
racially specific poverty and hardship on the basis of culture rather
than genetics 42 4 or institutionalized racism. 425 Yet both contexts es-
sentialize minorities' cultures in such a way as to effectively treat cul-
ture as genetically preordained and thus treat differences as mere
semantic difference rather than a true ideological difference. 426 Fo-
cusing upon racial labeling per se as a harm therefore deflects atten-
tion from the important CRT task of challenging race as a tool and
technology of oppression.
Those CRT theorists who advocate the shift from race-conscious-
ness to "human-ness" misperceive the abolition of racial labeling as a
progressive gain in and of itself.427 Ironically, the call to employ a
CRT analysis that focuses on the universality of being human428 also
presupposes that a race-conscious analytical lens cannot be humanis-
tic. Yet, CRT's historical focus on eradicating racial discrimination
speaks precisely to that concern by recognizing the universal right of
all human beings to be treated with equal dignity and respect. "Race"
consciousness and "human" dignity are not per se incompatible, after
all.
The official Cuban eradication of racial differences and the con-
comitant failure to end racism serve as an admonition against the pos-
422 See Booth, supra note 156, at 172.
423 See supra notes 264-69 and accompanying text.
424 See Crenshaw, supra note 394, at 1379 (describing how old racist stereotypes of
Blacks as "victims of self-imposed ignorance, lack of direction, and poor work attitudes" are
now characterized as culturally based rather than genetically based).
425 In fact, the U.S. legal system is intentionally ill-equipped to administer claims of
institutionalized racism. See Haney L6pez, supra note 396, at 1834 (demonstrating that
courts do not understand that seemingly race-neutral institutional practices also produce
racially discriminatory harms because of how much institutional racism permeates society).
426 See FEAGIN, supra note 13, at 95 ("Another aspect of older racist views that can be
found in new dress is the idea of what one might call "cultural racism"-the view that
blacks have done less well than whites because of their allegedly deficient culture with its
weak work ethic and family values.").
427 Even those commentators who find the race-less CRT proposal to destabilize racial
classifications as inherently attractive doubt its ability to eradicate racism. See, e.g., Alexan-
der Polikoff, Comments on Alex M. Johnson, Jr.'s Destabilizing Race, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1685,
1688 (1995).
428 See, e.g., Stubbs, supra note 136.
[Vol. 87:10931160
MULTIRACIAL MATRIX
sibility of deconstructing away the concept of race in the United
States. Puerto Rico's failure thus far to avail itself of an elaborate sys-
tem of civil rights laws because of a parallel deflection from racial
identity should also serve as a warning for the continental United
States. Puerto Rico's public pride in its race mixture and fluid racial
categories have only hindered racial justice efforts because of their
validation of White supremacy and simultaneous distaste for focusing
on race issues. Although an appreciation of the common humanity
shared by all persons should underlie the articulation of all an-
tisubordination legal theories, a focus upon the commonality of being
human in lieu of race-conscious antiracist analysis does not directly or
adequately address the material persistence of racial subordination.
The Latin American comparison thus demonstrates one way in which
shedding the concept of race can work directly against the CRT mis-
sion of unveiling systemic or structural mechanisms of White
supremacy. As CRT enters its second decade, its continuing develop-
ment can be enriched through its embrace of transnational compara-
tive analyses that seek to unearth the commonalties-as well as the
particularities-of oppression in order to transform subordination in
all social, cultural, and legal contexts.
What, then, is the answer? Now that the United States's race ide-
ology is slowly starting to approximate that of Latin America, it may
very well be that contemporary Latin American movements for racial
equality may illuminate a new path towards racial justice. Unlike the
U.S. Civil Rights Movement, which was aided in its ability to organize
by the presumed fixed nature of race classification and the lack of
inhibition in calling attention to racial disparities as a matter of group-
based bias,429 Latin American racial justice movements organize them-
429 See Crenshaw, supra note 394, at 1384 ("Although 'White Only' signs may have been
crude and debilitating, they at least presented a readily discernible target around which to
organize."); see also Anthony W. Marx, Contested Citizenship: Tlw Dynamics of Racial Identity
and Social Movements, 40 INT'L REV. OF Soc. HisT. supp. 3, at 159, 169 (1995) (describing
how in South Africa "black racial identity was forged in response to official state discrimina-
tion.... Segregation and apartheid forced together its victims, whose direct experiences
informed their common identity as blacks and provoked protest."). This is not to suggest
that Jim Crow segregation made civil rights organizing in the United States automatic or
particularly easy. In fact, concentrated effort was dedicated towards motivating Black sup-
port for the civil rights movement before direct action plans could even be mounted. See
ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 66 (1984) ("The mass
movement ... was not spontaneous; it grew out of the deliberate efforts of organizers
.... "); HARVARD SrroFF, A NEw DEAL FOR BLAcKS 11 (1978) ("The civil rights organiza-
tions of the early twentieth century lacked... the support of most blacks. . . ."); MARK V.
TuSHNTr, MAING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 42 (1994) ("[The NAACP] ... understood that [to
fulfill its job of fighting] segregation[,] [it] required a mobilized African-American com-
munity."); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCA-
TION, 1925-1950, at 149 (1987) (describing how civil rights lawyers and activists had to
confront those members of the Black community who were accomodationists who opposed
active efforts to alter the system of race relations); Martin Luther King, Jr., Eulogy for the
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selves by: (1) deconstructing the ideological notion that racial mixture
is not itself a resolution of racial hierarchy and privilege; and (2) em-
phasizing that assertions of racial identity and the recognition of soci-
etal discrimination are not themselves manifestations of racism.
430
Nascent racial justice movements in Latin America resonate with
the contemporary U.S. context inasmuch as the post-Jim Crow United
States no longer has readily discernible emblems of skin-based privi-
lege and hierarchy around which to collectively organize.431 The legal
successes of the Civil Rights Movement now place racial minorities in
the United States in a situation comparable to that of minorities in
Latin America-struggling against racial hierarchy without formal le-
gal discrimination as a target.432 While Latin American racial justice
movements have come no closer to resolving the problem of lingering
racial discrimination and institutional bias, its activists are at least
aware of the organizational and legal challenges manifested by multi-
racial discourse.433 In contrast, the United States remains enraptured
with the sheen of humanitarianism that multiracial discourse uses to
veil and maintain racial hierarchy. Seeing beyond the attractive veil of
multiracial discourse will be one of many challenges that the contem-
porary U.S. racial justice movement will need to learn how to ad-
dress. 434 Consequently, the Latin American context, despite its
Young Victims of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church Bombing (Sept. 18, 1963), in A CALL
TO CONSCIENCE: THE LANDMARK SPEECHES OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 95, 96
(Clayborne Carson & Kris Shepard eds., 2001) (detailing King's chastisement of "every
Negro... who has passively accepted the evil system of segregation and who has stood on
the sidelines in a mighty struggle for justice").
430 See Elisa Larkin Nascimento, It's in the Blood: Notes on Race Attitudes in Brazil from a
Different Perspective, in BEYOND RACISM: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN BRAZIL, SOUTH AFRICA, AND
THE UNITED STATES 509, 509 (Charles V. Hamilton et al. eds., 2001) (describing how social
movements that focus on an Afro-Brazilian identity are accused of being racist themselves).
431 See Crenshaw, supra note 394, at 1384 ("Now, the targets are obscure and diffuse,
and this difference may create doubt among some Blacks whether there is enough similar-
ity between their life experiences and those of other Blacks to warrant collective political
action.").
432 See Cottrol, supra note 211, at 61-79 (contrasting formal legal discrimination in
post-slavery Latin America with the historical situation of the United States following
emancipation).
433 See, e.g., infra notes 436-38 and accompanying text (discussing Brazilian
movements).
434 Another continuing challenge will be the struggle to inspire collective action across
class lines. Crenshaw describes such action:
By "collectivity," I refer to the recognition of common interests and the
benefits derived by Blacks of all classes in sharing the burdens of social
struggle. The potential for collective struggle is maximized where the griev-
ance is shared by all. It was clear that racial segregation, for example, af-
fected all Blacks. The creation of opportunity for some Blacks-however
small the number may be-can obscure the degree to which Blacks have
common interests that warrant continual collective struggle.
Crenshaw, supra note 394, at 1383 n.197.
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multitude of regional and historical differences, has much to show the
United States.
Brazil is the country in Latin America with probably the most ar-
ticulated racial justice movement today.43 5 Its Black Movement is a
living movement comprised of more than two hundred organizations
throughout the country.4 6 Its activists counter those aspects of multi-
racial discourse that discourage collective identity and action 437 by
"situating themselves within a transnational community outside the
conventional boundaries of the territorial nation, '438 efforts that in
turn contribute to heightened racial consciousness. Indeed, sociolo-
gist Howard Winant notes that "the comparative analysis of race re-
sponds to a growing awareness of race as a global phenomenon whose
435 Brazil's contemporary racial justice movement proceeds from both the country's
long legacy of racial discrimination behind the veil of its racial democracy rhetoric, and its
origins as a large scale slave society. See HERBERT S. KLEIN, AFRICAN SLAVERY IN LATIN
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 67-88, 113-38 (1986) (describing the great importance Brazil
placed upon its slave labor and role as a slave society); Arthur F. Corwin, Afro-Brazilians:
Myths and Realities, in SLAVERY AND RACE RELATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 81, at
385-437 (presenting a race and class analysis of the subordination of Afro-Brazilians that
disrupts Brazil's mythology as a racial democracy); Florestan Fernandes, Beyond Poverty: The
Negro and the Mulatto in Brazil, in SLAVERY AND RACE RELATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note
81, at 277-97 (describing Brazil's tortured history with racism after the abolition of
slavery).
436 See Ant6nio Pitanga, Where Are the Blacks?, in BLACK BRAZIL: CULTURE, IDENTrrY, AND
SOCIAL MOBIUZATION, supra note 77, at 31, 39. "Brazil is changing. Race is becoming
politicized and activists are making some headway." john a. powell, Transformative Action: A
Strategy for Ending Racial Hierachy and Achieving True Democracy, in BEYOND RACISM: RACE AND
INEQUALrrY IN BRAZIL, SouTH AFRaCA, AND THE UNITED STATES, supra note 430, at 371, 389.
The move to re-examine racial equality was also spurred on by the election of President
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who made racial equality a governmental priority. See Cot-
trol, supra note 211, at 76 (observing that by the 1990s, the Brazilian Congress was begin-
ning to propose and debate racially based affirmative action legislation and attempted to
strengthen existing antidiscrimination legislation). The Afro-Brazilian organization with
perhaps the most international prominence is Geledds-the Institute for Black Women
located in Sao Paulo. Geled~s is a nongovernmental organization that provides legal assis-
tance, human rights education, vocational training, and leadership development programs
for people to combat racism and gender inequality. Geled~s embodies the global ap-
proach to law reform and social justice inasmuch as it complements community-based or-
ganizing with transnational collaborations and networks. See Carneiro, supra note 210, at
312-22 (describing the work of Geled6s and its formation of a network of legal assistance
units for race-related cases).
437 See Michael Hanchard, Introduction to RACIAL PoLrnCs IN CONTEMPORARY BRAZIL,
supra note 15, at 7 (noting that one recurrent theme in Afro-Brazilian politics is the prob-
lem of generating a political movement based on sharing a common racial identity because
there is no such thing in Brazilian society as a whole). "The continuing reproduction and
dissemination of stereotypes denigrating blacks and valorizing whites which results in low,
distorted self-images and an aversion to collective action among the former." Howard Wi-
nant, Racial Democracy and Racial Identity: Comparing the United States and Brazi4 in RACIAL
PoLrncs IN CONTEMPORARY BRAZIL, supra note 15, at 101 (quoting MICHAEL GEORGE
HANCHARD, ORPHEUS AND POwER: THE MOVIMENTO NEGRO OF RIO DE JANEIRO AND SAO
PAULO, BRAZIL, 1945-1988, at 103 (1994)).
438 See Hanchard, supra note 437, at 15.
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importance, far from diminishing in the postindustrial, post-cold war,
postmarxist, and incipient postapartheid world, is in fact increas-
ing."439 In fact, Afro-Brazilian activism with other Afro-Latin organiza-
tions leading up to the 2001 United Nations World Conference
Against Racism held in Durban, South Africa, is part of what recently
caused a number of Brazilian officials to institute racial quotas in gov-
ernment hiring.440 By operating both within the international sphere
as well as domestically, Afro-Brazilian racial justice organizations have
another mechanism for revealing to Afro-Brazilians the global com-
monalities of racial hierarchy and its existence within Brazil itself
alongside its multiracial discourse. Furthermore, working within the
international sphere also heightens the pressure on domestic govern-
ments to accommodate some of the demands of marginalized popula-
tions in order to preserve their image abroad. 44 1 The Brazilian
experience suggests that the U.S. focus on globalization should ex-
pand to incorporate transnational collaborations on matters of racial
justice in order to maintain clarity about the nature of racism in the
face of obfuscating changes in race ideology and demography.442
Treating race as a global issue and understanding the failure of race
mixture to solve racism elsewhere will assist U.S. activists in revealing
that race mixture is unlikely to do so in the United States.
Another fundamental aspect of the Brazilian racial justice move-
ment is its critical analysis of multiracial discourse.443 Effective critical
439 Winant, supra note 15, at 100. "In Brazil," Winant observes, "race is becoming
more politicized, so that the color continuum and the techniques available to elites to deny
and diffuse racial difference, and to disrupt and suppress racially based politics, are break-
ing down." Id. at 101.
440 See Miriam Jordan, Quotas for Blacks in Brazil Cause Hubbub, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27,
2001, atA6 (reporting that, in response to pressure from Black activists, the Brazilian Agra-
rian Ministry and Justice Ministry have instituted 20% Black racial quotas, and that
lawmakers in Rio dejaneiro voted to reserve 40% of all slots for minority students in state
universities). Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso has stated that a commis-
sion will be instituted to phase in racial quotas in other spheres of government. Id.
441 Professor Derrick Bell has termed this dynamic "the convergence theory." See Der-
rick A- Bell, Jr., Racial Remediation: An Historical Perspective on Current Conditions, 52 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 5, 6-13 (1976) (discussing abolition, the .Civil War Amendments, and school
desegregation as examples of this theory in practice in U.S. history).
442 Despite the United States's refusal to send high-level official representatives to the
2001 United Nations World Conference Against Racism because of the conference's later-
abandoned proposal to name Israel as a racist state and because of the conference's discus-
sion of slavery reparations, several U.S.-based nongovernmental organizations and a mid-
level official attended and sought common ground on global racism. See Rachel L. Swarns,
Race Talks Finally Reach Accord on Slavery and Palestinian Plight, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2001, at
Al. Some U.S. race scholars are also beginning to incorporate analyses of racism from a
global perspective. See, e.g., GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM (Adrien Katherine Wing ed.,
2000); HOWARD WINANT, THE WORLD IS A GHETrO: RACE AND DEMOCRACY SINCE WORLD
WAR 11 (2001).
443 See Rosana Heringer, A Agenda Anti-Racista das ONGs Brasileiras Nos Anos 90, in
TIRANDO A MASCARA: ENSAIOS SOBRE 0 RACISMO No BRASIL, supra note 210, at 343, 354
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analysis is achieved by consistently demonstrating the marginal effect
of fluid racial self-identification on the persistence of socioeconomic
racial disparities. For instance, the Brazilian Institute for Social and
Economic Analysis (IBASE), a nongovernmental organization, system-
atically compiles and distributes statistics regarding racial disparities
in the labor market.444 IBASE was also responsible for the public cam-
paign to consciously politicize racial self-classification on the 1991 Bra-
zilian census for the purpose of collecting more detailed racial
statistics. 445 Entitled the "Don't Let Your Color Pass for White-Re-
spond with Good Sense" campaign, it encouraged census respondents
to treat the color categories of Preto (Black), Pardo (Brown), and
Branco (White) as ethnic categories instead of color categories, and to
have all persons of African descent check a darker color category to
better reflect the population of African descent.446 The goal was to
encourage a collective political-racial identity for persons of African
descent regardless of their personal perspectives about their color and
racial appearance. 447 Although the campaign was successful in raising
awareness about the political content of racial identification, persons
of African descent did not overwhelmingly flock to the Black category
on the census.448 These results indicate that it may take quite some
time to persuade census respondents to use the census as a venue for
asserting a personal racial identity informed by phenotype rather than
a racial identity rooted in the political realities of racial subordination.
Despite Brazil's experience, IBASE's census strategy offers a po-
tential mechanism by which mixed-race persons in the United States
can continue to assert a multiracial racial identity in a social context
(describing how Brazilian NGOs focus on deconstructing the national myth of Brazil as
being a "racial democracy").
444 Id. at 347.
445 Id. at 348.
446 See Melissa Nobles, "Responding with Good Sense": The Politics of Race and Cen-
suses in Contemporary Brazil 1 (1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University)
(on file with author).
447 The 1991 Brazilian census campaign stood in marked contrast to the 1990 U.S.
Multiracial Movement census campaign, which had persons of mixed racial ancestry desig-
nated separately as "multiracial" rather than as descended from any particular race or eth-
nic group. See Herndndez, supra note 10, at 98-99.
448 The 1991 census results reflect a slight increase in the number of Brazilians using
the Brown category in comparison to the 1980 census numbers, and a slight decrease in
the numbers using the White category. The Black category maintained roughly the same
numbers. See IBGE Informa 6es Estatfsticas e Geocientificas, Censo Demogrdfico de 1991, at
http://vv.ibge.gov.br/ibge/estatistica/populacao/censodem/default.shtm (last visited
Mar. 13, 2002). Although by quantitative measures the campaign was only negligibly suc-
cessful, the campaign proponents claimed a victory in causing the Brazilian census officials
to publicly state that they would rethink the color categories for future census years in
order to more accurately reflect the number of persons of African ancestry. SeeTelephone
Interview with Melissa Nobles, Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (Nov. 6, 1997).
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while still selecting a racially specific collective identity on the census
to further statistical monitoring of racial disparities. 449 Encouraging
the distinction between social/cultural and political racial identiies
450
may be an effective way to respond to the growing number of mixed-
race persons in the United States who wish to assert a multiracial iden-
tity,45 1 and who state that they will continue to campaign for such a
classification on the decennial census until they are successful.
452
While it is true that the Multiracial Category Movement proponents
have indicated that they will be satisfied with nothing less than an ac-
tual "multiracial" racial category on the census forms, 455 an IBASE-
inspired encouragement of multiple notions of racial identification
may create the flexibility needed to sustain collective political action
in the midst of a postmodern expansion of social racial identities. Be-
cause "[p] olitical race helps us understand who is functionally black,
whether that person identifies with blackness or not. '454 Like the
IBASE census campaign, the U.S. Census Bureau and concerned non-
governmental organizations would have to develop a massive market-
ing plan to convince the public to regard the census racial
classifications as an inquiry solely concerning political-racial identifica-
tion and not a more personal inquiry into social or cultural racial
identities.
449 This proposal resonates with Sanjek's prediction that U.S. residents may one day
come to have one racial identity privately and another publicly. See Sanjek, supra note 413,
at 119-20.
450 An understanding of racial categories as political in nature has informed the work
of a number of scholars. See, e.g., LANi GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY 15
(2002) ("The political race project is an effort to change the framework of the conversa-
tion about race by naming relationships to power within the context of our racial and
political history. This approach reveals race as a political, notjust a social, construction.");
FELIX M. PAMLLA, LATINO ETHNIC CONSCIOUSNEss: THE CASE OF MEXICAN AMERICANS AND
PUERTO RICANS IN CHICAGO 154-63 (1985) (describing "Latinismo" as a collective political
ethnicity Latinos came to identify with despite a plethora of cultural differences amongst
Spanish-speaking communities in the United States in response to structural commonali-
ties of racism, inequality, and discrimination).
451 See, e.g., Ramon G. McLeod, Tiger Woods an Emblem for Census Issue, S.F. CHRON.,
Apr. 24, 1997, at A4.
452 Gotanda, supra note 6, at 257-58 (articulating multiple notions of race, which au-
thor describes as status-race, formal-race, historical-race, and culture-race).
453 See Project Race, Census 2000 Results: Questions and Answers, at http://wv.projec-
trace.com/statefederalcensus/census (Mar. 19, 2001) (articulating Multiracial Category
Movement proponents' dissatisfaction with multiple-race option because of preference for
an actual multiracial classification); see also Charles Michael Byrd, Census 2000 Protest: Check
American Indian!, INTERRACIAL VOICE, at http://ivw.webcom.com/intvoice/protest.html
(Jan. 1, 1998) (advocating that mixed-race persons protest against a multiple-race option
on the census with acts of civil disobedience, such as checking only the White racial classifi-
cation, checking any other racial classification but Black, checking every classification, not
returning the census form, checking Hispanic ethnicity, or checking the American Indian
box).
454 GUINIER & ToRREs, supra note 450, at 300.
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Of course, government bureaucrats might be concerned that en-
couraging a conscious social acceptance of multiple notions of race
will add needless complexity to the data collection process and civil
rights enforcement. But the reality is that this complexity is already
present but ineffectively addressed by a social and legal context that
ignores its manifestations by trying to reconcile distinct views of race
that are highly personal and yet of inherent public importance.455 In
contrast, the IBASE approach openly acknowledges the futility of try-
ing to impose a particular social racial identity upon individuals and
stresses the importance of educating the public about the significance
of the alternative political notion of race and of strategic essentialist
collective identity.4 56 While the concern may continue to exist that
the pursuit of "multiracial" identity is more a pursuit of White-like sta-
tus457 than the affirmation of an inherent racial and cultural identity,
the IBASE approach, by divorcing social race from political race, cre-
ates the opportunity to reveal any White supremacist aspects of a
mixed-race identity discourse. This opportunity is made possible by
the public focus on the political nature of collective identity and those
aspects of public discourse that further racial hierarchy and privilege.
At present, the U.S. system of permitting multiple responses to the
census racial category question obviates any ability to openly decon-
struct racial hierarchy. This is because the U.S. system attempts to
aggregate data about racial status through the vehicle of a modified
social race inquiry about personal identity. By providing census re-
spondents with the space to assert fluid notions of race, the govern-
ment forfeits the opportunity to encourage a public focus on racial
classifications as political in nature.458 With the advent of a shift in
455 Thus, the U.S. federal government's recent decision to permit multiple box-check-
ing in response to the racial category inquiry neither addresses the desire by some for an
actual multiracial category nor adequately aggregates racial data for statistical civil rights
enforcement because of the difficulty of comparing historical single-box-checking re-
sponses to the fractionated racial category responses presently used. See supra note 16 and
accompanying text.
456 "Strategic essentialism" involves the choice a group can consciously make to refer
to itself by a set of characteristics that are oversimplified and static, and that gloss over the
group's own internal diversity, but in turn serve to advance the group's ability to mobilize
its members for some political purpose. See GAYATRI CHAxRAVORTY SPrvAx, Subaltern Studies:
Deconstructing Historiography, in IN OTHER WoRs: EssAYs IN CULTURAL POLITICS 197, 205
(1988) (describing strategic essentialism as "a strategic use of positivist essentialism in a
scrupulously visible political interest" (emphasis in original)); see also Led Volpp,
(Mis)identi5fing Culture: Asian Women and the "CulturalDefense", 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 95
(1994) (proposing the use of strategic essentialism in the proffer of cultural information to
explain an individual's state of mind in criminal law cases).
457 See Hern,.ndez, supra note 10, at 115-21 (discussing the value attached to White-
ness in the United States and its manifestation in the Multiracial Category Movement).
458 Yet, the government does understand the political content of racial categories, as
demonstrated by the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) guidelines issued to as-
sist census data users when examining the racial data. Because the multiple-box-checking
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race ideology, the impoverished U.S. characterization of the import of
its race inquiry will only diminish efforts to unmask the reality of racial
hierarchy.
At first blush it may appear incongruent that a Latin American
context completely immersed in the labyrinth of multiracial discourse,
like Brazil, seems in a better position to deconstruct its racist ideology.
For instance, some commentators have been doubtful about the abil-
ity to legislate affirmative action programs in Brazil because of the
Latin American deflection from race and associations with Blackness,
in addition to the prevalence of racial mixing.45 9 But not only have
Afro-Brazilian activists been successful at instituting affirmative action
programs, they have also succeeded in requiring the programs' bene-
ficiaries to identify themselves as Black. 460 Afro-Brazilian activists are
generally confident that those who socially identify as Pardo or Mu-
latto, for example, will understand that the programmatic limitation
to Blacks is an umbrella category that includes them in much the
same way that racism against those of African descent includes them
as well. 46 1 In other words, even though social racial classifications in
Brazil are characterized as fluid, racism is manifested in more precise
option on the 2000 census creates sixty-three possible combinations of racial categories, it
is impossible to directly compare the census 2000 racial data to any other racial data from
previous years for the purpose of investigating the extent of socioeconomic stratification
across the years. In order to facilitate the use of the census racial data for civil rights
monitoring and enforcement, the OMB issued guidelines that detail how multiple-race
responses can be reallocated to single responses. The re-allocation guidelines incorporate
a political approach to race. Specifically, the provisional guidelines recommend that re-
sponses that combine one minority race and the White race should be allocated to the
minority race. There are two methods for allocating responses that include two or more
minority races. For civil rights enforcement action in response to a complaint, the multi-
ple race response is allocated to the race upon which the complainant alleges the discrimi-
nation was based. For civil rights enforcement action involving disparate impact analysis,
alternative allocations to each of the minority groups is recommended. See OFFICE OF
MGMT. AND BUDGET, TABULATION WORKING GROUP, INTERAGENCY COMM. FOR THE REVIEW OF
STANDARDS FOR DATA ON RACE AND ETHNICITY, PROVISIONAL GUIDANCE ON THE IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF THE 1997 STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL DATA ON RACE AND ETHNICITY 60-62 (Dec. 15,
2000). Objections to the OMB guidelines have already been expressed as contradicting
the goal of fluidity of the multiple-race response option. See Persily, supra note 400, at 933
("Critics of the OMB guidelines have described them as a modem version of the 'One
Drop Rule'-the Jim Crow-era law where one drop of black blood, or one iota of black
ancestry, made someone black."). Such objections will certainly continue to arise as long
as the government publicly encourages a fluid and individuated approach to racial classifi-
cation while simultaneously permitting a reallocation of those responses for civil rights
enforcement with no further explanation about the political nature of race.
459 See, e.g., George M. Frederickson, Race and Racism in Historical Perspective: Comparing
the United States, South Africa, and Brazi4 in BEYOND RACISM: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN BRAZIL,
SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE UNITED STATES, supra note 430, at 1, 13-14.
460 SeeJordan, supra note 440.
461 See da Silva Martins, supra note 408, at 424 (remarking that perpetrators of racism
in Brazil identify their victims racially in the binary terms of Black and White); see also
Heringer, supra note 443, at 354 (observing that even though Brazilians use a different
racial classification system from that of the United States, all Brazilians nonetheless recog-
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ways that divide the world between White and non-White.462 By view-
ing the affirmative action "Black" qualifier as a political category
rather than a social one, the Brazilian programs naturally tie political
racial identity to the materiality of racism and racial hierarchy. In
short, social identities may be fluid but political identities rooted in
the reality of racism are more binary in nature along a White/non-
White spectrum.
Remaining cognizant of the White/non-White binary nature of
racism should also be helpfuil in the U.S. judiciary's confrontation
with colorism cases. Rather than becoming enmeshed in the intrica-
cies of skin-color differentiation, civil rights activists should instead en-
courage judges to focus on the ways in which racial status and
hierarchy are asserted and who is harmed as a consequence. As one
Brazilian scholar has noted, "[C]olor (along with some facial charac-
teristics) is for us a synthesis and the most visible expression of an
individual's racial origin."463 In other words, color distinctions are as
much about race and racism as are biologically based notions of race
and racial distinctions-an aspect of multiracial discourse to which
the legal system must become attentive.
CONCLUSION
The racial justice movement in the United States today must take
note of the new race ideology slowly permeating our society and for-
mulate legal strategies that will critically reveal its subordinating ten-
dencies. 464 Focusing on racism as a global issue that treats race as a
collective political identity formation will assist racial justice activists to
recognize and address the civil rights dangers of a multiracial matrix.
This Article is an attempt to "broadcast [a] pirate signal and hack into
the Matrix"465 of a new race ideology that is developing in the United
States in order to unmask the racially subordinating power veiled by
its humanistic cast.
4 66
nize the remarks by famous Brazilian poet Gaetano Veloso: "we all know how Blacks are
treated" (translation mine)).
462 Caetana Maria Damasceno, "Em Casa De Enforcado Nao Se Fala Em Corda: Notas Sobre
a ConstrufCdo Social da 'Boa" Aparncia No Brasi in TIRANDO A MASCARA: ENSAIOS SOBRE 0
RACismo No BRASIL, supra note 210, at 165, 175.
463 Heringer, supra note 443, at 354 (translation mine).
464 See FEAGIN, supra note 13, at 244 ("As the 1960s civil rights movement demon-
strated, successful antioppression movements require a shattering of negative racial images
in the minds of the oppressed themselves. How to increase this self-consciousness remains
an ongoing task for antiracist struggles.").
465 Wachowski & Wachowski, supra note 26, at 308.
466 See id at 314 ("[A]s long as the Matrix exists, the human race will never be free.").
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APPENDIX A
EEOC RACE CHARGE STATISTICS 1992-2000
State
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
AK 13 12 17 25 17 17 16 29 22 168
AL 1,545 1,837 1,744 1,576 1,693 1,920 1,867 1,835 1,577 15,594
AR 730 713 790 952 630 740 691 683 634 6,563
AZ 389 369 431 502 465 560 557 471 568 4,312
CA 1,998 1,793 1,740 1,648 1,564 1,741 1,605 1,983 1,721 15,793
CO 485 512 479 419 499 353 284 284 402 3,717
CT 29 31 23 33 36 25 37 34 30 278
DC 375 369 350 245 222 305 227 179 253 2,525
DE 70 71 78 74 39 29 47 61 49 518
FL 1,399 1,690 1,706 1,566 1,606 1,791 1,851 1,662 1,602 14,873
GA 2,047 2,461 2,511 2,196 2,074 2,265 2,317 2,316 2,429 20,616
HI 53 44 51 58 50 75 67 60 68 526
IA 13 20 12 19 22 15 12 12 21 146
ID 6 3 2 7 5 3 2 10 6 44
IL 1,476 1,604 1,533 1,671 1,523 1,701 1,671 1,848 2,187 15,214
IN 471 652 734 749 832 1,020 937 1,103 928 7,426
KS 206 246 227 243 197 180 255 170 236 1,960
KY 371 441 379 371 393 382 428 389 417 3,571
LA 1,147 1,078 1,126 969 559 743 989 1,037 1,282 8,930
MA 86 78 65 38 39 51 47 43 85 532
MD 922 1,025 827 805 512 607 512 611 503 6,324
ME 2 5 0 1 1 3 1 3 2 18
MI 838 1,123 1,182 967 671 817 816 647 632 7,693
MN 181 260 287 343 416 436 313 358 284 2,878
MO 1,013 1,129 964 1,024 766 844 800 793 778 8,111
MS 841 871 664 735 947 1,095 1,061 991 841 8,046
MT 0 1 2 3 5 1 6 1 1 20
NC 1,856 1,656 1,703 1,308 1,198 1,414 1,465 1,246 1,438 13,284
ND 4 5 9 1 0 4 5 1 0 29
NE 36 26 13 13 21 11 12 16 8 156
NH 0 1 0 2 3 5 3 2 3 19
NJ 419 460 403 471 388 425 469 390 484 3,909
NM 227 210 281 318 222 213 196 186 253 2,106
NV 33 20 20 44 28 36 29 37 50 297
NY 923 1,090 920 966 1,008 868 1,054 1,075 1,041 8,945
OH 1,019 1,168 1,117 840 788 849 971 978 956 8,686
OK 418 471 554 435 379 464 422 433 410 3,986
OR 53 53 54 54 40 40 36 32 55 417
PA 963 945 1,001 912 719 694 658 595 687 7,174
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PR 1 5 2 2 0 2 0 1 1 14
RI 2 1 0 3 1 3 2 3 1 16
SC 223 243 231 303 245 302 401 366 453 2,767
SD 3 12 13 3 9 3 5 4 3 55
TN 1,393 1,012 1,227 1,686 1,198 1,181 1,102 1,158 1,195 11,152
TX 3,071 3,476 3,524 3,229 2,951 3,486 3,109 3,424 2,854 29,124
UT 5 2 7 4 5 6 20 14 25 88
VA 1,179 1,134 1,161 1,008 798 807 767 761 851 8,466
VT 3 5 2 3 2 2 1 1 3 22
WA 369 373 385 384 280 302 390 308 425 3,216
WI 361 427 390 419 386 466 396 277 272 3,394
NWV 52 44 38 32 22 30 20 17 20 275
WY" 8 7 2 1 1 1 4 1 4 29
Year
Total 29,327 31,284 30,981 29,680 26,475 29,333 28,953 28,939 29,050
Source: U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N NAT'L DATABASE, AuTomATIc REPORTING
FACILTY LISTING OF RAcE-BASED CHARGES F=D IN THE UNITED STATES AND PUERTO Rico (charts
on file with author)
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EEOC RACE CHARGES COMPARED TO CENSUS
POPULATION STATISTICS
Race Population Total %
1999 Charges 07/98-07/99 Minority Minority
AK 29 619,500 178,254 29%
AL 1,835 4,369,862 1,227,109 28%
AR 683 2,551,373 497,305 19%
AZ 471 4,778,332 1,623,463 34%
CA 1,983 33,145,121 17,298,573 52%
CO 284 4,056,133 917,346 23%
CT 34 3,282,031 680,366 21%
DC 179 519,000 375,015 72%
DE 61 753,538 195,502 26%
FL 1,662 15,111,244 5,009,551 33%
GA 2,316 7,788,240 2,654,746 34%
HI 60 1,185,497 889,464 75%
IA 12 2,869,413 165,390 6%
ID 10 1,251,700 131,675 11%
IL 1,848 12,128,370 3,574,359 29%
IN 1,103 5,942,901 725,676 12%
KS 170 2,654,052 376,976 14%
KY 389 3,960,825 357,256 9%
LA 1,037 4,372,035 1,608,750 37%
IA 43 6,175,169 1,044,574 17%
MiD 611 5,171,634 1,878,728 36%
ME 3 1,253,040 30,672 2%
NIl 647 9,863,775 1,917,234 19%
MN 358 4,775,508 430,297 9%
MO 793 5,468,338 790,808 14%
NIS 991 2,768,619 1,064,074 38%
NiT 1 882,779 81,936 9%
NC 1,246 7,650,789 2,066,816 27%
ND 1 633,666 47,181 7%
NE 16 1,666,028 182,855 11%
NH 2 1,201,134 46,167 4%
NJ 390 8,143,412 2,716,767 33%
NM 186 1,739,844 946,570 54%
NV 37 1,809,253 565,474 31%
NY 1,075 18,196,601 6,984,526 38%
OH 978 11,256,654 1,645,003 15%
OK 433 3,358,044 706,652 21%
OR 32 3,316,154 430,530 13%
PA 595 11,994,016 1,717,336 14%
PR 1 3,889,507 0 0%
RI 3 990,819 147,362 15%
Race Population Total %
2000 Charges 2000 Minority Minority
AK 22 626,932 199,740 32%
AL 1,577 4,447,100 1,294,275 29%
AR 634 2,673,400 540,951 20%
AZ 568 5,130,632 1,287,630 25%
CA 1,721 33,871,648 14,093,371 42%
CO 402 4,301,261 766,184 18%
CT 30 3,405,565 649,244 19%
DC 253 572,059 402,598 70%
DE 49 783,600 203,227 26%
FL 1,602 15,982,378 3,643,695 23%
GA 2,429 8,186,453 2,897,421 35%
HI 68 1,211,537 1,091,727 90%
IA 21 2,926,324 182,931 6%
ID 6 1,293,953 119,990 9%
IL 2,187 12,419,293 3,343,698 27%
IN 928 6,080,485 774,070 13%
KS 236 2,688,418 384,928 14%
Y 417 4,041,769 408,459 10%
LA 1,282 4,468,976 1,626,557 36%
MA 85 6,349,097 1,030,954 16%
MD 503 5,296,486 1,943,681 37%
ME 2 1,274,923 40,555 3%
Nil 632 9,938,444 2,010,354 20%
MN 284 4,919,479 541,369 11%
MO 778 5,595,211 863,201 15%
MS 841 2,844,658 1,105,080 39%
MT 1 902,195 86,773 10%
NC 1,438 8,049,313 2,276,027 28%
ND 0 642,200 50,084 8%
NE 8 1,711,263 182,575 11%
NH 3 1,235,786 50,994 4%
NJ 484 8,414,350 2,378,802 28%
NM 253 1,819,046 616,538 34%
NV 50 1,998,257 515,140 26%
NY 1,041 18,976,457 6,325,257 33%
OH 956 11,353,140 1,744,007 15%
OK 410 3,450,654 843,146 24%
OR 55 3,421,399 478,538 14%
PA 687 12,281,054 1,837,864 15%
PR 1 3,808,610 780,399 20%
RI 1 1,048,319 167,851 16%
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SC 366 3,885,736 1,256,450 32%
SD 4 733,133 79,290 11%
TN 1,158 5,483,535 1,045,939 19%
TX 3,424 20,044,141 9,190,342 46%
UT 14 2,129,836 254,872 12%
VA 761 6,872,912 1,928,646 28%
VT 1 593,740 14,692 2%
WA 308 5,756,361 1,029,026 18%
WI 277 5,250,446 563,697 11%
WV 17 1,806,928 77,656 4%
WY 1 479,602 48,190 10%
Year
total 28,939 276,580,320 79,417,138
SC 453 4,012,012 1,328,412 33%
SD 3 754,844 86,884 12%
TN 1,195 5,689,283 1,138,971 20%
TX 2,854 20,851,820 6,148,529 29%
UT 25 2,233,169 248,836 11%
VA 851 7,078,515 1,998,922 28%
VT 3 608,827 20,545 3%
WA 425 5,894,121 1,123,240 19%
WI 272 5,363,675 607,632 11%
WV 20 1,808,344 91,800 5%
WY 4 493,782 40,206 8%
Year
total 29,050 285,230,516 72,613,862
Sources-. (1) U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNrTY COMM'N NAT'L DATABASE, AturOMATc REPORTING
FACILITY LISTING OF RAcE-BAED CHARGES FILED IN THE UNITED STATES AND PUERTO Rico (charts on file





TABLE OF U.S. RACE-RELATED REPORTED FEDERAL AND
STATE CASES AVAMLBLE IN WESTLAW DATABASE





















































Methodology- The number of race-related cases for each state was obtained onJuly 19, 2001 by
performing a "KeySearch" on http://wwv.westIaw.com for each state and Puerto Rico. The steps
followed for the KeySearch were: (1) selecting "KeySearch"; (2) selecting the topic "Civil Rights";
(3) selecting the subtopic "Race or Nationality Discrimination"; (4) selecting "Search All of Race
or Nationality Discrimination"; (5) selecting "Reported Cases"; (6) choosing the designated state
and its "federal & state cases"; and (7) adding the additional search terms "plaintiff s/s rac! s/s
discrim!". When the same KeySearch was performed for the territory of Puerto Rico, I
discovered that the search only produced federal cases. Accordingly, the Puerto Rico tabulation
was supplemented by a search of cases on http://www.microjuris.com, Puerto Rico's own
electronic legal database.
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APPENDIX E
WESTLAW RACE-RELATED REPORTED CASES FROM JANUARY 1,
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